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CREDIT WHERE IT COUNTS:
THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
AND ITS CRITICS
MICHAEL S. BARR*
Despite the depth and breadth of U.S. credit markets, low- and moderate-income
communities and minority borrowers have not historically enjoyed full access to
credit. The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was enacted in 1977 to help over-
come barriers to credit that these groups faced. Scholars have long leveled
numerous critiques against CRA as unnecessary, ineffectual, costly, and lawless.
Many have argued that CRA should be eliminated. By contrast, I contend that
market failures and discrimination justify governmental intervention and that CRA
is a reasonable policy response to these problems. Using recent empirical evidence,
I demonstrate that over the last decade CRA has enhanced access to credit for low-
income, moderate-income, and minority borrowers at relatively low cost, consistent
with the theory that CRA is helping to overcome market failures. I argue that the
form of CRA's legal directive, more akin to a standard, is preferable to more rules-
based approaches, on grounds of both efficiency and legitimacy. Comparing CRA
to other credit market regulations and subsidies, I argue that CRA is a reasonably
effective response to market failures and should not be abandoned. In sum, con-
trary to previous legal scholarship, I contend that CRA is justified, has resulted in
progress, and should be retained.
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INTRODUCTION
Financial markets in the United States are broad and deep.' Our
capital markets are regarded as highly efficient in spurring business
growth, and for most Americans, access to credit has become readily
available for consumer purchases and home ownership. Our home
mortgage markets are innovative and liquid, attracting investors from
around the globe. Competition in the financial services sector is gen-
erally vibrant, and the removal of many geographic and product
restrictions on banking has given rise to diversified financial services
organizations with nationwide reach.
Yet the very success of our credit markets makes it easy to over-
look those who may have been left behind historically-low- and
moderate-income communities, as well as minority households. 2
Enormous progress has been made in expanding access to home mort-
gage lending for low- and moderate-income and minority households,3
but there is evidence that minority borrowers continue to face dis-
I See generally ROBERT E. LITAN & JONATHAN RAUCH, U.S. DEP'T. OF TREASURY,
AMERICAN FINANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (1997).
2 This Article systematically explores themes I first worked on at the Treasury
Department, and then wrote about in Michael S. Barr, Access to Financial Services in the
21st Century: Five Opportunities for the Bush Administration and the 107th Congress, 16
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 447 (2002) and Michael S. Barr et al., The Com-
munity Reinvestment Act, in BANKING AND SOCIAL COHESION: ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES
TO A GLOBAL MARKET 214 (Christophe Guene & Edward Mayo eds., 2001).
3 In evaluating the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), this Article largely relies on
evidence regarding home mortgage lending because it is an important aspect of financial
security for low- and moderate-income borrowers, has attracted the greatest attention in
the literature, and has different market and regulatory features than other forms of credit.
I take up issues of short-term consumer debt and transactional financial services in Michael
S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121 (2004).
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crimination. 4 In addition, community advocates have long argued that
"redlining"-not lending to borrowers in neighborhoods with high
concentrations of minority households-has, at least historically, lim-
ited the flow of capital for homeownership in minority communities. 5
Moreover, the effects of race and economics are intertwined because
of the high degree of racial segregation in housing and the concentra-
tion of minority households in low-income communities. Economic
theories predict that low-income communities generally would have
lower access to capital than they would in a fully functioning market
because of market failures, in addition to discrimination. For
example, information externalities, which prevent lenders from fully
recapturing the costs of gathering information and developing exper-
tise in lending to low-income borrowers, may have impeded the for-
mation or full development of credit markets in low-income
communities, which generally have had fewer home mortgage transac-
tions than higher-income markets. 6  More recently, "subprime" 7
lenders have provided more capital in low-income areas. Consumer
advocates have argued, however, that the increased flows of credit
have, in some cases, been accompanied by "predatory" or abusive
lending practices targeted at minorities, the elderly, and other seg-
ments of the population.
Congress has enacted a wide range of federal laws and subsidy
programs that affect the provision of credit.8 This Article focuses on
perhaps the most controversial of these laws: the Community
Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA). 9 Passed in response to concerns
4 See infra Part III.B.
5 The federal government's housing insurance program and private market partici-
pants in some cases literally drew red lines on maps around areas that were to be avoided,
and more widespread racial discrimination in housing has been well documented. See
NAT'L COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, H.R. Doc. No.
91-34, at 101 (1969); Amy E. Hillier, Spatial Analysis of Historical Redlining: A
Methodological Exploration, 14 J. HOUSING RES. 137, 142-44 (citing examples of historical
redlining).
6 See infra Part III.C.
7 The label "subprime" refers to the status of borrowers who pay higher interest rates,
at least in part, because they are thought to have credit histories below the quality of prime
borrowers. Subprime lenders are lenders who specialize in lending to such borrowers. For
a more thorough discussion, see infra Part III.
8 See generally, e.g., Michael S. Barr, Modes of Credit Market Regulation, in BUILDING
ASSETS, BUILDING CREDIT: CREATING WEALTH IN Low-INCOME COMMUNITIES (Nicolas
Retsinas & Eric Belsky eds., forthcoming 2005) (providing introduction to five types of
credit market regulation and subsidy programs); Lawrence J. White, Focusing on Fannie
and Freddie: The Dilemmas of Reforming Housing Finance, 23 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 43
(2003) (discussing role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in housing policy).
9 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (2000) (Community Reinvestment Chapter); see also id.
§ 1831u(b)(3) (CRA requirement for interstate mergers); id. § 1831y (CRA Sunshine
Requirements); id. § 1843(l)(l)-(2) (CRA requirement on insured depositories must be
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about redlining of minority and low-income areas, 10 and market fail-
ures in low-income communities," CRA encourages federally insured
banks and thrifts to meet the credit needs of the entire communities
that they serve, including low- and moderate-income areas, consistent
with safe and sound banking practices.1 2 Federal banking agencies
periodically examine and rate banks and thrifts on their CRA per-
formance. Banks have an incentive to seek high ratings because regu-
lators consider a bank's or thrift's CRA record in determining
whether to approve that institution's application for a "deposit
facility," which includes mergers with or acquisitions of other deposi-
tory institutions. CRA also plays a role in the approval process for
more mundane events, such as the opening or closing of a bank
branch. 13 Such applications also provide the public with an opportu-
nity to comment, including by commenting on the CRA performance
of the institution. 14
CRA has been since its enactment, and remains today,' 5 the sub-
ject of extensive debate. The contentiousness of the policy is reflected
in the uncharacteristic drama that accompanies proposed policy
changes. For example, in July 2004, two of the four federal banking
regulators pulled out of a joint CRA rulemaking process: The Office
of Thrift Supervision (OTS) made a unilateral announcement that the
agency was going to curtail CRA examinations for nearly ninety per-
cent of institutions that it regulates, those holding less than $1 billion
in assets, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) pro-
posed a similar rule. 16 The Federal Reserve Board and the Office of
met for financial holding companies or financial subsidiaries to engage in expanded finan-
cial activities).
10 See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 17,604 (1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire) ("[CRA] is
intended to eliminate the practice of redlining by lending institutions."). In its structure,
CRA focuses on market failures rather than on discrimination per se, but as I discuss infra
Parts III.A & III.B, market failures and discrimination are intertwined.
11 For the theories underlying CRA, see infra Part III.
12 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (2000).
13 See 12 U.S.C. § 2902(3) (2000); see also infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
14 12 C.F.R. § 25.29(c) (2004).
15 See, e.g., Michele Heller, Reg Relief.? Senator Puts Everything on the Table, AM.
BANKER, June 10, 2004, at 1 (noting that CRA is high on Senate Banking Committee list
for regulatory relief).
16 Michele Heller, FDIC Seen Siding with OTS on CRA, AM. BANKER, July 20, 2004, at
1. See also David W. Chen, U.S. Set to Alter Rules for Banks Lending to Poor, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 20, 2004, at Al (describing effects of proposals to raise small bank threshold and
arguments about importance of CRA); Editorial, Endangering Community Development,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2004, at A14 (arguing that regulators should reject proposal to raise
threshold for small banks). The Office of Thrift Supervision finalized the rule on August
18, 2004. See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 51,155 (Aug. 18,
2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 563.12(t)). The FDIC proposed a similar rule, Community
Reinvestment, 69 Fed. Reg. 51,611 (Aug. 20, 2004).
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the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) balked at this move. 17 OTS
then proposed to let any savings and loan institution, regardless of
size, opt out of the investment and service tests under CRA.a8 Then,
the Board, the OCC, and the FDIC agreed to raise the small bank
threshold to $1 billion but to add a new "community development
test" for institutions with between $250 million and $1 billion in
assets. 19 At bottom, debate over these kinds of changes revolves
around competing views of the underlying purposes of CRA, the need
for government intervention in credit markets, and the costs and ben-
efits of such policies.20
Legal scholars vigorously question the theoretical and empirical
claims that motivated the enactment of CRA, and many of them
advocate eliminating the policy. 21 A large body of literature suggests
17 Heller, supra note 16.
18 Community Reinvestment Act-Community Development, Assigned Ratings, 69
Fed. Reg. 68,257, 68,262 (proposed Nov. 24, 2004).
19 See Joint Press Release, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation & Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Banking Agencies Propose Revisions to Community
Reinvestment Act Regulations (Feb. 22, 2005), at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/
2005/pr1305.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2005); Press Release, Federal Reserve Board,
Request for Comments on Proposed Revisions to Regulations Implementing the Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act, Regulation BB (Feb. 25, 2005) at http://www.federalreserve.govl
boarddocs/press/bcreg/2005/20050225/default.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2005).
20 See, e.g., Robert E. Rubin & Michael Rubinger, Don't Let Banks Turn Their Backs
on the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2004, at A19 (arguing that CRA has been successfully
helping communities and that OTS and FDIC plans would place these gains at risk).
21 See generally Charles W. Calomiris et al., Housing-Finance Intervention and Private
Incentives: Helping Minorities and the Poor, 26 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 634 (1994)
(arguing there is lack of evidence of bigotry in mortgage market); Jeffery W. Gunther,
Should CRA Stand for "Community Redundancy Act"?, REG., vol. 23, iss. 3, at 56 (2000)
(arguing CRA is costly and not necessary to ensure access to credit to minorities), available
at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv23n3/gunther.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2005);
Keith N. Hylton, Banks and Inner Cities: Market and Regulatory Obstacles to Development
Lending, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 197 (2000) (maintaining that existing regulatory framework
is partially responsonsible for credit market's failure to serve minorities); Michael
Klausner, Market Failure and Community Investment: A Market-Oriented Alternative to the
Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1561 (1995) (finding CRA to be an
inefficient solution to lending discrimination); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
The Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291 (1993)
(concluding that the CRA does more harm than good); Peter P. Swire, Equality of Oppor-
tunity and Investment in Creditworthiness, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1533 (1995) (using regression
analysis to argue creditworthiness, not redlining, is responsible for minorities being under-
served by credit markets); Peter P. Swire, Safe Harbors and a Proposal to Improve the
Community Reinvestment Act, 79 VA. L. REv. 349 (1993) [hereinafter Swire, Safe Harbors]
(responding to Macey and Miller and offering safe harbor proposal for protection from
CRA enforcement); Lawrence J. White, The Community Reinvestment Act: Good Inten-
tions Headed in the Wrong Direction, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281 (1993) (faulting CRA as
either redundant or dependent on cross-subsidy); Craig E. Marcus, Note, Beyond the
Boundaries of the Community Reinvestment Act and the Fair Lending Laws: Developing a
Market-Based Framework for Generating Low- and Moderate-Income Lending, 96 COLUM.
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that competition in credit markets has driven (or will drive) out dis-
criminatory22 or abusive practices and that the market failures are illu-
sory.23 Critics of CRA argue that it addresses a nonexistent problem.
Moreover, they argue that problems in credit markets are insufficient
to justify intervention and that, even if intervention is warranted,
CRA is the wrong policy to pursue. Earlier legal scholarship sug-
gested that CRA was having little, if any, positive effect, and at a high
cost. For example, in their seminal article a decade ago, Jonathan
Macey and Geoffrey Miller attempted to demonstrate the weak foun-
dations and high cost of CRA in the wake of the 1989 reforms to
CRA, charging that CRA is theoretically unjustified, undermines the
safety and soundness of the banking system and empowers community
group rent-seeking at the expense of bank profitability.24
Critics lodge five main arguments against CRA: First, they argue
that the CRA is unwarranted in theory because market failures and
discrimination are not significant problems in credit markets and
CRA is ill-equipped to address them if they are. Second, CRA pro-
vides little benefit to low-income communities and is costly because it
forces banks to make unprofitable, risky loans and compliance costs
are high. Third, CRA's use of a legal standard rather than a rule is
lawless, and contributes to its higher costs. Fourth, the scope of CRA
harms banks and thrifts as well as the low-income communities it is
intended to serve. Lastly, other alternatives are better able to over-
come market failures and discrimination, and to help low-income and
minority households.
This Article systematically analyzes these prior criticisms of CRA
and lays a solid theoretical and empirical foundation for the Act. The
Article first establishes the theoretical and empirical case for the per-
sistence of credit market failures and racial discrimination that justify
CRA. I contend that a good deal of earlier legal scholarship on CRA
wrongly discounted these market problems. Of course, at the most
L. REV. 710 (1996) (arguing CRA provides weak incentive to improve low- and moderate-
income lending because it does not combat discrimination or require banks to make partic-
ular kinds of loans in specified areas). For a "community empowerment" critique, see
generally Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance and Community Economic Empowerment:
Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive Racial Justice, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1463 (1994). Criticisms of CRA are discussed in detail in Part II infra.
22 This view usually is derived from Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination,
in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS 3 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973)
and GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).
23 See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Lacker, Neighborhoods and Banking, 81 ECON. Q. 13, 15-24
(1995) (arguing that empirical evidence does not demonstrate conclusively that discrimina-
tion or market failures exist in bank lending to low-income communities).
24 See Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 318-24, 333-37.
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basic level, no market is perfect.2 5 The real question is a relative
one-whether CRA is preferable to other alternatives, including
simply allowing those market failures to persist, or relying on market
forces to overcome them. This Article explores why such market
imperfections might be relatively greater in low-income communities,
as well as more appropriate as targets of government intervention,
given the social benefits of expanded access to capital. 26 The Article
then argues that critics failed to explore fully how CRA could help to
overcome market failures and discrimination. Thus the critics have
missed the ways in which CRA could help in theory, and has helped in
practice, to overcome these problems.
The Article deploys recent empirical analyses that cast doubt on
many of the critics' claims about the costs and benefits of CRA. In
part, earlier critics were wrong in their predictions about the high
costs and low benefits of CRA, based largely on anecdotal evidence,
and rooted in their belief that no meaningful market failures existed.
In part, the 1995 reforms to CRA promulgated by the bank regulators
responded to earlier criticisms in positive ways. Recent evidence
shows that over the last decade CRA appears to have created far
greater benefits than previous legal scholarship had predicted.
Lending to low- and moderate-income and minority households
increased dramatically during the 1990s. Through econometric con-
trols, studies suggest that CRA has had an independent effect on
increased lending to low- and moderate-income and minority commu-
nities. Earlier articles suggested that the costs of CRA were exceed-
ingly high; this Article argues that such costs are relatively low, and
that the 1995 reforms likely contributed to reducing the costs. The
fact that CRA lending has provided real benefits to communities and
has not proven to be unprofitable or overly risky provides indirect
support for market failure and discrimination theories underlying
CRA. That is, if market failures and discrimination were not signifi-
cantly present, either CRA would not matter, or an effective CRA
would wind up forcing banks and thrifts to make costly, risky loans.
The empirical evidence instead is more consistent with the argument
that CRA is theoretically justified.
25 The existence of transaction costs, for example, implies that markets are not perfect.
Cf. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) (arguing it is
unrealistic to assume there are "no costs involved in carrying out market transactions" and
therefore market forces will not necessarily lead to efficient allocations of legal rights).
26 For discussion of circumstances disfavoring government intervention to correct
market failures, see, for example, JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
8-10 (3d ed. 2000).
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In addition, this Article argues that some of the costs incurred
under CRA-for example, those caused by the lack of bright line
rules under the CRA standard-also represent benefits, previously
ignored or dismissed, in the form of increased citizen participation and
local, contextual "rulemaking." In that regard, I contend that the
"rules versus standards" literature has failed to give sufficient atten-
tion to both the "expressive benefits" of legal standards and to their
potential to improve social welfare and enhance the accountability
and legitimacy of the regulatory process when such standards are
structured to encourage involvement in the process of regulatory
interpretation by both citizens and the regulated entities themselves.
Moreover, proponents of rules have focused on the ex post transac-
tion costs involved in standards and have failed to give appropriate
weight to the substantive benefits of flexibility that standards provide.
In particular, standards may be preferable to rules when the conduct
to be regulated varies significantly by the size, market context, organi-
zational structure and business strategy of the regulated entity. These
benefits explain in part why CRA's current approach has significant
advantages over rule-based proposals to set numerical targets or
create safe harbors. In sum, I contend that CRA has a reasonable
foundation, 27 and that it can be defended as socially efficient, in the
sense that the benefits of CRA likely exceed the costs. 28
CRA's opponents are also critical of the geographic and institu-
tional scope of CRA. With respect to geographic scope, they argue
that CRA is overly focused on communities around bank branches
when there is no reason banks should lend near where they take
deposits. With respect to institutional scope, they argue that CRA
unfairly or inefficiently burdens banks and thrifts while leaving other
market participants outside CRA's scope. While there is some force
to these arguments, I argue, on balance, that CRA's geographic scope
is broader and more flexible than critics allege, and that CRA's insti-
tutional focus on banks and thrifts is reasonable, given governmental
subsidies to these institutions and their specialized market roles.
Some critics argue that CRA should be eliminated because other
regulatory steps have been taken, or could be, to overcome market
failures and improve access to capital in low- and moderate-income
27 See infra Parts III-V.
28 1 am making a claim here for Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is
achieved when the benefits of a policy exceed its costs, regardless of whether winners in
fact compensate losers for their costs. See Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of
Economics and Inter-Personal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939); J.R. Hicks,
The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939).
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areas or to minority borrowers.2 9 These other alternatives are often
mentioned in a cursory fashion rather than systematically explored.
On closer examination, by contrast, I argue that CRA seems reason-
ably effective at reducing market failures and discrimination when
compared with other types of credit market regulation, including dis-
closure, fair lending laws, product regulation, and subsidy. I also show
that tax and transfer systems proposed by critics suffer from deficien-
cies that make them problematic as alternatives to CRA. I do not
argue that CRA is preferable to all of these approaches, but rather
that all of the approaches suffer from limitations that make it plau-
sible to think that the tradeoffs involved in deploying CRA to over-
come market failures and discrimination are reasonable ones, and that
eliminating CRA would be ill-advised.
The approach that I will take in the Article to analyzing CRA is
non-utopian. I do not ask, in an ideal world, what would be an ideal
policy. Instead, my approach asks-is CRA a reasonable policy
response to real world problems? Given that we have CRA, should
we keep it, or abandon it, as critics suggest? I answer these questions
by drawing on theory, empirical evidence, and comparative analysis.
My short answer is: CRA is a reasonable policy response to market
failures and discrimination, and we should keep it.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly describes CRA's
history and structure. Part II recounts the scholarly critiques of CRA,
and the remaining parts respond to these arguments. Part III defends
CRA in theory as an appropriate response to market failure and dis-
crimination. Part IV analyzes recent empirical evidence regarding the
costs and benefits of CRA and argues that the empirical case for
CRA's role in overcoming market failures and discrimination is
strong. Part V shows that the structure of CRA, using an approach
more akin to a standard, rather than a rule, contributes to the benefits
CRA confers. I also explain why numerical targets and safe harbors,
which are variants of a rule-based approach, would be inferior to cur-
rent policy. Part VI explores the current scope of CRA. I argue that
critics' arguments about the geographic and institutional scope of
CRA have much less force than commonly asserted. Part VII ana-
lyzes CRA in the context of other alternatives, and contends that the
tradeoffs involved in CRA are plausible ones, and that CRA should
not be eliminated in favor of these other alternatives.
29 See infra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
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I
THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT Acr: HISTORY
AND PURPOSE
The Community Reinvestment Act has a rich cultural, political,
and economic history, but I only wish to sketch enough of the con-
tours here to enable readers to engage with the arguments about the
merits of the Act. CRA was enacted in the 1970s as part of a trio of
laws-together with the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 30 (HMDA)
and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 31 (ECOA)-designed to
address racial discrimination as well as lack of access to credit in low-
and moderate-income communities. In enacting the Community
Reinvestment Act in 1977, Congress found:
(1) regulated financial institutions are required by law to demon-
strate that their deposit facilities serve the convenience and needs of
the communities in which they are chartered to do business;
(2) the convenience and needs of communities include the need for
credit services as well as deposit services; and
(3) regulated financial institutions have [a] continuing and affirma-
tive obligation to help meet the credit needs of the local communi-
ties in which they are chartered. 32
Congress directed the appropriate federal regulatory agency with
supervisory responsibility for each type of insured depository institu-
tion to "(1) assess the institution's record of meeting the credit needs
of its entire community, including low- and moderate-income neigh-
borhoods, consistent with the safe and sound operation of such institu-
tion; and (2) take such record into account in its evaluation of an
application for a deposit facility by such institution. ' 33 To meet the
first directive, the regulatory agencies regularly examine each deposi-
tory institution, write up an evaluation of the institution's perform-
ance, and assign the institution a rating. 34 To meet the second
directive, the agencies evaluate CRA performance in the context of
applications for mergers and acquisitions, deposit insurance, branch
openings, and other matters constituting "application for a deposit
facility."' 35 The structure of CRA expanded on pre-existing require-
ments for the regulators to take into account the "convenience and
30 12 U.S.C. § 2801 (2000).
31 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2000).
32 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a).
33 Id. § 2903(a).
34 See id. § 2906 (describing ratings of "[o]utstanding," "[s]atisfactory," "[n]eeds to
improve," or "[s]ubstantial noncompliance").
35 Id. § 2902.
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needs" of the community in evaluating such applications,36 and the
pre-existing authority for the regulators to hold public hearings to
consider such applications.37
During the first decade or so following CRA's enactment, regula-
tors paid CRA scant attention, and the results of CRA were likely
modest as well. Regulators used a series of twelve factors to evaluate
banks and thrifts,38 and most commentators found that the regulators
and banks had focused on process-oriented evaluations, such as the
time spent at Board meetings discussing community needs, rather
than on results. 39 This began to change at the end of the 1980s. Over
time, particularly during the 1990s, both legal and market develop-
ments strengthened CRA.40 Legislative changes to CRA enacted in
1989 required regulators to publicly disclose the institution's rating
and performance evaluation,41 which harnessed the power of public
relations to CRA's goals. Also in 1989, a bank regulator for the first
time denied an application for merger on CRA grounds.42 The
merger denial demonstrated that there could be serious consequences
for poor CRA performance.
Still, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, community organizations
and banks tended to view CRA as both overly burdensome and
underperforming. In 1993, the banking agencies, at the behest of
President Clinton, began a process to revise the CRA regulations, and
issued proposals in 1993 and 1994.
Final changes to the regulations implementing CRA issued in
199543 focused CRA evaluations on objective performance measures
rather than the more subjective and process-oriented factors that reg-
ulators previously had used and that scholars, banks, and community
organizations often had criticized. These new regulations required
36 Id. § 2901(a)(1); see also id. § 1842(c)(1) (requiring Board to consider whether
merger or acquisition meets "convenience and needs" of community).
37 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 5.11 (2004) (describing OCC hearing procedures for
applications).
38 Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, Joint Final Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156,
22,157 (May 4, 1995).
39 Id. at 22,156-57.
40 See, e.g., ERIC S. BELSKY ET AL., INSIGHTS INTO THE PRACTICE OF COMMUNITY
REINVESTMENT ACT LENDING: A SYNTHESIS OF CRA DISCUSSION GROUPS 4-8 (2000)
(presenting findings from discussions with lenders and community organizations), available
at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/governmentprograms/cra00-1.pdf. I discuss
these legal and market development and CRA's effectiveness in further detail infra Part
IV.
41 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-73, 103 Stat. 183, 527 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b) (2000)).
42 Continental Bank Corporation, 75 FED. RESERVE BULL. 304, 305-06 (1989)
(describing "important deficiencies" in CRA performance and denying application).
43 Community Reinvestment (Regulation BB), 12 C.F.R. § 228.11 (2004).
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banks and thrifts to disclose information about their small-business,
small-farm, and community-development lending. 44 Under the 1995
regulations, large banks, small banks, and wholesale or limited-pur-
pose institutions have tailored examinations that more closely align
CRA examinations with business strategies of different types of
banking institutions. Large banks are evaluated on a three-part test of
their lending, investments, and services, while small banks undergo a
streamlined review of lending.45
For large banks, the lending test, which counts for fifty percent of
the bank's CRA rating, evaluates the bank's performance in home
mortgage, small-business, small-farm, and community-development
lending, and under some circumstances, its consumer lending. The
agency considers the number and amount of loans, the geographic dis-
tribution of loans, including to low- and moderate-income areas, and
the income of borrowers. 46 The agency also considers "innovative or
flexible lending practices."'47 Under the investment test, which counts
for twenty-five percent of the bank's CRA grade, the agency evaluates
the dollar amount of the bank's investments, its innovativeness, its
responsiveness to community needs, and the extent to which the
investment fills gaps that other investors do not "routinely" provide.48
Under the service test, which counts for the remaining twenty-five
percent of the bank's evaluation, the agency analyzes "the availability
and effectiveness of a bank's systems for delivering retail banking ser-
vices and the extent and innovativeness of its community development
services."'49 The agency assesses an institution's record under the tests
in light of the "performance context" in which the institution is oper-
ating, including economic, demographic, credit and other market fac-
tors; the bank's own capacities, constraints, and business plans; and
the bank's "past performance and the performance of similarly situ-
ated lenders."'50
Lending has rightly been the focus of a statute aimed at the
"credit needs" of communities, but investment and services play crit-
ical roles as well in meeting the credit needs of low- and moderate-
income communities and are thus appropriately evaluated under
CRA. Investments help build local financial and community infra-
structure and stabilize and broaden the economic base of low- and
44 12 C.F.R. § 25.42 (2004).
45 See id. §§ 25.21-25.26, 228.21-228.26.
46 Id. § 25.22.
47 Id. § 25.22(b)(5).
48 Id. § 25.23.
49 Id. § 25.24.
50 Id. § 25.21(b).
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moderate-income communities. Investments help expand access to
credit by enhancing the capacity of specialized local lenders such as
Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) to provide
credit. By stabilizing a local community with direct investment, banks
also enable loans to be made in the community in a more safe and
sound manner.
The importance of services to the provision of credit has been less
well understood in the past, but recent research shows that services
also play a critical role in expanding access to credit.51 Access to an
appropriate bank account for most low-income "unbanked" individ-
uals could mean the opportunity for lower transaction costs, greater
consumer protection, more access to loans, and increased savings as a
cushion against financial emergency and as a predicate for
borrowing.52
These legislative and regulatory changes occurred during a time
of increasingly intense consolidation in the banking industry, which
provided greater opportunities for community organizations and regu-
lators to evaluate bank and thrift performance under CRA in the con-
text of merger applications. With the passage of the Gramm-Leach
Bliley "Financial Modernization" Act of 1999,53 some aspects of CRA
were again strengthened. Under the Act, banks and thrifts must have
a satisfactory CRA record if they, or their holding companies, are to
engage in newly authorized financial activities, such as certain insur-
ance and securities functions.54 At the same time, the Act generally
increased the time period between regular CRA examinations for
small banks with satisfactory or outstanding ratings on their last
examination. 55
II
CRITIQUES OF CRA
The Community Reinvestment Act has been widely criticized by
leading scholars.56 This Part summarizes the five key arguments
against CRA.
5 See Barr, supra note 3, at 138 (describing how it is more difficult to establish credit
or qualify for loan without bank account).
52 See id. at 134-41.
53 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
54 12 U.S.C. § 2903(c) (2000); id. § 1843(l)(2).
55 Id. § 2908.
56 See, e.g., supra note 21.
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A. No Market Failures or Discrimination Justifying CRA
One group of critics argues that CRA is not necessary because
there are theoretical reasons to believe that credit markets are effi-
cient and will drive out discriminatory practices, and in their view the
evidence establishing the existence of discrimination in credit markets
is weak.57 Others have focused on market failures, and argued that
these market failures, if they exist, are no worse in low-income areas
than in high-income areas and can be easily overcome by market
forces.58 If there were profits to be had in these communities, markets
would find them without any regulatory intervention, they argue.
Critics also argue that even if market failures and discrimination
exist in low-income communities, CRA is ill-designed to address these
problems. They charge that the CRA is vague, blunt, and contradic-
tory. The Act does not make explicit whether it is targeted at discrim-
ination,59 and fails to explain whether low-income communities or
individuals are to be helped. In the critics' view, CRA may be
designed to address market failures, to combat discrimination, to
achieve redistributive goals, or perhaps to advance an old-fashioned
notion of "local" depositors' funds being lent locally (an ideal now
irrelevant in global credit markets), but these goals are contradictory
and muddled.60 According to this view, there is a poor fit between
antidiscrimination principles and CRA,61 and the structure of CRA
would exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, market failures.62 In sum,
critics argue that CRA is not justified in theory.
B. Little Benefit, High Costs
Critics contend that CRA has provided little benefit at a very
high cost because it is the wrong answer to a nonexistent problem.63
The benefits are insignificant, they argue, because economic growth,
bank deregulation, technological innovation, and competition would
57 See, e.g., Lacker, supra note 23, at 17 (describing as "inconclusive" Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act data on discrimination against minority loan applicants). I discuss the cri-
tique further, and respond to it, in Part III.
58 See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 21, at 60 (raising questions about degree to which
CRA is needed to ensure fair access to credit by all segments of economy).
59 See Calomiris et al., supra note 21, at 637 (indicating that CRA never mentions
minorities explicitly).
60 See Klausner, supra note 21, at 1561-64 (describing ambiguity of CRA goals); Swire,
Safe Harbors, supra note 21, at 360, 366-67 (mentioning difficult tradeoffs between dif-
ferent CRA goals).
61 See Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 295 (indicating that using CRA for "affirma-
tive action" is distortion of original purpose of CRA).
62 See Klausner, supra note 21, at 1565-80.
63 1 respond to this critique in Part IV infra.
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have driven banks to lend in low-income areas even without CRA.64
Loan commitments that make headlines are a public relations boon
but simply represent what the banks would do anyway. 65 Others con-
tend that city renewal policies and community development financial
institutions were responsible for increased lending. 66 Critics contend
that lending not covered by CRA and lending by banks and thrifts
outside their CRA assessment areas spurred the lending increases in
low-income areas, so CRA could not have been responsible for any
increased lending in these communities. 67
At the same time, critics have argued that CRA imposes high
costs in a number of ways, 68 and recent scholarship has suggested that
the 1995 regulatory reform did not reduce compliance costs or
enhance shareholder value.69 First, critics argue that CRA conflicts
with bank safety and soundness regulation. CRA expects banks not
only to expand credit to households to whom they would not other-
wise lend but also to maintain safety and soundness. Critics deride
these aims as mutually inconsistent. 70 Because, in their view, market
failures and discrimination are not significant factors justifying CRA,
they argue that CRA forces banks to engage in unprofitable, risky
lending. 71 To the extent that CRA forces banks to lend to less
creditworthy borrowers, CRA increases the bank's risk and reduces
its profitability. To the extent that CRA forces banks to lend locally,
64 See Gunther, supra note 21, at 56 (suggesting that recent growth in lending in low-
income neighborhoods is due to effectiveness of market forces in breaking down financial
barriers to such lending); Hylton, supra note 21, at 204-05 (describing factors other than
CRA that may have contributed to improvement of lending markets for urban poor).
65 See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
66 See Hylton, supra note 21, at 205 (pointing to improved management policies of big-
city mayors, as well as to Community Development Financial Institutions Act of 1994).
67 See Gunther, supra note 21, at 58 (indicating that lenders not covered by CRA
devoted growing proportion of home purchase loans to low-income communities).
68 See Calomiris et al., supra note 21, at 641 (describing how CRA requires banks to
expend great deal of effort and considerable resources focusing on low-income concerns);
Klausner, supra note 21, at 1590-91 (describing how tradeable obligations would be less
costly than current CRA regime); Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 295 (indicating that
CRA imposes significant compliance costs on institutions).
69 See David B. Ely & Kenneth J. Robinson, Is the Community Reinvestment Act in
Need of Further Reform? Evidence from Equity Markets During the 1995 Reform Process,
23 J. FIN. SERVICES REs., 59, 75 (2003) (indicating that expected benefits of reforms are
approximately equal to expected costs).
70 See Gunther, supra note 21, at 59; Hylton, supra note 21, at 197.
71 See Calomiris et al., supra note 21, at 654 (indicating that CRA compliance may
involve making unprofitable loans); Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 295 (suggesting that
CRA requires banks to make unprofitable and risky investment- and product-line deci-
sions); White, supra note 21, at 282 (claiming that CRA either encourages making of
unprofitable loans or is redundant because it encourages banks to make profitable loans
they would have made anyway).
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CRA undermines the ability of banks to diversify their lending geo-
graphically, thereby undermining the soundness of their portfolio.
72
Moreover, critics charge that during economic downturns, when banks
must necessarily reduce their risk profiles, CRA examiners would give
banks bad ratings for what are in fact only prudent reductions in
risk .73
Second, CRA, in their view, deters efficiency-enhancing mergers
and cost reductions through closures of low-return bank branches.
74
By requiring CRA review during merger applications, CRA adds
costs to all mergers and may impede marginal ones from proceeding,
if this view is correct. Whatever efficiency losses accrue from deter-
ring such mergers, or from the transaction costs of CRA during
merger applications, outweigh the benefits of CRA, if any, in their
view.
Third, enforcement of CRA's broad standard has been described
as arbitrary and inconsistent. 75 Critics allege that regulatory outcomes
depend on the strength of local community groups, competitive fac-
tors in the financial sector, the decisions of banks to merge, and the
whims of regulators. There is reportedly wide variation in the strict-
ness of regulators, both among agencies, and within agencies by geo-
graphic region.76 In the critics view, CRA's standard is effectively
lawless.
Fourth, critics argue that the CRA standard gives regulators
unfettered discretion that they wrongly use to benefit interest groups.
For example, Macey and Miller decry the manner in which public par-
ticipation in reviewing the CRA performance of banks and thrifts
empowers activist pressure groups, who, they allege, engage in ram-
pant rent-seeking by holding banks hostage to give the groups funds
for their own purposes.77 Others charge that inner-city developers
gain advantage from the regulation.78 One scholar contends that large
banks benefit from CRA relative to small banks and impede any
changes to CRA that would benefit smaller institutions.79 Critics fur-
72 See Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 324.
73 See Gunther, supra note 21, at 60.
74 See Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 322-23.
75 See Calomiris et al., supra note 21, at 637-38 (describing how vagueness of CRA has
led to arbitrary enforcement); Hylton, supra note 21, at 203 (same); Macey & Miller, supra
note 21, at 295 (same); Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 21, at 361-62 (describing CRA's
high compliance costs and agencies' overbroad discretion).
76 See KENNETH H. THOMAS, THE CRA HANDBOOK 547 (1998).
77 See Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 333-37 (describing how CRA has increased
power of activist groups dedicated to various causes related to community development).
78 See Hylton, supra note 21, at 237.
79 See id. at 234-37 (arguing that large banks benefit overall from CRA and thus block
reforms).
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ther posit that the banking regulators are major beneficiaries of CRA
because it gives them a lever to use against banks in mergers they are
concerned about for other reasons or allows them to pursue political
goals unrelated to CRA.80 According to this view, the power of rent-
seeking interest groups and regulators under CRA leads banks to
engage in CRA compliance in a way that benefits rent-seeking pres-
sure groups but that does not actually help low-income or minority
communities. Banks, motivated by the desire to satisfy pressure
groups and regulators, engage in wasteful spending on public relations
and headline-making loan commitments, 81 and spend inordinate hours
and dollars on compliance, generation of data reporting, and other
wasteful paperwork, according to this view.82
C. Rules versus Standards
At bottom, many of the criticisms regarding whether CRA is a
reasonable response to market failures find their expression as an
argument that CRA's standards-based regulation is lawless and ineffi-
cient.8 3 Even those who take as a given the existence of CRA argue
that the standards-based approach of CRA should give way to more
rules-based regimes. Some scholars call for tradeable CRA obliga-
tions akin to those used in environmental regimes,84 while others call
for safe harbors under CRA for the top bank performers. 85 These
proposals stem from the view that CRA is an inefficient means to
overcome market failures and discrimination.
CRA's requirement that banks lend wherever they take deposits
is a poor design choice to overcome market failures, critics allege,
because it undermines innovation, specialization and scale economies.
In their view, CRA impedes specialization because it requires banks
to invest in learning about all their communities, rather than permit-
ting banks to invest the high fixed costs of such knowledge in one
area.86 CRA thwarts innovation because it requires a high level of
80 See Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 342.
81 See id. at 295, 330-33 (suggesting that compliance with CRA often requires suc-
cessful public relations plan); see also Calomiris et al., supra note 21, at 638 (describing
how banks feel obliged to waste resources in order to demonstrate their good faith).
82 See Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 21, at 361; White, supra note 21, at 283.
83 See, e.g., Calomiris et al., supra note 21, at 637-38 (citing views that CRA is "arbi-
trary," "vague[ ]," and "waste[s] resources"); Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 295
(arguing that CRA standard is "vague" and "arbitrary"). I respond to this critique in Part
V.
84 See Calomiris et al., supra note 21, at 652; Klausner, supra note 21, at 1580.
85 See Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 21, at 353-69.
86 See Calomiris et al., supra note 21, at 655; Klausner, supra note 21, at 1574-75;
Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 21, at 354-55.
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lending once an initial investment in branches in a poor area is made.
CRA undermines the ability of banks to benefit from scale econo-
mies87 and precludes banks from internalizing the positive externali-
ties of their lending because CRA requires many institutions to lend
in the community. 88
In the view of CRA's critics, rules-based regimes would be more
efficient than a standard at addressing these problems. Thus, both
Michael Klausner and Peter Swire have called for reforms that in their
view would enhance CRA's effectiveness at lower cost. Klausner has
called for tradeable CRA obligations, akin to tradeable environmental
requirements, to take advantage of bank specialization, innovation
and scale economies. In another effort to reform CRA, Swire has
proposed safe harbors for strong CRA performers. Under a safe
harbor, a bank would not face CRA scrutiny during merger applica-
tions if the bank had achieved a given level of lending as of its last
CRA examination. A safe harbor, it is argued, would provide a mea-
sure of certainty to the best banks and thrifts and would thereby lower
the costs of CRA, at least the costs due to relying on a "vague" stan-
dard rather than a rule.
D. Geographic and Institutional Scope Distorts Markets
Critics contend that the scope of CRA distorts the markets in two
ways.89 First, CRA distorts banks' location decisions in a way that
actually hurts low-income communities. Second, because regulatory
burdens and incentives are targeted to some, but not all, financial
intermediaries, CRA may simply shift the composition of lending and
not expand it or change its terms, and place an unfair and inefficient
burden on banks and thrifts.90
Scholars argue that banks can avoid their vague CRA obligations
by moving out or staying out of low-income and minority neighbor-
hoods so that their "assessment" area for lending excludes such com-
87 See Calomiris et al., supra note 21, at 652, 655.
88 Klausner, supra note 21, at 1577 (arguing that coordination offers means of internal-
izing externalities, but CRA makes coordination difficult); Cf White, supra note 21, at 285
(arguing that "[ijf banks could coordinate their lending decisions, they might find that their
joint lending could arrest the community's decline and make their loans jointly profitable;
in essence, each bank would benefit from the lending decisions of other banks").
89 I respond to this critique in Part VI.
90 JONATHAN ZINMAN, THE EFFICACY AND EFFICIENCY OF CREDIT MARKET INTER-
VENTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 2 (Harvard Univ. Joint
Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Working Paper CRA02-2, 2002), at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/
publications/governmentprograms/cra02-2 zinman.pdf (last visited April 5, 2005).
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munities.91 Defining communities by the geographical "accident" of
deposit facilities, they argue, is itself a difficult process with perverse
effects on bank locational decisions.92 They argue that CRA creates
incentives for banks to avoid opening branches in poor neighborhoods
in the first place, in order to avoid having to comply with CRA by
lending in those communities.93
Critics lament the additional burden CRA places on banks and
thrifts while no similar burden affects other participants in the finan-
cial markets. They deny that one can justify CRA as a quid pro quo
for a net subsidy from the federal government to banks. Even if a net
subsidy exists (which some commentators doubt94 ), critics say the
appropriate response would be to eliminate the distortion directly, not
enact CRA.95 Moreover, CRA is bad economics, in the critics' view,
because it places a regulatory burden on one type of financial institu-
tion (banks and thrifts) while letting comparable institutions (credit
unions, independent finance companies) and other financial market
participants (insurance companies, securities firms) off without any
similar obligations. 96 In this view, it is irrational to apply CRA to
banks and thrifts, but not to other financial companies, or, for that
matter, every participant in every market, including, say, to packagers
of frozen peas.
E. Other Alternatives
Finally, critics argue that if one wants to achieve CRA's goals,
superior regulatory alternatives exist.97 They argue that if CRA is
rooted in distributional goals, these can better be met through the tax
and transfer system, rather than through legal rules. 98 Still others
91 See Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 296, 340 (describing how CRA drives capital
away from poor neighborhoods by imposing tax on depository institutions "foolhardy"
enough to do business in such communities); White, supra note 21, at 287 (indicating that
banks and thrifts will avoid areas where CRA obligations are onerous).
92 See Klausner, supra note 21, at 1584 (suggesting some problems with tying CRA
obligations to bank's area of operation).
93 See Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 296.
94 See, e.g., Kenneth Jones & Barry Kolatch, The Federal Safety Net, Banking Subsidies,
and Implications for Financial Modernization, 12 FDIC BANKING REV. 1, 15 (1999) (sug-
gesting that if banks receive any net subsidy at all from federal safety net, it is small).
95 See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 296 (suggesting that goal of subsidizing
poor or disadvantaged citizens can be better accomplished by direct subsidy programs).
96 See Calomiris et al., supra note 21, at 655; Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 312-13;
White, supra note 21, at 287-90 (describing frequently proffered reasons for why CRA
treats banks differently from other lending institutions).
97 I respond to this critique in Part VII infra.
98 See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient
than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994) (arguing that
tax and transfer system is always superior to legal rules in redistributing income). But see
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argue for in-kind demand-side subsidies, supply-side subsidies, or tax
incentives.99 Others urge enforcement of existing antidiscrimination
law. 100 Some contend that the market solution-in particular, the
growth of the subprime mortgage market-answers any concerns
about underserved low-income communities.10' Other scholars call
for an increased focus on community development banks and peer-
lending based on ethnic communities.10 2
Some of these arguments have strong theoretical force. Market
failures are difficult to establish empirically, and "[t]he existence of
important credit market failures is uncertain. ' 10 3 Moreover, it is
unclear whether banks and thrifts would respond to incentives in
desired ways, and the costs of CRA in overcoming these market fail-
ures and discrimination ought to be considered in determining
whether it is an efficient means to overcome these problems. This
debate cannot be decided in the abstract, nor on the basis of anecdotal
evidence. Furthermore, the literature on standards versus rules would
lend support, if correct, to the views of CRA's critics. In addition,
there is room for reasonable debate about the scope of CRA. Lastly,
other alternatives do exist that influence the provision of credit to
minorities and low- and moderate-income communities. The
remainder of the article takes up these five points in turn.
III
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRA
In this Part, I will discuss how the theoretical support for CRA
derives from three bases. First, CRA addresses market failures
caused by imperfect information, collective action problems, agency
costs, and neighborhood externalities that are more acute in low-
income neighborhoods and for low-income borrowers than in credit
markets generally. Contrary to the views of CRA's critics, I will argue
that the market failures are significant, and that CRA is an appro-
Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 21, at 368 (criticizing arguments that relying on tax and
transfer system is preferable alternative to CRA).
99 See, e.g., Klausner, supra note 21, at 1592 (suggesting "tax benefits or other trans-
fers"); Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 21, at 367-68 (describing direct expenditures in
low- and moderate-income neighborhoods as alternative to CRA); White, supra note 21, at
291 (arguing for "direct government subsidies" if there is public purpose in increasing
lending).
100 See White, supra note 21, at 283-84.
101 See Gunther, supra note 21, at 57.
102 See Calomiris et al., supra note 21, at 654-57; Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 21, at
354-55 (describing how safe harbor policy might support investment in community devel-
opment banks).
103 ZINMAN, supra note 90, at 1.
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priate response to them. Second, I will argue that CRA helps to
reduce discrimination against minority borrowers and communities.
CRA was not designed to address racial discrimination against indi-
vidual borrowers directly, but it was aimed, in part, at addressing
"redlining" discrimination and its legacy in segregated, low-income
neighborhoods. Moreover, the significant correlation between race
and income, and between race of homeowner and racial composition
and income of neighborhood, gives CRA leverage to overcome bar-
riers to credit faced by minority households. In some contexts, this
leverage is greater than that of fair lending laws. 1°4 Thus, I will
explain why CRA is an important part of a broader regulatory
strategy to overcome the legacy of discrimination in order to expand
access to credit to minority households. Third, I will contend that
CRA has largely not done enough to break down inefficient barriers
between the bifurcated prime and subprime credit markets. CRA
could do more to enhance competition between prime and subprime
lenders in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. Over time,
along with market changes, CRA can help make the subprime and
prime markets more efficient by completing the market. In addition,
CRA could play a strong role in reducing discrimination that results
from, and occurs in, bifurcated credit markets.
A. Market Failure
Credit market imperfections could impede lending in low- and
moderate-income communities in several ways. First, information
externalities and asymmetries may lead banks to overlook
creditworthy borrowers and profitable loans.1 05 Information external-
ities exist when creditors cannot fully recoup the costs of gathering
information about creditworthy borrowers because other lenders can
use the information generated to lend. Information externalities can
produce credit constraints because the efficiency of bank lending is in
part a function of "market thickness. '' 10 6 Information asymmetries, in
which lenders cannot fully distinguish creditworthy from un-
creditworthy borrowers, are reduced the more information that
lenders have about prospective borrowers. CRA helps to reduce
104 See infra Part VII.A (comparing CRA to fair lending laws).
105 See Janusz Ordover & Andrew Weiss, Information and the Law: Evaluating Legal
Restrictions on Competitive Contracts, 71 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PRoC. 399, 401
(1981).
106 William W. Lang & Leonard I. Nakamura, A Model of Redlining, 33 J. URB. ECON.
223, 229-33 (1993) (explaining how information externalities can lead to inefficient credit
rationing in low-volume markets). Market thickness refers to the amount of economic
activity, as measured by the number of participants, or the number or total value of trans-
actions, over some time period. Id. at 229-31.
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information externalities and asymmetries by increasing market thick-
ness. Second, collective action problems exacerbate information
externalities and inhibit entry into these communities.10 7 CRA could
help to mitigate these credit constraints by providing "an effective
commitment device to coordinate lending."' 08 Third, agency costs
make it difficult to align corporate interest in profitable lending with
the behavior of loan agents. CRA can help to address agency costs by
providing additional incentives to reform corporate structures to align
with these goals. Lastly, neighborhood externalities provide grounds
for governmental intervention to reduce credit constraints and
increase homeownership. 10 9 I take up these points in turn.
Information externalities contribute to lower rates of lending in
low-income communities than would be socially optimal.110 Bor-
rowers in low-income neighborhoods find it more difficult to obtain
mortgage loans in part because lenders lack sufficient information on
home sales in these thin markets, that is, markets with a relatively
lower level of economic activity.11' The smaller number of transac-
tions in a low-income community makes appraisals more difficult.
Any one financial institution will not be willing to participate in a
market with uncertain collateral values. The resulting reduction in
market participants will decrease further the amount of information
available about property values and reduce the liquidity of other loans
to that neighborhood. Lenders will not want to lend in areas with low
107 If monopolies were licensed for low-income areas, there would be no collective
action problem, but we generally believe that monopolies are inefficient because the price,
quantity, and quality of goods will be inferior to those offered in a competitive market. For
empirical support of the existence of credit constraints because creditors cannot fully cap-
ture information externalities in competitive markets, see, for example, Mitchell A.
Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending
Relationships, 110 Q.J. EcoN. 407, 433 (1995) (finding that young firms are more credit
constrained in competitive markets than in concentrated ones).
108 ZINMAN, supra note 103, at 34 n.33.
109 See, e.g., JACK M. GUTrENTAG & SUSAN M. WACHTER, REDLINING AND PUBLIC
POLICY 39 (1980).
110 See STEPHEN Ross & JOHN YINGER, THE COLOR OF CREDIT: MORTGAGE DISCRIMI-
NATION, RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, AND FAIR-LENDING ENFORCEMENT 180-81 (2002)
(analyzing Lang & Nakamura, supra note 106); David M. Harrison, The Importance of
Lender Heterogeneity in Mortgage Lending, 49 J. URa. ECON. 285, 294 (2001); Klausner,
supra note 21, at 1569-70; David C. Ling & Susan M. Wachter, Information Externalities
and Home Mortgage Underwriting, 44 J. URB. ECON. 317, 318 (1998). But see Paul S.
Calem, Mortgage Credit Availability in Low- and Moderate-Income Minority Neighbor-
hoods: Are Information Externalities Critical?, 13 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 71, 105 (1996)
(finding that information externalities result in higher loan denial rate overall, but that this
relationship does not hold in minority neighborhoods).
111 For empirical evidence on market thinness, and improvements during the 1990s, see
infra text accompanying notes 230-238.
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levels of liquidity. Property values will decline as the market becomes
less liquid, reinforcing the downward trend in lending.
The information and expertise required to offset this trend are
costly. In low-income communities, such information externalities are
likely to be even more costly to overcome-and the benefits of over-
coming them are likely to be smaller-than in high-income neighbor-
hoods.112 Creditors will face the up-front costs of developing
expertise in neighborhoods that they have not served previously and
about which there is less information available from other creditors,
appraisers, and real estate professionals. In addition, creditors will
need to spread the fixed costs of finding information about low-
income neighborhoods over fewer transactions and smaller loan
sizes.113 Creditors will have to train their personnel to search for
creditworthy borrowers and sound residential neighborhoods in loca-
tions where lenders have not conducted a large number of transac-
tions previously. Such information creates positive externalities that
benefit all lenders. Information about collateral values and the exis-
tence of creditworthy borrowers will likely-if lenders report credit
histories-inure to the benefit of all lenders. 14 Thus, the lender that
invested in the additional information will not be fully compensated
for its investment.
Given high search costs, lenders will use the average risk of the
pool and miss good risks. Even if search and credit-analysis costs are
reduced, there is likely to be insufficient volume and liquidity to sup-
port a relatively complete market.115 The friction from information
112 See Klausner, supra note 21, at 1569-70.
113 See id.
114 Lenders report credit histories of borrowers under voluntary arrangements with
credit bureaus. Lenders may then access the credit histories of borrowers or potential
borrowers in order to make lending decisions. See generally Robert B. Avery et al., An
Overview of Consumer Data and Credit Reporting, 89 FED. RES. BULL. 47 (2003).
115 In a complete market, equilibrium is always efficient. See generally, Kenneth J.
Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy, 22
ECONOMETRICA 265 (1954). In an incomplete market, equilibrium may be inefficient, or
may not be reached at all. See generally, John Geanakoplos, An Introduction to General
Equilibrium with Incomplete Asset Markets, 19 J. MATHEMATICAL ECON. 1 (1990)
(explaining theory of general equilibrium with incomplete markets); Michael Rothschild &
Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics
of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629 (1976) (explaining how imperfect information
can prevent equilibria from forming); Pradeep Dubey et al., Default in a General Equilib-
rium Model with Incomplete Markets 17 (n.d., unpublished manuscript) (explaining how
imperfect information, such as "unreasonable pessimism[,] prevents many real world mar-
kets from opening"), at http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/dl2a/d1247.pdf (last visited April
7, 2005). Incomplete markets occur because of the presence of transaction costs (including
information and evaluation costs), adverse selection, moral hazard, asymmetric informa-
tion and information externalities, and insufficient volume and liquidity. See FRANKLIN
ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, COMPARING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 147 (2001).
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externalities likely makes it costlier to serve low-income borrowers
living in these neighborhoods whether they purchase a home in a low-
income community or seek better options in high-income ones.
In addition, many lenders-in this context, banks and thrifts
making prime loans-will worry that adverse selection and moral
hazard will increase if the lenders charge more to cover their risks
from market thinness and the uncertainty regarding distinguishing
good risks from bad ones. Adverse selection increases with loan price
because good-risk borrowers will avoid the higher cost loan if they
have access to other alternatives. Moral hazard increases with loan
price because the borrower faces a greater incentive to default when
the costs of continuing to pay are higher.116 Lenders that do enter the
market-in this context, mostly "subprime lenders"-will charge
higher prices to offset these risks. Moreover, the higher prices may
drive more borrowers out of the market or increase defaults, making
it less likely that other lenders will be willing to serve the thinner,
riskier market. Furthermore, lenders may seek to internalize more of
the benefits of customer information by not reporting credit histories
to the credit bureaus. 117 By failing to report credit histories, they gain
market share, which would induce them to spend more on information
and lend more. Borrowers, however, will face higher prices and will
not be able to demonstrate to other lenders, including prime lenders,
that they are creditworthy.
In addition to information externalities that lower the returns to
lending to low-income borrowers and in low-income neighborhoods,
asymmetries in information between lenders and borrowers that are
costly to overcome also can lead to credit rationing. "Credit
rationing" describes situations where a lender decides not to make a
loan to a given borrower or class of borrowers rather than making the
116 See generally, Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with
Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1981).
117 See, e.g., Advisory Letter from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council, to Chief Financial Officers (Jan. 18, 2000) (noting motivation for lack of reporting
is "intense competition among lenders for customers"), available at http://
www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bulletin/2000-3a.txt. Creditors may be more inclined to fail to report
in thin markets than in thick ones because the information externalities, and thus the gains
derived from not reporting, are higher in thin markets than in thick ones. That is, the gains
from withholding information about good borrowers are smaller in a market full of good
borrowers, than in a market with fewer good borrowers. Credit bureaus are now well
established in the United States and work well for the majority of borrowers, but these
bureaus took a long time and required high levels of market volume to develop. See
Michael E. Staten & Fred H. Cate, Does the Fair Credit Reporting Act Promote Accurate
Credit Reporting? 4-5 (2004) (unpublished working paper), available at http://
www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/babc/babc_04-14.pdf. Moreover, even in the
well developed credit reporting market in the United States generally, subprime lenders
tend not to report to the bureaus, and other lenders incompletely report.
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loan and charging a higher price to cover higher cost or risk. Joseph
Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss have demonstrated that credit rationing
can occur when seemingly similar borrowers differ in unobserved
ways in their willingness and ability to repay. 1 8 If lenders charge
higher interest rates to compensate themselves for the uncertainty
regarding the risk of a given pool of borrowers, they will face higher
default rates because of adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse
selection would mean that riskier borrowers will take out loans from
the bank because they cannot get access to lower-priced loans else-
where. These riskier borrowers will tend to default more often
because moral hazard increases as interest rates increase. Moral
hazard is a function of interest rates because the gains from failing to
pay increase with interest owed, while losses cannot exceed the
amount owed.119 Moreover, higher-priced loans simply will be more
difficult for low-income borrowers to repay, and thus higher prices
yield higher default rates. Higher prices are an independent source of
default, in addition to moral hazard, because low-income borrowers
face a relatively hard budget constraint with little room to adjust
expenditures, dip into savings, or access other credit in order to meet
debt service requirements. Both moral hazard and this price effect
increase the likelihood that low-income borrowers will default even if
they did not present a similar risk of defaulting on a lower-cost loan.
Calomiris is correct that the problem of adverse selection is likely
worse for small businesses than for home mortgage applicants because
information asymmetries are lower in the home mortgage market. 120
Yet such asymmetries are not fully eliminated even with the advent of
credit scoring, and there are several reasons why it is costly to over-
come information asymmetries regarding low-income borrowers.
These borrowers often lack credit histories, and many do not even
have a bank account, 121 so determining their creditworthiness is more
difficult and costly. Many low-income households could provide
indicia that they are likely to repay their loans, such as a strong record
of paying rent and utilities on time, or sending remittances regularly
to family members, as immigrants often do, but banks are not accus-
tomed to relying on such information. There is not yet a clearing-
house or standardized method of determining creditworthiness on the
118 Stiglitz & Weiss, supra note 116, at 408.
119 See id. at 393.
120 See Calomiris, supra note 21, at 644 (arguing that only source for asymmetric infor-
mation is "likely" to be "idiosyncratic attachment to the house" and that such asymmetry
would not lead to credit rationing).
121 See Barr, supra note 3, at 123 (showing that 22% of low-income households lack
bank accounts).
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basis of these factors, 122 making these measures more uncertain than
the standard credit scores produced by the credit bureaus. Moreover,
although credit scores are good predictors of repayment, there is vari-
ance around a given score. Additionally, low-income households
often have lower levels of educational attainment and thus may
require more assistance in completing loan applications. 23 Creditors
rationally might choose not to spend the additional sums necessary to
lend to creditworthy low-income borrowers absent regulatory or other
interventions that alter these economics. These high costs of over-
coming information asymmetries would plague low-income borrowers
seeking a loan regardless of whether the borrower wanted to live in a
low-income neighborhood or sought access to better economic oppor-
tunities in a higher-income neighborhood where lenders already
operate.
Creditors considering whether to enter a low-income market also
face collective action problems.124 Lenders may delay entry into an
otherwise profitable market because their lending would lead to bene-
fits that they cannot fully capture in the form of information, market
volume, and liquidity because other lenders can free ride. This delay
in entry further diminishes the economic prospects of the area and
reinforces other lenders' decisions not to lend. Even if there are
creditworthy borrowers and sufficient collateral values, a lender
rationally might avoid the risk of lending in an uncertain market
because other lenders are not lending there. That would be the case
even if all lenders would be better off if they all chose to lend in the
community. One can characterize this delayed entry as a collective
action problem. 125 By contrast, if lenders know that others will par-
ticipate because they are required to do so under CRA, then their
collateral is more likely to have knowable values, their collateral and
122 For innovative pilots in this regard, see, for example, a new organization, "Pay Rent,
Build Credit," which seeks to develop credit histories for low-income households based on
consistent payment of rent. See Pay Rent, Build Credit Homepage, at http://
www.payrentbuildcredit.com (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
123 See Klausner, supra note 21, at 1568.
124 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (2d ed. 1971) (explaining why collective action problems can
lead to inefficient outcomes, including in development of public policy). Collective action
problems are a type of market failure that can occur when rational market participants do
not produce efficient outcomes because the market involves a public good. In its pure
form, a public good is nonrival and nonexcludable, but externalities that do not meet these
formal tests still can result in collective action problems.
125 Contrary to previous scholarship, see for example Klausner, supra note 21, at 1577
("The CRA does little to promote coordination."), I argue that CRA is an effective
response to collective action problems because it helps banks and thrifts coordinate their
lending. See infra text accompanying notes 128-132.
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Law Review
May 20051
HeinOnline  -- 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 539 2005
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
loans are more likely to be liquid, loan volume might rise to the level
sufficient to support a complete market, and property values may be
able to rise more quickly, all other things being equal.
Other institutions that might mitigate these market failures are
weaker or altogether absent in low-income communities. For
example, to the extent that higher-income communities could, in
theory, exhibit information externalities or collective action problems,
such failures are overcome by real estate developers and agents (who
gather and disseminate information about price and quality), neigh-
borhood associations (who enforce rules such as lawn maintenance
that bolster uniform reliability of collateral values), and the like.
These institutions generally are weaker or unavailable in low-income
communities, and their absence exacerbates market failures.
Neighborhood externalities that result from credit market failures
also undergird CRA.126 Neighborhoods with low access to credit see
declines in property values, increased vacant properties, and other
indicia of distress. Households find it more difficult to get credit if
they live in distressed neighborhoods. Lower access to credit can
increase neglect of properties.127 Adjacent property owners may
decide not to invest in maintenance or to move out of the neighbor-
hood.1 28 Poorly kept and vacant homes further depress property
values, and reduce the volume and liquidity of credit markets.
Critics of CRA might argue that market failures, if they exist in
low-income communities, do not apply to low-income borrowers
purchasing homes outside low-income areas. In their view, CRA's
inclusion of lending to low-income borrowers outside low-income
areas would thus be unjustified. While critics are correct that market
failures operate in more intense ways in low-income neighborhoods,
such factors still come into play when low-income borrowers seek to
move out of such neighborhoods. For low-income households seeking
to purchase a home in a better neighborhood, rather than in a low-
income one, nearly all of these market failures would still apply.
Information externalities with respect to borrower creditworthiness
are costly to overcome because of the low volume of low-income bor-
126 See GUTUENTAG & WACHTER, supra note 109, at 7-9, 39 (describing neighborhood
externality caused by coordination problems among rational lenders and asserting CRA's
capacity to mitigate that externality); Klausner, supra note 21, at 1570-71 (discussing
neighborhood externalities caused by physical deterioration and bank lending decisions).
127 See, e.g., Klausner, supra note 21, at 1571 (stating that "owners who want to rehabili-
tate their properties may be unable to do so because they cannot borrow the money
needed," and thus "a lack of credit in a neighborhood can actually precipitate its decline").
128 See GEORGE C. GALSTER, HOMEOWNERS AND NEIGHBORHOOD REINVESTMENT
144-224 (1987) (discussing factors contributing to homeowner mobility and upkeep
behavior).
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rowers, particularly from low-income neighborhoods, and the cost of
developing expertise in finding creditworthy borrowers in these thin
markets. Information asymmetries are costly to overcome regardless
of the location of the purchased home because low-income house-
holds have lower levels of assets available for downpayments or to
demonstrate creditworthiness and many lack standard indicia used by
creditors to evaluate risk. Collective action problems delay entry in
serving low-income borrowers in similar ways to entering a low-
income neighborhood. Moreover, low-income borrowers likely lack
familiarity with or access to many of the institutional supports, such as
a knowledgeable real estate broker, on which higher income bor-
rowers rely.
CRA is a reasonable, though by no means the only possible,
policy response to these market failures affecting low-income bor-
rowers and neighborhoods. By providing incentives to banks and
thrifts to lend in their entire community, CRA promotes market thick-
ness. CRA solves the problem of underproduction from externalities
by encouraging the banks and thrifts to lend anyway. Under CRA,
free riders cannot exploit collective action problems because each
bank is, in effect, required to participate in the market. Thus, CRA is
a form of pre-commitment device that overcomes the coordination
problem inherent when positive externalities are sufficiently large to
act in ways similar to public goods.129 Banks know that there will be
liquidity and volume because other lenders will be looking for lending
opportunities in these markets because of their CRA obligations.
Moreover, once a sufficient volume of loans of similar characteristics
to similar borrowers is reached, these loans can then be packaged and
sold on secondary markets, which provides capital and liquidity for
continued lending.
Over time, the thicker the market, the less each incremental loan
will produce significant information externalities. With lower infor-
mation externalities, lenders face less of a disincentive to lend in low-
income communities because they can capture a larger share of the
benefits from lending there. Furthermore, as lenders obtain informa-
tion about creditworthy low-income borrowers and develop expertise
in lending to these borrowers, the transaction costs associated with
129 A pure public good is nonrival and nonexcludable. That is, the cost of additional
consumption of the good is zero and anyone can use the good at no cost. No one person
has an incentive to produce such a good because everyone else will be able to free ride on
the production. In the real world, pure public goods are rare, but many phenomena with
large externalities exhibit similar traits to public goods, in which collective action problems
prevent coordination to internalize the externality. See HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC
FINANCE 61-62, 92 (4th ed. 1995).
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overcoming information asymmetries also decrease. It becomes easier
both to obtain information about creditworthy borrowers and prop-
erty values, and to evaluate such information. With lower information
asymmetries, loan prices can be reduced so that they become com-
mensurate with measurable risk, and thus adverse selection and moral
hazard pose less of a problem to reaching further into the market of
potential borrowers in low-income communities.
In addition, CRA both directly and indirectly bolsters commu-
nity-based organizations in low-income communities that have been
critical to the development of home mortgage markets in ways that
are similar to the development of lending in wealthier communities.
CRA encourages banks to support community organizations directly
by giving banks CRA consideration for loans, investments, and ser-
vices to community development organizations that strengthen and
revitalize local communities. 130 CRA also indirectly supports these
institutions because banks need such strong institutions in these com-
munities in order to reduce the risk and increase the effectiveness of
their lending operations. These stronger institutions, in turn, reinforce
the effectiveness of CRA in overcoming market failures. Community-
based organizations play roles analogous to real estate brokers, devel-
opers and neighborhood associations by stabilizing and improving
housing stock, revitalizing local business districts, providing home
ownership and other financial counseling to low-income borrowers,
and helping to match creditworthy borrowers with willing banks and
thrifts.
Finally, CRA helps to address neighborhood externalities by
increasing the volume and liquidity of credit markets. These better
functioning credit markets increase access to homeownership for low-
income borrowers. CRA thus can work like other policies that are
designed to increase access to credit and homeownership and can help
to turn neighborhoods around, increasing property values for adjacent
properties and neighborhoods.131 Government policies designed to
130 See 12 C.F.R. § 25.22(b)(4) (2004) (including community development lending as
part of lending test), § 25.23(e)(3) (including community development as part of invest-
ment test), § 25.24(e) (including community development lending as part of service test).
131 See, e.g., Ingrid Gould Ellen et al., Building Homes, Reviving Neighborhoods: Spil-
lovers from Subsidized Construction of Owner-Occupied Housing in New York City, 12 J.
HOUSING RES. 185, 211 (2001) (finding that two affordable homeownership projects in
New York City had positive effect on property values in immediate neighborhood);
Michael H. Schill et al., Revitalizing Inner-City Neighborhoods: New York City's Ten-Year
Plan, 13 HousING POL'Y DEBATE 529, 562-63 (2002) (finding that New York City's Ten-
Year Plan investments in housing production in city's poorest neighborhoods had positive
impact on those neighborhoods).
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increase homeownership thus can have positive externalities in com-
munities not directly affected by the government programs. 132
If CRA succeeds in overcoming these market failures, one could
ask how long CRA would continue to be necessary. Critics would
argue that enough time has passed under CRA for banks to "get it."
Either I am right, and there were market failures present but now
banks have overcome them by lending to these communities, or I am
wrong, and there were never any market failures to overcome. The
answer to that question involves both an empirical and a theoretical
enquiry, and unchartered terrain. No market is perfect. Market fail-
ures can exist in reasonably well-functioning markets without causing
significant problems. Progress has undoubtedly been made. The
question becomes at what point any market failures become relatively
inconsequential so that the costs of governmental regulation to over-
come them become unlikely to be worth incurring.
My intuition, based on conversations over the years with senior
management from banks and thrifts, is that this point has not yet been
reached, although this is an area in which continued empirical
research is essential. In theoretical terms, low-income markets are
likely to stay relatively thinner than high-income markets for some
time, even with the advances in low-income lending that this Article
describes. 133 Low-income households will remain relatively more
opaque to banks than higher-income ones, and less able to signal
creditworthiness through sizeable down payments, given their low
levels of asset holding and diverse sources of income. Thus, bank
incentives to avoid household adverse selection and moral hazard,
given information asymmetries, are likely to remain important consid-
erations in decisions about the appropriate cutoffs for credit rationing
and risk-based pricing with respect to such households. At the neigh-
borhood level, home ownership, the number of home sales, the price
of homes, and loan sizes, are likely to remain at lower levels than in
higher-income neighborhoods, and real estate agents and appraisers
are still likely to have lower volumes of activity in such neighborhoods
than in the more affluent areas they serve. These factors suggest that
information externalities will continue to be an important factor lim-
iting lending. Thus, the volume of lending and liquidity required for a
fully functioning market will likely continue to be difficult to sustain
without at least some of the government policies discussed in this
Article. For banks and thrifts where institutional structures and incen-
132 Ellen et al., supra note 131, at 211; Schill et al., supra note 131, at 562-63.
133 For a discussion of the empirical evidence, see infra text accompanying notes
231230-238.
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tives have not been altered to make lending to low-income households
a core mission of the institution, the difficulty of focusing employee
time and attention on serving this market will likely exacerbate the
problem.
The imperfect competition that results from these transaction
costs-including the cost of information, thinking creatively about the
information, and information externalities; adverse selection and
moral hazard; asymmetric information; agency costs in keeping the
institution engaged in low-income lending; and the difficulty of cre-
ating and sustaining volume and liquidity to support the market-
means that low-income households are likely to remain perennially at
risk from being excluded from the pool of households that banks and
thrifts will find it most profitable to serve. Thus, CRA and other poli-
cies are likely to be an important factor in lending to these communi-
ties for some time to come.
B. Racial Discrimination
CRA was not enacted to address racial discrimination against
particular borrowers. That role was assigned to the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act of 1974 (ECOA).1 3 4 Yet CRA had its origins in
claims that banks were "redlining," that is, refusing to lend to poten-
tial borrowers living in low-income, minority communities. One
cannot fully understand the rationale for CRA unless one sees it as
part of the federal government's response to the long history of pri-
vate sector and official discrimination in housing and credit markets.
In this Section, I explore the theory and evidence regarding credit
market discrimination as a basis for CRA.135 Contrary to the claims
of CRA's critics, I argue that racial discrimination, and the effects of
such discrimination, likely persists in home mortgage markets, and
that the legacy of discrimination provides further theoretical justifica-
tion for CRA. Moreover, I will argue that CRA in fact plays an
important role, alongside ECOA, in overcoming such discrimination.
The dominant view, derived from the work of Gary Becker, is
that in the long run, in a perfect market, discrimination will disap-
134 15 U.S.C. § 1691-1691f (2000). The Federal Reserve Board implements the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act(ECOA) under Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. pt. 202 (2004).
135 See A. Brooke Overby, The Community Reinvestment Act Reconsidered, 143 U. PA.
L. REV. 1431, 1453 (1995) (arguing that CRA should be understood as response to racial
discrimination). But see Klausner, supra note 21, at 1563-64 (arguing that ECOA, not
CRA, should address racial discrimination). For a defense of the view that CRA should be
seen as a legitimate response to racial discrimination in addition to ECOA, see Part VII.A
infra (comparing CRA to ECOA).
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pear. 136 Competition helps to drive away discrimination based on
racial animus because market participants who practice it will lose out
on hiring the best human capital and will leave profits from good cus-
tomers on the table that other, nondiscriminatory actors will scoop up.
Long-run equilibrium probably will occur sooner in credit markets
than in, say, labor markets, because credit markets are more effi-
cient. 137 I agree that competition likely diminishes discrimination.
Nonetheless, the force of competition acting on discrimination
depends on market structure, and for those who are discriminated
against, waiting around for competition to work may be ill comfort.
Government intervention can speed up the process of ending discrimi-
nation both by directly prohibiting it, and by overcoming market fail-
ures that exacerbate it.
Market failures can exacerbate discrimination in a variety of
ways. At a given point in time, one would need to specify the parame-
ters of Becker's model to test his hypothesis, 138 and competing theo-
ries suggest that the model is too limited. 139 As I will explain more
fully below, credit-rationing theory can explain the persistence of
lending discrimination. In addition, Becker's model assumes that only
racial animus is illegal, and it is this form of discrimination that Becker
demonstrates would disappear in a perfect market. Statistical discrim-
ination-in which lenders use factors correlated with race as proxies
for creditworthiness-violates ECOA, but such discrimination is
rational under Becker's model.140 Lastly, price discrimination,
whether based on animus or statistical models, can persist in seg-
136 Becker himself is somewhat softer on this point. See BECKER, supra note 22, at 159
("Employer discrimination should, on average, be less in competitive industries than in
monopolistic ones."). But see JOHN J. DONOHUE III, FOUNDATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMINATION LAW 189 (2d ed. 2003) (arguing that laws barring discrimination in employ-
ment are efficient because such laws speed up long-term effects of competitive markets in
reducing discrimination).
137 See John J. Donohue III, Employment Discrimination Law in Perspective: Three
Concepts of Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2583, 2595-97 (1994) (explaining why labor mar-
kets are less efficient than equity markets, with result that competition in labor markets
will take longer than competition in equity markets to reduce discrimination).
138 Becker himself acknowledged as much. See Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The
Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, 101 J. OF POL. ECON. 385, 388 (1993) (noting that
his model "depends not only on the distribution of tastes for discrimination among poten-
tial employers, but critically also on the nature of firm production functions").
139 DONOHUE, supra note 136, at 205.
140 Compare Ross & YINGER, supra note 110, at 32-33, 41-42 (explaining that statistical
discrimination violates fair lending law); FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, INTER-
AGENCY FAIR LENDING EXAMINATION PROCEDURES, at iv (1999) (same), available at
http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/fairlend.pdf, with BECKER, supra note 22, at 14 (defining discrimi-
nation as individual foregoing profits to satisfy irrational "taste" for discrimination); see
also infra Part VII.A (comparing CRA to fair lending laws).
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mented credit markets even if there is competition within each
market. Such price discrimination appears to be an important factor
in a portion of today's credit markets.14 1
Credit rationing enables discrimination, whether based on animus
or statistics, to persist even in competitive markets. As Stiglitz and
Weiss show, credit rationing can occur because of asymmetric infor-
mation, adverse selection, and moral hazard. 142 If credit rationing
occurs, identical marginal applicants will be treated differently; some
borrowers will get loans while others will not, and lenders will not
charge differential prices to sort borrowers by risk. This single-price
model generally describes the prime credit market dominated by
banks and thrifts,143 while the subprime market differentiates by risk.
Since lenders in credit-rationing models do not provide loans to all
members of a class of identical loan applicants, in theory they could
discriminate on the basis of race within this class of loan applicants
without losing profits (absent legal liability under antidiscrimination
laws) because it would not matter which group, within the group of
marginal borrowers, banks chose to ration. Moreover, tests of lending
discrimination based on profitability would not identify lending dis-
crimination because lenders who discriminated would be just as profit-
able as lenders who did not. 144 Within the group of marginal
141 See infra note 162.
142 See supra note 118 and accompanying text; see also David Besanko & Anjan V.
Thakor, Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolist and Competitive Credit
Markets, 28 INT'L ECON. REV. 671, 672 (1987) (showing credit rationing when low-risk
borrowers lack downpayments to distinguish as low-risk); Paul Calem & Michael Stutzer,
The Simple Analytics of Observed Discrimination in Credit Markets, 4 J. FIN. INTERMEDIA-
TION 189, 194-95 (1995) (discussing how creditors use high denial rates to separate low-risk
from high-risk borrowers). Under an alternative theory, Ferguson and Peters show that
even with symmetric information, credit rationing can occur when a lender's marginal cost
of making a loan to a given class of borrowers increases with the size of the lender's port-
folio for reasons unrelated to borrower creditworthiness. Michael F. Ferguson & Stephen
R. Peters, Is Lending Discrimination Always Costly?, 21 J. OF REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 23,
24 (2000). Such portfolio effects might arise, they argue, from either higher resale or man-
agement costs from risk diversification or regulatory costs. See MICHAEL F. FERGUSON &
STEPHEN R. PETERS, A SYMMETRIC-INFORMATION MODEL OF CREDIT RATIONING (U. of
Cincinnati, Working Paper, 1997). Greater heterogeneity of loan pools, which would result
from using more expansive underwriting criteria is itself a source of higher securitization
costs, see TASK FORCE ON MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES DISCLOSURE, STAFF REPORT:
ENHANCING DISCLOSURE IN THE MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES MARKETS 30 n.78
(2003) [hereinafter MBS DISCLOSURE REPORT], available at http://www.treas.gov/press/
releases/docs/disclosure.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2005), and thus could be an example of
such portfolio effects.
143 For discussion of the subprime market, see infra, Part III.C.
144 See Ross & YINGER, supra note 110, at 272 (noting that studies seeking to determine
whether creditors apply higher standards to minority applicants, as measured by lower
default rates for minorities, cannot prove absence of both statistical- and animus-based
discrimination).
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borrowers, the rationed borrowers will not differ significantly in per-
formance from the borrowers who get a loan.
145
Moreover, putting credit rationing aside, statistical discrimination
could be profitable if race is correlated with an aspect of creditworthi-
ness that is costly to observe directly. It is rational for financial insti-
tutions to avoid information costs by making statistical assessments
about creditworthiness, even if such factors are correlated with race.
Lenders could use such averages to ration credit, or use differential
pricing. Competitive markets will not drive out statistical discrimina-
tion in the short term146 precisely because such discrimination is
rational, in the absence of legal liability for improperly relying on such
stereotypes. Still, statistical discrimination will be less accurate than a
direct measure of individual creditworthiness. As technology and
innovation drive down the costs of obtaining such measures, one
would expect statistical discrimination to diminish in competitive mar-
kets over the long term, although that might be quite a while. 147
Turning from theory to evidence, the terrain becomes even more
contested. Critics are right that the evidence on discrimination in
credit markets is hotly debated.1 48 Disparities in the rates at which
whites and African Americans (among others) are denied home mort-
gage loans continue to be large. But disparities alone do not prove
discrimination; the empirical debate revolves around controls for
145 Suppose, for example, at a given price of capital, that a lender chose to lend to all
applicants with a credit score of 680 and above (since all of these loans will be sold on the
secondary market) and to make 100 loans at scores of 620-679, and only 50 loans at scores
of 580-619. It does not matter which borrowers with the same scores are rationed within
these second and third groups, so lenders could, in theory, ration only black borrowers, or
ration only borrowers with certain characteristics that the lender believes are indicative of
creditworthiness but that are highly correlated with race.
146 The short term and long term are not defined here. In the context of higher educa-
tion, Justice O'Connor suggested that affirmative action would no longer be needed in 25
years. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). Alan Kreuger has pointed out that
25 years may not be long enough, given that the black-white wage gap is cut in half only
over a generation. Alan B. Krueger, Economic Scene: The Supreme Court Finds the
'Mushball Middle' on Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2003, at C2.
147 See Stuart I. Greenbaum, Twenty-Five Years of Banking Research, 25 FIN. MGMT.,
Summer 1996, at 86, 91 (arguing that reduced information costs should reduce discrimina-
tion). But see Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination: A Law
and Economics Analysis, 73 TEX. L. REV. 787, 791 (1995) (arguing that discrimination
reduces returns to investing in creditworthiness for minorities which would perpetuate dis-
crimination); Stanley D. Longhofer & Stephen R. Peters, Self-Selection and Discrimina-
tion in Credit Markets 4, 11-17 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York
University Law Review) (describing equilibria in which borrowers sort themselves among
discriminatory and non-discriminatory lenders based on their creditworthiness and dis-
crimination persists).
148 See Ross & YINGER, supra note 110, at 95-106 (surveying literature on mortgage
lending discrimination).
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creditworthiness and other factors that legitimately affect lending
decisions. The debate intensified with the release of the first Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data containing race in 1991 and
the publication of a study by economists at the Federal Reserve Board
of Boston in 1992.149 The study found that African Americans were
nearly twice as likely as whites to be denied home mortgage loans
after adjusting for an array of variables related to risk.150 The study
has come under a barrage of attacks,151 but rebuttals have affirmed its
central findings.152 On balance, the evidence suggests that disparities
between African American and white borrowers persist even after
taking into account a wide variety of factors that legitimately could
influence a creditor's underwriting practices. 153 These significant dis-
parities suggest that minorities are subject to either disparate treat-
ment discrimination, or disparate impact discrimination based on
facially neutral, but unnecessary, market practices.154 Matched-pair
testing also has found differential treatment by creditors similar to
that found in the home sales market. 155 In sum, recent analysis sug-
gests that "extensive underwriting discrimination existed in 1990, and
there is no more recent evidence to show that this discrimination has
gone away."'1 56 Skeptics are correct, however, in viewing this evidence
as subject to challenge, and further research remains warranted in
understanding the role of discrimination.
149 See Alicia H. Munnell et al., Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA Data,
86 AM. ECON. REV. 25 (1996) (final publication with additional controls and responses to
critics of initial publication, ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., MORTGAGE LENDING IN BOSTON:
INTERPRETING THE HMDA DATA (Fed. Res. Bank of Boston, Working Paper 92-97,
1992)).
150 Id. at 26 (finding that probability of loan denial is 1.8 times higher for blacks and
Hispanics than for whites).
151 See, e.g., Ross & YINGER, supra note 110, at 107-69 (analyzing these studies).
152 See, e.g., id. at 163-65 (analyzing these studies and concluding that although "a limi-
tation in the Boston Fed Study [relating to variability in lender underwriting standards]
could potentially lead to a serious overstatement of discrimination[,] ... the Boston Fed
Study provides strong, but not irrefutable, evidence that in 1990 lenders in Boston engaged
in either disparate-treatment discrimination or disparate-impact discrimination, or both").
153 Id.; see also McKinley Blackburn & Todd Vermilyea, A Comparison of Unexplained
Racial Disparities in Bank Level and Market Level Models of Mortgage Lending (Jan.
2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with New York University Law Review) (finding
evidence of discrimination when combining data across banks).
154 Ross & YINGER, supra note 110, at 211.
155 See, e.g., Robin Smith & Michelle DeLair, New Evidence From Lender Testing: Dis-
crimination at the Pre-Application Stage, in MORTGAGE LENDING DISCRIMINATION: A
REVIEW OF EXISTING EVIDENCE 23-24 (Margery Austin Turner & Felicity Skidmore eds.,
1999) (concluding, based on paired testing, that "race-based differential treatment is
occuring in some cities"), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/mortgage-
lending.pdf.
156 Ross & YINGER, supra note 110, at 367.
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Studies of redlining on the basis of neighborhood composition
also face greater empirical challenges and provide inconclusive results.
Two studies have found that largely African American census tracts
received fewer loans than other tracts, after controlling for tract char-
acteristics, while one study suggests that there may be redlining on the
basis of income.157 The redlining studies generally provide only weak
empirical support for the theoretical propositions regarding
discrimination.
In addition to discrimination in loan denials, price discrimination
also can occur because of market fragmentation. 158 In fragmented or
incomplete markets, markets do not clear at a single equilibrium
price. 159 Prime lenders generally offer a single price to borrowers who
meet their criteria for a given type of loan and property and ration
credit among the others. Subprime lenders, in contrast, offer differen-
tial pricing of loans on the basis of risk and other factors. Although
the growth of risk-based pricing in the subprime market has broad-
ened the eligible pool of borrowers, 60 differentiated pricing also may
result in racial discrimination. Using credit scores, creditors can
determine the price at which they would be willing to lend to a partic-
ular borrower, but the subprime market's fragmented nature prevents
all potential borrowers from learning about lenders' pricing schemes.
This permits lenders to distinguish among similar borrowers in pricing
loans. Creditors price loans based on risk, but also on factors other
than risk, including a borrower's willingness to pay. Differential
pricing can facilitate market clearing by permitting a wider range of
creditors and borrowers to reach agreement on a loan contract tai-
lored to their mutual needs, but in practice, these pricing techniques
lead to systematically different prices for minorities than for whites.
157 See id. at 229-30 (citing Stephen L. Ross & Geoffrey M.B. Tootell, Redlining, the
Community Reinvestment Act, and Private Mortgage Insurance (1998) (unpublished man-
uscript, on file with New York University Law Review)) (finding evidence that lenders
practice redlining against low-income census tracts); id. at 232 (citing study that shows
largely black tracts receive significantly smaller supply of mortgages than other tracts, con-
trolling for other characteristics); see also Consent Decree, United States v. Chevy Chase
Fed. Savings Bank, No. 94-1824 (JG) (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 1994), reprinted in NAT'L CON-
SUMER LAW CTR., CREDIT DISCRIMINATION 401 (2d. ed. 1998) (settlement resulting from
allegations of redlining in mortgage financing in African American neighborhoods).
Income redlining does not violate ECOA, although it would affect an institution's perform-
ance under CRA. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 25.41(e)(3) (bank's assessment area may "not arbi-
trarily exclude low- or moderate-income geographies").
158 See, e.g., IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF
RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION 31 (2001) (finding evidence of price discrimination
in retail car sales, where vehicles do not have fixed sales price).
159 See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 115, at 147 (arguing that in imperfect markets, con-
tracts do not trade as "homogeneous commodity at a single market-clearing price").
160 See infra Part III.C (discussing growth of subprime market).
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Despite the fact that price discrimination is illegal under
ECOA,'6 1 price discrimination occurs in a range of credit markets. 162
Because comprehensive loan pricing data are not available for home
mortgages, 163 researchers have focused on case studies regarding
"overages," the amount by which negotiated loan rates exceed the
lender's minimum rates set forth on "rate sheets" for loan officers.164
Some studies have found that mortgages obtained by African
Americans more often contain overages, and higher ones, than mort-
gages obtained by others.165 African Americans also fare worse than
whites in negotiations with mortgage brokers and loan officers.' 66
161 See, e.g., CREDIT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 157, at 229 & n.78 (citing Consent
Agreement, United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Vicksburg, No. 5-94-CV-6(b)(n) (S.D.
Miss. Jan. 21, 1994) (case brought by Department of Justice for bank's price discrimination
in loan products)).
162 See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Expert Report, Cason v. Nissan (No. 3-98-0223) (M.D. Tenn.
May 25, 2001) at 1, available in NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CREDIT DISCRIMINATION (3d
ed. 2002 & Supp. 2004) (CD-ROM) (finding evidence of disparate racial impact in car
financing practices); AYRES, supra note 158, at 20-21; Ross & YINGER, supra note 110, at
12 ("[S]everal studies suggest that ... discrimination in the setting of mortgage rates
appears to occur in some circumstances."); Richard W. Lang, The Conference on Business
Access to Capital and Credit, in FED. RESERVE Sys. RESEARCH CONFERENCE, SUMMARY:
BUSINESS ACCESS TO CAPITAL AND CREDIT 7 (1999) (reporting that "all three papers
found that African American-owned small businesses were less likely than White-owned
businesses to receive loans, despite holding constant many factors likely to help account for
differences in creditworthiness"), at http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/files/busi-
ness-accesscapital.summary.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2005); Ian Ayres & Peter Sie-
gelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car, 85 AM. ECON. REV.
304, 304 (1995) (finding "large and statistically significant differences in prices quoted to
test buyers of different races and genders").
163 The Federal Reserve Board now requires certain price data for high cost loans to be
reported. Home Mortgage Disclosure; Final & Proposed Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 7221, 7222
(Feb. 15, 2002) (to be codifed at 12 C.F.R. pt. 203). This data will be available for the first
time in summer 2005.
164 On the problem of the differential effects based on race of yield spread premiums,
which compensate brokers for getting borrowers to accept higher interest rates than they
qualify for, see generally Howell E. Jackson & Jeremy Berry, Kickbacks or Compensation:
The Case of Yield Spread Premiums (2003) (unpublished manuscript on file with New York
University Law Review) (discussing payment of yield spread premiums in residential mort-
gage originations).
165 See id. at 9 (finding that blacks and Hispanics more often paid overages and paid
higher overages than whites); Ross & YINGER, supra note 110, at 225-26 (citing studies
that find blacks pay about two-point overage, as compared to whites' one point, and that
blacks and Hispanics are more likely to be charged overages than whites). But see id. at
225-26 (citing study that reports more frequent overages for blacks and Hispanics, but that
overages for blacks and Hispanics are slightly, but significantly, lower than for whites when
paid).
166 Ross & YINGER, supra note 110, at 222-27 (surveying three recent findings of dis-
crimination in loan terms); see also Harold A. Black et al., Is There Discrimination in Mort-
gage Pricing? The Case of Overages, 27 J. BANKING & FIN. 1139, 1159 (2003) (finding that
"minorities are significantly more likely to pay an overage than similarly situated whites,
and when they do, they tend to pay higher overages"); Blackburn & Vermilyea, supra note
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Another potential source of racial discrimination is automated
underwriting systems, now widely used by creditors to determine
creditworthiness. Automated underwriting systems can help to reduce
discrimination to the extent that they are based on objective factors
that best measure creditworthiness, and limit loan officer or broker
discretion to base their decisions on the race of the borrower. Yet
they can have a disparate impact on minorities if the factors used are
correlated with race,167 and can allow disparate treatment if brokers
treat borderline cases differently. As to the former, for example,
lenders might place too much weight on the household's assets, and
not enough weight on the loan-to-value ratios, 168 in a manner that dis-
proportionately affects minority households, who hold less wealth
than whites at every income level. Asset holdings are predictive of
creditworthiness, but so too are loan-to-value ratios. Depending on
the weight placed on these factors, a creditor might get equal predic-
tive value from relying more on loan-to-value ratios, but with less of
an adverse effect on minorities. As to the latter problem of disparate
treatment, for example, brokers and loan officers have been found to
help white borderline applicants more readily or extensively than
black borderline applicants. 169
Other factors may reinforce credit market discrimination. Firms
adopt reward structures for loan officers that favor larger loans, which
are easier to make in high-income areas that typically have higher
concentrations of white borrowers. In addition, loan officers or bro-
kers may discriminate, but their practices might go undetected by
creditors because of agency problems.170 Furthermore, banks may
underinvest (from a social perspective) in branches or in training loan
officers in how to make loans in underserved, minority neighbor-
hoods. Moreover, credit discrimination might lead minorities to
153, at 3 (finding evidence of racial discrimination using "regulatory model"). Possible
explanations for worse negotiating outcomes include borrower anxiety based on experi-
ence with past discrimination, greater risk aversion with respect to loan denials, higher
levels of information asymmetry in which the borrower underestimates her own
creditworthiness or profitability to the lender, or discrimination by the loan officer or
broker in negotiating the loan price.
167 See Ross & YINGER, supra note 110, at 277-91.
168 For a general discussion of the problem of weighting of factors, see Ross & YINGER,
supra note 110, at 277-87.
169 See, e.g., Margery Austin Turner & Felicity Skidmore, Introduction, Summary, and
Recommendations, in MORTGAGE LENDING DISCRIMINATION: A REVIEW OF EXISTING
EVIDENCE 8 (Margery Austin Turner & Felicity Skidmore eds., 1999) (citing evidence that
"whites were more likely to be 'coached' on how best to handle potentially problematic
aspects of their credit profile").
170 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF CORPORATE LAW 8-15 (1991) (discussing agency costs).
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underinvest in creditworthiness, diminishing their prospects for a loan
and further entrenching racial disparities. 171
Additionally, credit markets are affected by discrimination that
may occur elsewhere in society. Discrimination in the housing
market1 72 or the labor market 173 are transmitted to credit markets in
the sense that minority individuals are lower-income and have lower
wealth than they would absent discrimination. The long history of pri-
vate and publicly sanctioned discrimination in the United States has
contributed to lower incomes and lower wealth for African Americans
and other minorities. Minority households thus are more likely to live
in low-income neighborhoods, have low levels of assets, own homes
with lower collateral values, and demonstrate overall less
creditworthiness. Lastly, fears of racial integration in housing could
have depressed housing prices, leading to lower sales, fewer loans, and
thus higher interest rates in minority neighborhoods.
Segregation and wealth disparities are, in part, legacies of dis-
crimination. Black households are significantly more likely to live in
low-income neighborhoods, and neighborhoods are highly segregated
by race.174 Black families are more than twice as likely as their white
counterparts to have low incomes: 37.4% of black families earned
under $25,000 in 2002, while 18.5% of white families earned under
that amount. 175 Black families are nearly three times as likely to have
incomes below the poverty level as white families: 20.7% of black
families had incomes below the poverty level in 2002 while only 7.4%
of white families did.' 76 Median income for black families was 62%
that of white families.1 77
171 See Swire, supra note 147, at 791 (arguing that discrimination reduces returns to
investing in creditworthiness for minorities).
172 For the history of discrimination in government housing policy and in real estate
markets, see generally MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., DISCRIMINATION IN METROPOL-
ITAN HOUSING MARKETS: NATIONAL RESULTS FROM PHASE 1 HDS 2000 i-viii (2002)
(describing history of paired testing "as a tool for fair housing enforcement, detecting and
documenting individual instances of discrimination"), http://www.huduser.org/Publica-
tions/pdfPhaselReport.pdf; Anthony Pennington-Cross & Anthony M. Yezer, The Fed-
eral Housing Administration in the New Millennium, 11 J. HOUSING RES. 357, 357-61
(2000); Ross & YINGER, supra note 110, at 1-10.
173 For discussion of causes and effects of labor market discrimination, see generally
DONOHUE, supra note 136.
174 See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEG-
REGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 1-2 (1993) (describing extent of racial
segregation by neighborhood); TURNER ET AL., supra note 172, at iii-v (describing discrim-
ination in housing sales and rental markets).
175 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 2003, at 43, http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract-04.html.
176 Id.
177 Id.
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The median black household holds about six to seven times less
wealth than the median white household: $19,000 for black house-
holds compared with $120,900 for white households. 178 "The net
worth of black and Hispanic college graduates is similar to the net
worth of white high school graduates, and the net worth of black and
Hispanic high school graduates is similar to the net worth of white
high school dropouts. ' 179 For most households, their home is a critical
asset. 180 Yet despite gains in the 1990s, the homeownership rate for
non-white or Hispanic families is only 47% compared to 73% for
white families. 18' Lower wealth (or put another way, asset poverty)
can contribute to other social disadvantages, including less access to
credit, less ability to accumulate other assets (both financial and
homeownership), lower standards of living in worse neighborhoods,
lower levels of opportunity for children, and worse educational, labor
force, marital and health outcomes.1 82
While critics are correct that antidiscrimination legislation is a
more direct method of addressing discrimination in credit markets and
other contexts, evidence suggests that antidiscrimination laws have
not completely eradicated discrimination from our society. 183 CRA
can play an important role in overcoming credit market, non-credit
market discrimination, and the legacy of such discrimination. 84 Any
178 Ana M. Aizcorbe et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence From the
1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, 89 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 7-8 (2003). For further
discussion of the income gap between black and white households, see generally DALTON
CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED (1999); MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M.
SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTHIWIHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INE-
QUALITY (1995).
179 JOHN KARL SCHOLZ & KARA LEVINE, U.S. BLACK-WHITE WEALTH INEQUALITY: A
SURVEY 4 (2003), at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/-scholz/Research/Wealth-surveyy.pdf (last
visited Mar. 3, 2005).
180 See Aizcorbe, supra note 178, at 9 tbl.4, 16 & tbl.7 (showing that in 2001, primary
residences made up 46.8% of families' nonfinancial assets, that nonfinancial assets made
up 58% of total assets, and that this was the largest single asset category).
181 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2004-2005,
at 457 (2001 statistics), http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract-04.html.
182 See CONLEY, supra note 178, at 1-7 (discussing social impact of wealth gap between
blacks and whites); ROBERT HAVEMAN & BARBARA WOLFE, SUCCEEDING GENERATIONS:
ON THE EFFECTS OF INVESTMENTS IN CHILDREN 3 (1994) (summarizing effects of poverty
on children); SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE
PARENT: WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS 79-94 (1994) (discussing how lower income associ-
ated with single parenthood impacts children's achievement); OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra
note 178, at 1-15 (same).
183 See, e.g., DONOHUE, supra note 136, at 297 ("The passage of antidiscrimination legis-
lation and the growing social disapproval of overtly discriminatory behavior have elimi-
nated such proclamations far more thoroughly than they have eliminated discriminatory
conduct on the part of employers.").
184 In this Part, I discuss the reasons for the importance of CRA in overcoming discrimi-
nation. In Part IV, I discuss the empirical evidence that CRA has helped to do so. In Part
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serious attempt to address our long history of racial discrimination
and its legacy needs to take account of racial segregation and the vast
wealth gap in the United States. CRA is by no means the only or
primary way to do so. But CRA is well-positioned to contribute to
reducing discrimination and its effects by engaging federally insured
depository institutions in helping to overcome the market failures that
I described in Section A.
CRA encourages banks and thrifts to learn about low- and mod-
erate-income communities in which minority households are dispro-
portionately represented. To the extent that statistical and animus-
based discrimination are rooted in lack of familiarity with minority
communities, CRA can help foster greater understanding. To the
extent that CRA succeeds in overcoming market failures, CRA can
also help to reduce discrimination by harnessing competitive forces,
increasing homeownership rates, improving credit opportunities in
low-income neighborhoods and for low-income borrowers, and
helping to connect low-income households to mainstream credit mar-
kets. Overcoming market failures in credit markets will inure to the
benefit of all low-income borrowers and communities. Given the high
correlation between being black and having a low income, living in a
low-income neighborhood, and having little wealth, overcoming these
market failures will help minority households gain access to new eco-
nomic opportunities and diminish the space for discrimination.
In addition to addressing discrimination by helping to overcome
market failures that affect minority households, CRA helps to rein-
force ECOA's antidiscrimination norms directly. Under the 1995 reg-
ulations, "[e]vidence of discriminatory or other illegal credit practices
adversely affects" the bank's CRA performance rating, 185 including
evidence regarding violations of ECOA and the Fair Housing Act.18 6
The basic principle is that engaging in such illegal credit practices
would be "inconsistent with helping to meet community credit
needs."'1 87 To the extent that CRA is underenforced in non-CRA
supervisory contexts, or to the extent that the difficulty of proving an
ECOA case, or ECOA's penalties once discrimination is proved,
under-deter discriminatory practices, this provision of CRA would
help to reinforce ECOA.188
VII, I explain why CRA has important advantages over existing antidiscrimination laws in
some contexts.
185 12 C.F.R. § 25.28(c) (2004).
186 Community Reinvestment Act: Interagency Questions and Answers Regarding
Community Reinvestments; Notice, 66 Fed. Reg. 36,620, 36,640 (July 12, 2001).
187 Id.
188 For further analysis of ECOA, see infra Part VII.
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C. Problems in the Subprime Sector
The expansion of lending by subprime specialists to a broader
range of borrowers is generally a positive development, reflecting in
part a reduction in informational barriers in low-income communities
as well as advances in financial innovation. In many ways, however,
problems in the subprime sector illustrate the overlapping and mutu-
ally reinforcing problems of market failure and racial discrimination.
Thus, while the subprime sector exhibits its own pathologies war-
ranting separate treatment in this section, analysis of this sector can
help to reveal the ways in which market failures exacerbate discrimi-
nation, and how overcoming such failures can reduce discrimination
and improve the efficiency of the home mortgage market as a whole.
As I explain in Part IV, banks and thrifts have increased their lending
to low- and moderate-income borrowers in ways that suggest that
CRA is working. But subprime lending-a sector largely outside
CRA's purview because such lending has been undertaken largely by
financial services companies other than banks and thrifts t89-has
grown dramatically at the same time.190 Subprime lenders specialize
in making loans to borrowers with impaired or limited credit history.
Most subprime loans are refinance loans. 191 Although refinancing
may be used to obtain better rates, subprime refinance loans usually
are used for home improvement or consumer purchases, to pay for
education expenses, or to consolidate other consumer debt.192 With
new and lower-cost sources of funding available from the secondary
market through securitization, and with advances in information and
risk management, subprime lending has grown sevenfold from a rela-
tively small base in 1994 to reach $241 billion, or 9% of the market, by
189 As I explain below, affiliate loans can be counted at the bank's option and although
such affiliate loans are not usually included, if they are included, and if the affiliate is a
subprime lender, such subprime affiliate loans could be included in a bank's CRA perform-
ance rating. In the late 1990s, a number of banks and bank holding companies purchased
affiliates that, among other things, make subprime loans. Moreover, some loan pools pur-
chased by banks and thrifts could include subprime loans, and subprime loans currently are
not distinguished from other types of loans in HMDA data.
190 For evidence that CRA nonetheless can be demonstrated to have been an important
factor in driving increased lending in low-income areas, see infra Part IV.A.
191 U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, CURBING PRED-
ATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING: A JOINT REPORT 31 (2000) [hereinafter HUD-TREA-
SURY REPORT] (co-directed by the author), available at http://www.hud.gov.80/pressrel/
treasrpt.pdf.
192 See id. at 30-31.
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2002.193 In 2002, there were just over 200 subprime and manufactured
home lenders.194
The subprime market is plagued by serious problems that are a
blend of the market failures and racial discrimination discussed in the
previous two Sections. Some subprime borrowers who could have
qualified for loans from prime lenders end up in the subprime market,
paying higher rates: Preliminary research suggests that between 10%
and 35% of subprime borrowers could qualify for prime mortgage
loans. 195 Some minority borrowers may have been improperly
"steered" to higher cost lenders by brokers or real estate profes-
sionals. 196 Even after accounting for neighborhood and borrower
characteristics that influence lending decisions, there is "a strong geo-
graphic concentration of subprime lending in those neighborhoods
where there is a large population of African American homeowners"
and "African-American borrowers, regardless of the neighborhood
where they are located, have relatively high likelihood of obtaining a
subprime compared to a prime loan. ' 197 Moreover, studies have doc-
umented abusive practices in the subprime sector. 198 These practices
have included "flipping," repeatedly refinancing a loan in a short
period of time. Flipping subjects a borrower to high fees, including
prepayment penalties, which diminish the borrower's home equity
without providing significant benefit. Loans have been "packed" with
193 Governor Edward M. Gramlich, Remarks at the Texas Association of Bank Counsel
27th Annual Convention (Oct. 9, 2003), at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
speeches/2003/20031009/default.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
194 U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., HUD SUBPRIME AND MANUFACTURED
HOME LENDER LIST, at http://www.huduser.org/datasets/manu.html (last visited Jan. 16,
2005). Manufactured home is the term for a home that is factory-built and usually sold at
retail outlets. Manufactured homes include what are commonly referred to as "mobile
homes," as well as factory-built homes that resemble traditional site-built ones.
195 FREDDIE MAC, AUTOMATED UNDERWRITING: MAKING MORTGAGE LENDING SIM-
PLER AND FAIRER FOR AMERICA'S FAMILIES Chap. 5 (Sept. 1996), http://www.freddiemac.
com/corporate/reports/moseley/mosehome.htm.
196 It is difficult to find direct evidence of credit steering, as opposed to evidence of
steering by real estate professionals regarding home location. Minorities disproportion-
ately use subprime lenders, but in addition to steering, minorities may misperceive their
own creditworthiness, believe that prime lenders would deny their loans, or make bad
choices. Moreover, subprime lenders market heavily in these communities, and prime
lenders may not market sufficiently in minority communities for them to be perceived as
real options by community members.
197 Paul S. Calem et al., The Neighborhood Distribution of Subprime Mortgage Lending,
29 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 393, 407 (2004).
198 For a full discussion of such practices, see generally HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra
note 191 (detailing predatory lending abuses and evaluating reform proposals). I co-
directed this report while at Treasury. See also Michael S. Barr, Access to Financial Ser-
vices in the 21st Century: Five Opportunities for the Bush Administration and the 107th
Congress, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 447, 455-62 (2002) (describing
problems in and opportunities for reform of subprime mortgage market).
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additional products (such as credit life insurance) without the bor-
rower understanding that the products were optional or unsuitable.199
Loans have included fees unrelated to risk or servicing, and which are
structured to disguise the loans' true costs. 200 Some brokers have
made home mortgage loans without regard to the borrower's ability to
repay.201 These so-called "asset based" loans often were made by bro-
kers who earned high fees and were less concerned about their reputa-
tions among lenders.20 2 In other cases borrowers have testified that
"unscrupulous mortgage brokers, lenders, home improvement con-
tractors, appraisers, and combinations thereof" engaged in "outright
fraud" as well as "deceptive or high-pressure sales tactics," and often
"prey[ed] on . . . the elderly, minorities, and individuals with lower
incomes and less education. '20 3
While credit risk is a key determinant of whether a borrower
receives a prime or subprime loan, a recent study suggests that "credit
risk alone may not fully explain why borrowers end up in the sub-
prime market. ' 2 4 For example, borrowers who are older, Hispanic,
or search less for interest rates are more likely to end up in the sub-
prime market.20 5 Having a subprime loan is an important determinant
of refinancing with a subprime loan even after controlling for relevant
factors related to risk and creditworthiness: Some 60% of subprime
borrowers who refinanced did so with subprime loans rather than
prime ones,206 indicating that many subprime borrowers get stuck in
the subprime market.
The higher price that borrowers pay is a function not only of
using a subprime lender, but also of negotiating with mortgage bro-
kers, who dominate the subprime market. Brokers are compensated
for getting borrowers to pay higher rates than those for which the bor-
rower would qualify. Such "yield spread premiums" are used
widely.20 7 In loans with yield spread premiums, unlike other loans,
there is wide dispersion in prices paid to mortgage brokers. Within
199 See HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 191, at 2.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 76-77.
203 Id. at 2.
204 Marsha J. Courchane et at., Subprime Borrowers: Mortgage Transitions and Out-
comes, 29 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 365, 373 (2004).
205 Id. at 371-72.
206 Id. at 375, tbl.1.
207 See Jackson & Berry, supra note 164, at 127. While in principle yield spread pre-
miums could permit lenders legitimately to pass on the cost of a mortgage broker fee to a
cash strapped borrower in the form of a higher interest rate rather than in the form of a
cash payment, the evidence suggests that yield spread premiums are in fact used to com-
pensate brokers for getting borrowers to accept higher interest rates.
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the group of borrowers paying yield spread premiums, African
Americans paid $474 more for their loans, and Hispanics $590 more,
than white borrowers; thus, even if minority and white borrowers
could qualify for the same rate, in practice minority borrowers are
likely to pay much more.208 Minority borrowers and white borrowers
tend to go to different lenders, with minority borrowers more likely to
use subprime lenders, "some [of which] use particularly aggressive
rate-setting rules with minority customers." 20 9 Moreover, borrowers
in the subprime market form a pool whose risk characteristics are
worse and more widely dispersed than borrowers in the prime
market.210 Even though there is rough risk-based pricing in the sub-
prime market, defaulting borrowers create an externality that raises
interest rates on all subprime borrowers because creditors price loans
based on pooling risk by observable characteristics. Regulation of the
subprime sector is in part a response to the problem of incomplete
contracts.2 11 Borrowers cannot contract with one another to allocate
the costs of the negative externality of default. Moreover, these exter-
nalities are more likely to be concentrated in low-income communi-
ties. Concentrated defaults make it less likely that creditors will be
willing to lend to households living in neighborhoods with high default
rates, both because the defaults will have undermined the stability of
property values in the neighborhood, and because living in a neigh-
borhood with high defaults will signal lower creditworthiness. More-
over, foreclosures concentrated in low-income neighborhoods cause
negative externalities to neighboring property owners in terms of
lower property values, reduced levels of investment in maintenance,
and an increase in vandalism and crime on abandoned properties.212
Some critics believe that the subprime market's growth obviates
the need for CRA. After all, if subprime lending has increased
208 Id. at 125 (describing differences in "total mortgage broker compensation," which
includes both yield spread premiums and their functional equivalents, broker "discount
fees"); see also JACK GUTrENTAG, ANOTHER VIEW OF PREDATORY LENDING 8 (Wharton
Fin. Inst. Ctr., Working Paper No. 01-23-B, 2000) ("According to the brokers, [a] major
determinant of profit per loan is the sophistication of the borrower relative to the sales
skills of the loan officer."), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/01/0123.pdf.
209 Ross & YINGER, supra note 110, at 344.
210 Anthony Pennington-Cross, Credit History and the Performance of Prime and Non-
prime Mortgages, 27 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 279, 299 (2003).
211 On the problem of incomplete contracts, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87,
88-89 (1989) (distinguishing between paternalism and externalities as bases for immutable
rules to fill gaps in incomplete contracts); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of
Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 115 (1999) (explaining theory of incomplete
contracts based on inability of parties to contract at reasonable cost for all contingent
states).
212 See, e.g., Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 172, at 369.
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without impetus from CRA, why not simply rely on subprime lenders
in low-income communities? Critics like Gunther argue that market
forces have solved the alleged market failures that I described. I think
the empirical evidence is more complicated than that, as I discuss
more fully in the next Part. Lending by subprime specialists does not
replace lending by banks and thrifts. First, subprime creditors spe-
cialize in refinance loans rather than in home purchase originations. 213
Because they specialize in refinance loans, subprime lenders free-ride
on the information generated by firms engaged in home purchase
lending, predominately banks and thrifts covered by CRA. Second,
many subprime lenders have failed to report credit scores for sound
borrowers in order to capture the informational benefits from their
investment. 214 As a result, the positive externalities from increased
lending in low-income areas are not always realized. Third, borrowing
from a subprime lender may signal to prime lenders that a borrower is
more likely to be a bad credit risk. While in one study, 40% of sub-
prime borrowers were able to obtain prime refinance mortgages, 60%
were not.215 For these borrowers, rather than increasing access to
prime lending, subprime borrowing helped to keep them in the sub-
prime market, where borrowers pay more for credit. As this study
found, "previous mortgage segment is an important determinant of
current market segment even after controlling for risk-related under-
writing and demographic effects. '21 6 Thus, the growth of subprime
lending does not obviate the need for prime lending to creditworthy
borrowers in low-income communities. Lastly, the empirical evidence
I explore in Part IV is more consistent with the view that CRA has
had an independent role in expanding access to credit in low-income
communities than with the view of CRA's critics.
CRA has not yet done enough to integrate the prime and sub-
prime markets, as evidenced by these problems.217 CRA is uniquely
213 See HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 191, at 31.
214 See supra note 117.
215 Courchane et al., supra note 204, at 374.
216 Id. at 375.
217 See, e.g., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., In re Citigroup Inc. & Citifinancial
Credit Co., Order to Cease and Desist and Order of Assessment of a Civil Money Penalty
Issued Upon Consent, May 27, 2004 (alleging subprime affiliate engaging in asset-based
lending in violation of HOEPA, requiring co-signators to sell more credit insurance in vio-
lation of Regulation B, misleading examiners, and assessing civil money penalties of $70
million and securing agreement to pay restitution to borrowers), available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/enforcement/2004/20040527/attachment.pdf (last vis-
ited Mar. 30, 2005). But see OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMMU-
NITY REINVESTMENT ACT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: CITIBANK, N.A. 7, 11-12 (June 9,
2003) [hereinafter CRA PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: CITIBANK] (rating Citibank out-
standing after evaluating performance of bank and its mortgage affiliates, including
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positioned to overcome the bifurcation between the prime and sub-
prime markets by enhancing competition from banks and thrifts.
Overcoming that bifurcation would improve market efficiency, reduce
racial discrimination, and speed the process of correcting other
market failures. An integrated market would reduce the scope for
price discrimination among similarly situated borrowers. As I explain
in Part VII, CRA can help bolster ECOA in reducing some forms of
discrimination, especially those involving disparate impact that results
from bifurcated markets in which minority and white borrowers tend
to go to different lenders, and market fragmentation, which increases
the opportunity for differential pricing that disadvantages minorities.
CRA can also help reinforce the Home Owners Equity Protection Act
(HOEPA), as I explain in Part VII, to overcome problems in the sub-
prime market by helping to enhance competition from banks and
thrifts in serving these households.
D. Summary
Market failures in low-income communities, racial discrimination,
and bifurcated credit markets warrant governmental action. I have
argued that, in principle, CRA is a reasonable policy response to these
problems. CRA helps to overcome information externalities and col-
lective action problems by helping to coordinate bank lending. CRA
responds to the continuing effects of racial discrimination by encour-
aging banks and thrifts to lend in low-income areas and to low-income
borrowers, where and among whom minorities are disproportionately
represented. With modest regulatory changes, CRA could offer an
even stronger response to the market failures and discrimination that
have arisen in the subprime market. In the next Part, I use recent
empirical evidence to explain how CRA already is helping to over-
come many of these barriers, even though problems remain.
IV
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE THAT CRA Is EFFECTIVE
Part III identified specific market failures and discrimination that
are the theoretical foundations for CRA and explained how CRA
could help to overcome such problems. The debate over CRA, how-
ever, cannot be decided based on abstractions or anecdotes. This Part
explores recent empirical evidence showing that CRA, on balance,
Citifinancial, and noting that fair lending concerns at another affiliate "did not significantly
impact our CRA assessment of Citibank" because affiliate did not constitute significant
percentage of institution's low- and moderate-income mortgage lending), at http://www.
occ.treas.gov/ftp/craeval/may04/1461.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 80:513
HeinOnline  -- 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 560 2005
CREDIT WHERE IT COUNTS
constitutes a defensible policy response to market failures and dis-
crimination. The first Section relies on empirical evidence, some of
which was published in a study that I directed at the Treasury
Department, to demonstrate that CRA has a positive impact on access
to credit, despite the empirical difficulty of isolating CRA as a cause
of recent positive developments in credit markets.218 This evidence
effectively rebuts the arguments of critics that CRA provides little
benefit, or is actually harmful, to low-income communities, and is con-
sistent with a theory that CRA is helping to overcome market failures
and discrimination.
Section B analyzes the critics' claims that CRA is overly costly,
and explains how the costs of CRA generally are overstated. In par-
ticular, the claim that CRA induces banks and thrifts to make danger-
ously unprofitable loans is not substantiated by the data. Instead, the
data is again more consistent with a theory that CRA is helping to
improve market efficiency by overcoming market failures and discrim-
ination. Similarly, I present evidence to rebut claims of rampant rent
seeking, high compliance costs, heavy burdens on efficient mergers,
and other costs predicted by CRA's critics. Even a rough sense of the
costs and benefits of CRA adduced thus far suggests that it is on net
socially beneficial, and reasonable legal response to market failures
and the legacy of discrimination.
A. The Benefits of CRA Are Substantial
The experience under CRA over the last decade suggests that
CRA has been effective in helping to overcome market failures in
low-income communities. In this Section, I first describe innovative
initiatives that CRA has spurred by banking organizations in order to
serve low- and moderate-income communities. I then evaluate recent
empirical evidence that attempts to measure the effects of CRA on
home mortgage lending, which constitutes the bulk of CRA-eligible
lending and as to which data is most readily available. I also discuss
evidence regarding small business and community development
lending as well as community development investments.
Initiatives by financial institutions over the last decade suggest
that CRA-in combination with other factors that I assess more fully
below-is helping banks and thrifts to eliminate or reduce barriers to
credit. These activities are consistent with the view that CRA is
218 It should be re-emphasized in this Part, as in the discussion of market imperfections,
that empirical studies in an area as complicated as credit markets cannot prove any conten-
tion with certainty. Technological and economic change exacerbates this difficulty, as do
the multiplicity of regulations and the pervasiveness of subsidies.
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encouraging banks and thrifts to undertake steps to overcome market
failures in order to meet the "credit needs of their entire commu-
nity. ''219 For example, lenders have formed multi-bank Community
Development Corporations (CDCs) and loan consortia, and
partnered with third parties to reduce risk, overcome collective action
problems, and share the costs and benefits of developing information
about low-income markets. 220 Banks have invested in locally based
Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) to develop
specialized market knowledge, share risk, and explore new market
opportunities. 221 They have engaged in special marketing programs to
targeted communities, and have experimented with more flexible
underwriting and specialized servicing techniques to determine if a
broader range of applications could be approved without undue
risk.222 Banks also have funded credit counseling to improve the
creditworthiness of potential borrowers. 223 Many larger institutions
have developed specialized units within their organizations that focus
on the needs of low- and moderate-income communities.224 These
units help overcome agency costs by keeping the organization focused
on expanding its low-income and minority lending, and by sharing
expertise as to how to do so. A positive lending cycle has begun in
many communities: Once lenders know that others will be making
loans to a community, they face less liquidity risk, gather and dissemi-
nate information more quickly, and produce positive information
219 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a) (2000).
220 See, e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., THE PERFORMANCE AND
PROFITABILITY OF CRA-RELATED LENDING, 86-87 (2000) [hereinafter PERFORMANCE
AND PROFITABILITY] (noting that banks limit "potential exposure to losses by sharing risks
with third parties, including local or state public authorities or private revolving loan
funds"), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/surveys/craloansurvey/
cratext.pdf; infra note 222 and accompanying text. Third parties are involved in three
quarters of CRA special lending programs. Id. Third parties include financial consortia,
nonprofit organizations, and public entities at all levels of government. Id. at tbl.12, avail-
able at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/surveys/crloansurvey/cratables.pdf; see
also Robert B. Avery et al., CRA Special Lending Programs, FED. RES. BULL. 711 (2000)
(reporting on results of survey); How an Innovative Bank Launched a CDC, COMMUNITY
DEV. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY (Winter 2004-05) (describing suc-
cessful housing project funded through national bank CDC that provided revenues suffi-
cient to cover CDC loan costs), at http://www.occ.treas.gov/cdd/ezine/winter04/
how_a_inn.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
221 See, e.g., COMMUNITY DEV. NEWSL. 2002 (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Washington, D.C.) (describing variety of strategies for bank partnerships with CDFIs),
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/cdd/E-zineText.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
222 See, e.g., PERFORMANCE AND PROFITABILITY, supra note 220, 86, tbl.13 (describing
characteristics of "affordable mortgage lending programs").
223 Id. at 86-87.
224 See, e.g., id. at 65 ("About 63 percent of the [CRA special lending] programs are
operated by a distinct unit or department.").
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externalities. Experience suggests that increased lending to low-
income communities has occurred, and that such lending has not led
to the kind or the extent of unprofitable, excessively risky activity pre-
dicted by critics.225
Home mortgage data show increased lending to minority and
low-income borrowers.226 From 1993 to 1999, the number of home
purchase loans made to Hispanics increased 121.4%; to Native
Americans, 118.9%; to African Americans, 91.0%; to Asians, 70.1%;
and to whites, 33.5%. 227 Over that period, the number of home
purchase loans extended to applicants with incomes less than 80% of
the median increased 86.2%, a much higher rate of growth than any
other income group experienced. 228 In 1999, conventional home
purchase loans extended in neighborhoods that are predominantly
minority were up 17% over the previous year, compared with 6%
growth in other neighborhoods.2 29
Consistent with the theoretical analysis presented earlier, empir-
ical evidence suggests that markets were relatively thin, and thus
prone to relatively higher information externalities, at the beginning
of the 1990s, and that market thickness improved during the
decade.230 One measure of market thickness for home purchase loans
is the volume of potential transactions as measured by the level of
home ownership in low- and moderate-income communities as com-
pared with high-income communities. In 1990, there were 19.6 million
homeowners in low- and moderate-income communities, 49.6% the
225 See id.; see also infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing results of study in greater detail).
226 See, e.g., JOINT CrR. FOR Hous. STUDIES, HARVARD UNIV., THE 25TH ANNIVER-
SARY OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT Ac-r: ACCESS TO CAPITAL IN AN EVOLVING
FINANCIAL SERVICES SYSTEM 3 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 JOINT CENTER CRA REPORT],
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/governmentprograms/cra0 2 -l.pdL
227 Author's calculations based on HMDA data as reported by the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council. See HMDA data, tbl. 7, at http://www.ffiec.gov/hmcrpr/
hmda03.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2005). As Peter Swire was kind enough to point out to
me, critics might contend that this overstates progress in lending to minority households
because Hispanic household growth was much higher than white household growth. Over
this time period, the number of white households grew by 6.2%, black households by
12.4%, and Hispanic households by 36.7%. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, HOUSEHOLDS BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 1970 TO PRESENT, tbl. HH-2
(2004), http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/tabHH-2.pdf. Adjusting for
growth in the number of households, however, still shows progress for minorities. The
growth in loans to whites was 3.58 times its household growth rate; for Hispanics, 3.31
times; for blacks 7.34 times.
228 See supra note 227.
229 Author's calculation based on HMDA data, supra note 227, at tbl.5.
230 1 would like to thank Geoffrey Miller for suggesting that I examine the empirical
evidence for the "market thinness" proposition using turnover rates and Rachel Drew for
generating the tables of Census data that support this analysis.
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number of homeowners in high-income areas.231 By 2000, the ratio
had improved, so that the 24.8 million homeowners in low- and mod-
erate-income communities were 55% of the number in high-income
areas.2 32 The number of homeowners in low- and moderate-income
communities grew by 26.6% over the decade, while the number of
homeowners in high-income areas grew by only 14%.233 Another
measure of market thickness is liquidity in home sales, as measured by
the turnover rate-the percentage of homeowners who move in a
given time. In the five years preceding 1990, 28.7% of homeowners in
low- and moderate-income areas moved, as compared with 36.8% in
high-income census tracts, a difference of 8 percentage points.234 By
2000, the percentage of homeowners who had moved in the prior five
years was 32.3% for homeowners in low- and moderate-income tracts
and 36.9% for high-income tracts, a difference that had diminished to
4.5 percentage points. 235 A third way of thinking about market thick-
ness is to look at the number of low- and moderate-income area
homeowners who moved, generating a home sale, compared to the
number of high income homeowners who moved. In the five years
preceding 1990, about 5.6 million homeowners living in low- and mod-
erate-income tracts had moved, about 38% of the number of home-
owners who had moved in high-income areas.236 By 2000, the gap
had narrowed: The number of homeowners who had moved in the
prior five years in low- and moderate-income areas increased to 8 mil-
lion, about 48% of the comparable figure for homeowners in high-
income areas. 237 The basic trend lines are the same for low- and mod-
erate-income census tracts in which at least half of the households are
minority, but the absolute levels of homeownership and home sales
are much lower than in non-minority low- and moderate-income
tracts, turnover rates are somewhat lower in minority tracts than in
non-minority tracts, and the trends in improvement less pronounced
in minority tracts than in non-minority tracts.2 38
231 Author's calculations based on table, Homeownership and Turnover Rates, 1990,
2000 (on file with New York University Law Review) generated using microdata from U.S.
Census 1990 & 2000. See genereally U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
www.census.gov. Individual census tracts borders may have shifted between 1990 and
2000, but it is not possible to obtain the same micro files for 1990 data using 2000 census
tract definitions, and these shifts are unlikely to affect the data in a meaningful way.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 In minority tracts, there were 4.6 million homeowners in 1990 and 5.1 million home-
owners in 2000. There were 1.1 million homeowners who had moved in the previous 5
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Examples of innovative lending structures, growth in lending to
these communities, and higher levels of home ownership and sales are
indicative of progress, but careful econometric studies are essential to
understanding the role of CRA itself in overcoming market failures
and discrimination. Such studies have found evidence that CRA
improved access to home mortgage credit for low-income borrowers
during the 1990s, when CRA regulations were amended to focus on
performance, regulatory agencies stepped up the seriousness of their
CRA reviews, and bank merger activity increased. One study found
that the share of loans to individuals targeted by CRA and fair
lending regulations originated by banks, thrifts, and their affiliates in
the 1990s increased; it also found evidence of gains to minorities and
low-income areas from all lenders, which the authors attribute in part
to increased fair lending enforcement. 239 Other researchers have
found evidence consistent "with the view that the CRA has been
effective in encouraging bank organizations, particularly those
involved in consolidation, to serve lower-income and minority bor-
rowers and neighborhoods. '240 Lending to low- and moderate-
income borrowers grew much faster than lending to other groups in
the 1990s, which may be attributable both to CRA and to other fac-
tors.24 1 A case study found that one lender had extended loans to
low-income and minority borrowers with lower credit scores than it
normally required, and had essentially doubled its lending to low- and
moderate-income borrowers, because of CRA.242 These studies gen-
erally found much higher levels of activity during the 1990s than
during the 1980s, when CRA was thought generally to be ineffective
because of inadequate regulatory attention.
Many of the studies described above, however, had difficulties
discerning the effect of CRA apart from other policy and market
years in 1990 and 1.4 million in 2000. Turnover rates were 24% in 1990 and 27.6% in 2000.
Id.
239 Douglas D. Evanoff & Lewis M. Siegal, CRA and Fair Lending Regulations:
Resulting Trends in Mortgage Lending, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 19, 28-38 (1996).
240 Robert B. Avery et al., Trends in Home Purchase Lending: Consolidation and the
Community Reinvestment Act, 85 FED. RES. BULL. 81, 82 (1999).
241 Robert B. Avery et al., Credit Risk, Credit Scoring, and the Performance of Home
Mortgages, 82 FED. RES. BULL. 621, 638-39 (1996).
242 Michael LaCour-Little, Does the Community Reinvestment Act Make Mortgage
Credit More Widely Available? Some New Evidence Based on the Performance of CRA
Mortgage Credits 14, 21 (May 4, 1998) (Conference paper presented at the Midyear
Meeting of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, Washington,
D.C., unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York University Law Review) (noting
that in study of loans from one mortgage lender, "only about half of all loans extended to
the low-to-moderate income segment would not have qualified anyway under traditional
scoring standards").
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Law Review
May 2005]
HeinOnline  -- 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 565 2005
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
changes. As a result, researchers attempted to isolate the effects of
CRA with greater precision. I directed a two-part study at the
Treasury Department, undertaken by researchers from the Brookings
Institution and the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard
University, which constituted one such attempt. The baseline study
found that, in absolute terms, between 1993 and 1998, depository insti-
tutions covered by the CRA and their affiliates made nearly $620 bil-
lion in home mortgage, small business, and community development
loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers and communities.2 43
Although fully comparable data are not available for the 1980s, avail-
able evidence suggests that stepped up regulatory attention under
CRA, as well as other developments that I discuss below, resulted in
much higher levels of lending to these borrowers.244 One way to mea-
sure CRA's effectiveness during the 1990s is to compare CRA lending
by each bank or thrift to the same institution's non-CRA-eligible
lending. CRA-eligible home mortgage lending increased relative to
other home mortgage lending by banks and thrifts and their affiliates.
The number of CRA-eligible mortgage loans increased by thirty-nine
percent between 1993 and 1998, while other mortgage loans increased
243 Author's calculations based on ROBERT E. LITAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AFTER FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION:
A BASELINE REPORT ES-5 ($467 billion in home mortgage lending including $135 billion in
1998 alone), ES-14 ($99 billion in small business lending), ES-16 ($53 billion in community
development lending) (Apr. 2000) [hereinafter LIrAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT], avail-
able at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/crareport.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2005);
see also ROBERT E. LITAN ET AL., THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AFTER FINAN-
CIAL MODERNIZATION: A FINAL REPORT 26 (Jan. 2001) (noting continued growth rate in
1999 in home mortgage lending from 1998 levels) [hereinafter LITAN ET AL., FINAL
REPORT], available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/finalrpt.pdf (last visited
Jan. 26, 2005). Updating the total figures through 1999 would yield over $800 billion in
flows. Author's calculations based on LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT, supra, ($619 bil-
lion); LITAN ET AL., FINAL REPORT, supra (based on conservative assumption of additional
$135 billion in home mortgage lending); Fed. Fin. Inst. Examination Council, CRA
National Aggregate Table 2-2, 1999 ($35.4 billion in small business loans in low- and mod-
erate-income areas), available at http://www.ffiec.gov/webcraad/cranaag.htm (last visited
Mar. 30, 2005); Fed. Fin. Inst. Examination Council., CRA National Aggregate Table 3,
1999 ($17 billion in community development lending), available at http://www.ffiec.gov/
webcraad/cranaag.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2005). For further analysis based on the data
from the Treasury reports, see Eric S. Belsky et al., The Effects of the Community Rein-
vestment Act on Bank and Thrift Home Purchase Mortgage Lending (Harvard Univ. Joint
Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Working Paper CRA01-1, 2001) (confirming results of LITAN ET
AL., supra), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/govemmentprograms/
belschillyezer-cra01-1.pdf. Mortgage loans made between 1993 and 1998 constituted $467
billion of that total. See LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT, supra, at ES-5, 36 tbl.2. In 1998
alone, CRA-covered institutions and their affiliates made $135 billion in mortgage loans to
these borrowers, an eighty percent increase over their lending in 1993. See id. at ES-3 tbl.,
ES-1, ES-5.
244 BELSKY ET AL., supra note 243, at 5-6; LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT, supra note
243, at 61-69; LITAN ET AL., FINAL REPORT, supra note 243, at 3.
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by only seventeen percent.245 Excluding all affiliates (which are
included in CRA assessments only at the lender's discretion 246) banks
and thrifts themselves increased their home mortgage lending to
CRA-eligible low- and moderate-income borrowers and areas by ten
percent; in contrast, mortgage lending in more affluent markets by
these lenders did not change.247 The faster growth in CRA lending
compared to other mortgage lending is reflected in the larger shares of
bank and thrift portfolios devoted to CRA-eligible loans. Over this
period, the portfolio share of CRA-covered lender and affiliate mort-
gage loans going to these low- and moderate-income borrowers and
areas increased from 25% to 28%. That is, over the relevant period,
these CRA-covered institutions and their affiliates increasingly
focused on underserved markets.2 48
Critics argue that the growth of lending by independent mortgage
and finance companies in the subprime market shows that CRA is
irrelevant. 249 In their view, since non-CRA lenders are serving low-
income markets, CRA must be unnecessary. I do not believe that to
be the case. To begin with, subprime lenders provide a different
product from prime lenders. The dramatic expansion of non-covered
lenders in the subprime refinance market, albeit from a low base,
means that banks and thrifts lost market share overall in low- and
moderate-income communities. Yet fully 85% of non-covered institu-
tions' growth is attributable to lending by specialists in subprime and
manufactured home lending.250 More than 77% of this subprime
lending growth is attributable to refinancing rather than home
purchase loans.251 As a result of the growth in subprime refinance
lending, if one includes both prime and subprime markets, non-cov-
ered institutions increased their overall market share of lending to
low- and moderate-income borrowers and areas from 35% in 1993 to
37% in 1998.252 By contrast, lenders covered by CRA primarily spe-
cialize in prime lending. In the prime market, banks and thrifts cov-
ered by CRA and their affiliates increased their market share of
lending to low- and moderate-income borrowers and areas from 66%
in 1993 to 71% in 1998.253 Thus, banks and thrifts subject to CRA
increased their market share in home purchase lending, while finance
245 See LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT, supra note 243, at ES-6.
246 Id. at 111.
247 See id. at 79.
248 See id. at ES-6-7 & ES-2.
249 See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 21, at 57, 60.
250 LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT, supra note 243, at 39.
251 See id. at ES-9.
252 See id.
253 See id. at ES-10.
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and mortgage companies focused on subprime refinance loans. That
is, to the extent that CRA is designed to overcome market failures
that diminish the opportunities for low-income borrowers to purchase
a home, such home purchase lending by CRA-covered lenders
increased more rapidly than similar lending by other lenders.
Without more evidence, however, the critics are correct that one
cannot attribute the rapid growth in lending to low-income, moderate-
income, and minority borrowers and areas to CRA. A series of other
factors undoubtedly contributed to these gains. First and foremost,
strong economic growth during the 1990s led to rapid income growth
and lower unemployment rates for minorities and gains for low-
income households.254 Real interest rates for mortgages were at low
levels during much of this period. 255 Second, financial and technolog-
ical innovation helped drive down the costs of assessing creditworthi-
ness, offering mortgage products, effectuating transactions, and
funding loans through securitization.256 Third, extensive consolidation
in the financial services sector in the wake of the removal of important
geographic restrictions on banking heightened the potential to mag-
nify the adverse consequences to banks and thrifts of poor perform-
ance under CRA when they undertook major transactions.257 At the
same time, consolidation also likely enhanced competition for the
delivery of credit in many markets, including both mature markets in
high-income areas and newly found opportunities in low-income com-
munities. 258 Fourth, it is difficult to disaggregate the effects of CRA,
HMDA, ECOA, Federal Housing Administration (FHA) lending, and
the government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) Affordable Housing
Goals, which all operated in intensified and perhaps differing ways on
different mortgage market participants during this period.259
Controlling for the effects of these factors, however, a follow-up
Treasury report that I again directed, undertaken by researchers from
Brookings and the Joint Center for Housing Studies, found that CRA
254 LITAN ET AL., FINAL REPORT, supra note 243, at 24; Ana M. Aizcorbe et al., Recent
Changes in US Family Finances: Evidence from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer
Finances, 4 FED. RES. BULL. 4-5 (Jan. 2003) (showing income growth between 1992 and
2001 among nonwhite or Hispanic families and among bottom twentieth percentile of
income).
255 2002 JOINT CENTER CRA REPORT, supra note 226, at 1; LiTAN ET AL., BASELINE
REPORT, supra note 243, at ES-11.
256 2002 JOINT CENTER CRA REPORT, supra note 226, at 15.
257 Id. at 14, 24.
256 For a thoughtful analysis of how consolidation can increase bank competition and
benefit consumers, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Legal Restrictions on Bank Consolidation: An
Economic Analysis, 77 IOWA L. REv. 1083 (1992) (arguing in favor of deregulation of
geographic restrictions on bank mergers and acquisitions).
259 See infra Part VII.
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provides important benefits. For example, evidence benchmarking
banks and thrifts against non-CRA lenders facing similar market and
legal conditions (other than CRA) suggests that CRA is effective.
The report found that CRA lenders (with or without their affiliates)
increased their CRA-eligible home purchase prime lending faster than
those not regulated by CRA from 1993 to 1999.260 If the growth rates
in CRA-eligible home purchase lending by banks and thrifts and their
affiliates had been as slow as the growth rates for non-CRA lenders,
CRA-eligible lending by CRA-lenders would have been 20% lower
over that period.261
Similarly, analysis of CRA lending across metropolitan areas with
divergent economic circumstances and divergent levels of home mort-
gage activity reinforces the view that CRA helps expand access to
home mortgage credit for low- and moderate-income borrowers. 262
The report controlled for median household income, unemployment
rate, housing affordability, home ownership levels, demographic com-
position, the role of the secondary market and government loan pro-
grams. It then assessed the role of CRA, as measured by the
relationship between the share of loans to low- and moderate-income
borrowers and areas and the share of loans within the bank's assess-
ment area that are CRA-eligible, and the presence of CRA lending
agreements with community groups. Although the measures are
problematic in some ways,263 the report did find a correlation between
CRA and higher shares of loans to low-income neighborhoods and
borrowers. 264 Case studies of lenders and community organizations in
four metropolitan areas also support this view.265 Lenders and com-
munity organizations believe that CRA "drove" market changes in
lending.266 On these measures, CRA appears to make a difference,
although the report acknowledged that further econometric modeling
would be required to provide more definitive results.267 Additional
260 See LITAN ET AL., FINAL REPORT, supra note 243, at ES-4.
261 Id. at 35.
262 Id. at 36.
263 See id. at 36-46 (describing measurement, variable and other errors including spatial
aggregation bias and possible presence of heteroskedasticity).
264 Id. at 46.
265 Id. at 62.
266 Id. at 47.
267 See id., at ES-3-4. This research stands in contrast to the approach taken by
Gunther, supra note 21, at 60 (concluding that CRA is ineffective). Gunther examines
data from 1993 and 1997, years that are not comparable because of differences in refinanc-
ings. Gunther fails to distinguish between home purchase and refinance loans, and
between prime and subprime lending. He also excludes loans to low- and moderate-
income borrowers outside of low- and moderate-income areas even though such loans
count for CRA purposes and are important in expanding opportunity for low-income
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analysis of this data by authors of the Treasury report-controlling for
economic situation, demographics, housing market, market organiza-
tion, Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insurance, secondary
market sales, and other factors-confirmed that "CRA has increased
the flow of credit to [low- and moderate-income] borrowers and areas
by CRA-covered lenders and their affiliates over the period
studied. "268
The Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University fol-
lowed up this research by examining the behavior of CRA lenders, the
portion of CRA-eligible market share held by banks and thrifts, and
price changes and turnover rates in low-income neighborhoods. 269
The study controlled for economic, demographic, and housing market
variables as to metropolitan areas, tracts, loans, and borrowers, across
the more than 300 metropolitan areas studied. 270 This research again
found that CRA has had positive effects consistent with the theory
that CRA is helping to overcome market failures and discrimination.
For example, if CRA were helping to overcome information externali-
ties, one would expect to see higher rates of home sales-thicker mar-
kets-in CRA-eligible areas. In fact, the report found somewhat
higher turnover rates in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods
within banks' assessment areas than in low- and moderate-income
neighborhoods outside assessment areas.2 71
Measuring the precise effects of CRA is difficult given other reg-
ulatory and market changes. The models used in the Joint Center
report do not "reveal[ ] with precision the exact magnitude of the
impact of CRA,"272 and should be interpreted cautiously. Point esti-
mates can be described in different ways. For example, the report
found that the effect of CRA on the share of home mortgage lending
to low- and moderate-income borrowers and areas was equivalent to
the effect of a 1.3 percentage point decrease in the unemployment
rate, while the actual drop in unemployment over that time period
was about twice that figure.273 By this measure, CRA's effect should
be considered quite economically significant, although clearly much
less than the effect of economic growth. In addition, the report found:
households. Lastly, Gunther repeats arguments that CRA lending is unsound, ignoring the
contrary evidence from the Federal Reserve Board's report. See infra note 313 and accom-
panying text.
268 BELSKY ET AL., supra note 243, at 22.
269 2002 JOINT CENTER CRA REPORT, supra note 226, at 59.
270 See, e.g., id. at 64.
271 Id. at 75 (finding turnover rate of 6.24% in low- and moderate-income CRA assess-
ment areas and rate of 6.21% in low- and moderate-income non-CRA-assessment areas).
272 Id. at 58.
273 See id. at 58-59.
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CRA lenders have changed their behavior. CRA lenders originate
a higher proportion of CRA-eligible loans than they would if CRA
did not exist, and they seem to reject fewer CRA-eligible loan appli-
cations than they would if CRA did not exist.
CRA lenders appear to have captured a higher share of the CRA-
eligible lending market than they would have if CRA were not in
place.
CRA-eligible neighborhoods seem to have more rapid house price
increases and higher turnover rates than other neighborhoods,
which is consistent with an expansion of credit in those areas. 274
In reaching these conclusions, the report used two key variables
to assess the impact of CRA: one measuring lending within, as
opposed to outside, assessment areas, and one denoting whether com-
munity groups had signed CRA agreements with banks or thrifts that
promised increased lending.275 Not surprisingly, given the messiness
of the real world, some findings from the study are open to conflicting
interpretations.
On the one hand, critics would contend that the growth of the
subprime market may mean that CRA is less important than it once
was, or may even challenge the idea that CRA has improved lending
by banks and thrifts, since the growth of subprime lending has been
much stronger. In addition, some portion of the increased lending by
CRA-covered, prime lenders represented lending that shifted from
subprime lenders to prime lenders, rather than a net increase in
loans. 276 Moreover, the significant increase in lending that the Joint
Center attributed to CRA from lending to low- and moderate-income
borrowers in middle- and high-income neighborhoods 277 presumably
led to lower positive externalities for neighborhoods than would
lending to borrowers in low-income neighborhoods. Lending to low-
income borrowers in these higher income areas lends less support to a
market failure theory based on information externalities than would
increased lending in low-income areas. To the extent that market fail-
ures are neighborhood-focused and to the extent that CRA is aimed
at overcoming such failures, one would expect to see most of the
change in lending under CRA directed at such areas. Moreover, the
growth of subprime home purchase lending by independent mortgage
and finance companies in low-income communities could be taken as
evidence either that CRA is not working, or that it is not necessary.
274 Id. at 58.
275 Id. at 61-63.
276 Id. at 59, 72.
277 Id. at 59, 68.
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On the other hand, each of these points is amenable to a contrary
and often more plausible interpretation. The Joint Center's approach
actually may understate the effect of CRA on changing banking prac-
tices, both within and outside assessment areas. Once banks decide to
change their lending practices, it is more efficient to do so across the
banks' operations. Banks likely change their business practices to
meet the credit needs of low-income communities and then apply
those changed practices across all of the areas that they serve, low-
income or not. The costs of developing products and training per-
sonnel make the consistent application of these business practices
more efficient across all lending areas. Thus, using lending outside of
assessment areas as a control will understate the effects of CRA.
Moreover, if bank performance under CRA has a demonstration
effect on other lenders and helps to thicken the market, as informa-
tion externality theory would predict, 78 then the success of CRA also
contributed to the relative growth in low- and moderate-income
lending by non-CRA regulated lenders. As the Joint Center report
notes, the "fact that many large independent mortgage companies
(i.e., mortgage lenders not subject to CRA) have been stunningly suc-
cessful at serving the lower-income market is highly suggestive that
this dynamic has indeed played out and that a reasonable portion of
the CRA-eligible market is now being served economically. ' 279 As I
argued above, while progress has been made, my intuition is that
CRA is still required to overcome persistent market failures and much
more could still be done by banks and thrifts to serve low-income
communities.
In addition, in the absence of CRA, banks and thrifts may not
have behaved the same as independent mortgage firms in lending to
low- and moderate-income borrowers, but in fact behaved worse.
Glen Canner and his colleagues suggest that this is plausible, given
that banks have higher costs of funds and business plans that tend to
focus on higher cost services to a higher income clientele.280 Thus,
comparisons between bank and non-bank lending to low- and mod-
erate-income borrowers would understate CRA's impact on changing
the lending patterns of banks and thrifts.
278 Increases in loan volume and liquidity make it more profitable for lenders to enter
the market. Such lending increases available information and reduces information exter-
nalities from each additional loan.
279 2002 JOINT CENTER CRA REPORT, supra note 226, at 60.
280 See, e.g., GLENN B. CANNER ET AL., DOES THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT AcT
(CRA) CAUSE BANKS TO PROVIDE A SUBSIDY TO SOME MORTGAGE BORROWERS? 45-47
(Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. & Econ., Discussion Series No. 2002-19, 2002), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2002/200219/200219pap.pdf.
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Furthermore, a focus on CRA lending only in low-income neigh-
borhoods is too narrow. As explained in Part III, market failures, in
principle, can occur both as to low-income communities and as to low-
income borrowers. Discrimination, likewise, can affect minority bor-
rowers wherever they choose to live. Banks and thrifts under CRA
have likely lowered the cost of acquiring information and gaining
expertise in serving low-income borrowers wherever they buy, in addi-
tion to borrowers in low-income neighborhoods, because the expertise
and technology needed to develop alternative measures of
creditworthiness would span both types of lending. CRA lending to
low-income borrowers outside of poor neighborhoods improves social
mobility by helping low-income borrowers move to better neighbor-
hoods. In addition, CRA lending that gives minority borrowers the
opportunity to move to less segregated, middle- and upper-income
neighborhoods advances CRA's purposes in overcoming the legacy of
discrimination. These patterns of increased CRA lending to low-
income and minority borrowers in better neighborhoods also are con-
sistent with the evidence of some deconcentration of poverty in the
latter part of the 1990s in many metropolitan areas.281
In addition, GSE affordable housing goals and fair lending laws
likely increased lending by non-banks and banks, 282 but the different
industry and regulatory structure affecting different types of institu-
tions may vary the impact of these laws, so it is difficult to measure
what independent mortgage companies and banks would have done in
the absence of these laws. Ideally, one would want to model the inter-
actions of these laws on different market participants and then test the
model empirically.
Lastly, even if some gains in prime lending merely represent a
substitution of prime lending for subprime lending, such shifts directly
lower prices for borrowers who obtain a prime rather than a subprime
loan. Over time, with increased competition, industry pricing and
practice in low-income neighborhoods may move towards the stan-
dards of the prime market, which would provide significant benefits to
low- and moderate-income and minority households. Enhanced com-
petition in these markets, and increased volume and liquidity, from
281 See PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, THE BROOKINGS INST., STUNNING PROGRESS, HIDDEN
PROBLEMS: THE DRAMATIC DECLINE OF CONCENTRATED POVERTY IN THE 1990s (May
2003) (finding significant declines in concentrated poverty in 1990s), available at http://
www.brookings.edu/es/urban/publications/ argowskypoverty.pdf.
282 See LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT, supra note 243, at 70 (noting effects of govern-
ment-sponsored enterprise (GSE) affordable housing goals on purchases from both CRA-
covered lenders and non-CRA-covered lenders); LITAN ET AL., FINAL REPORT, supra note
243, at 45 (finding correlation between increased CRA origination share and increased
secondary market sales).
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both prime and subprime lenders, is consistent with the theoretical
model of CRA as helping to overcome collective action problems and
information externalities.
Despite the robustness of these studies, other empirical research
has failed to find significant effects of CRA. For example, economists
at the Federal Reserve Board tried to measure whether increased
mortgage lending under CRA has had any effect on outcomes in mod-
erate-income neighborhoods.2 83 They found that CRA-eligible, mod-
erate-income census tracts "had higher homeownership rates, higher
growth in owner-occupied units, and lower vacancy rates than would
have been predicted on the basis of changes in the not CRA-eligible
census tracts" with slightly higher incomes; but these results were not
robust, and two other outcome measures, for crime and median home
values found that "lower-income neighborhoods actually fared worse
than would have been predicted. '284 Generally speaking, the results
were inconclusive as to the effect of CRA on neighborhoods.
It is not surprising that the study had difficulty isolating an effect
of CRA not only on lending, but also on how increased lending, if any,
affected neighborhood outcomes. There are too many policy and
other factors that come into play in particular neighborhoods, and
these factors are unlikely either to track census tracts or to be consis-
tent across census tracts. Furthermore, some measures of outcomes,
such as the measure for crime, are only distantly related to increased
access to credit. Moreover, as the authors note,28 5 the census tract is
likely too small a unit of analysis given that banks and thrifts are
unlikely to target business practice changes at the census tract level.
As explained above, looking for census tract level differences will
mask the effect of CRA, if any, on changing bank and thrift practices
as they affect low- and moderate-income areas and borrowers more
generally, not just those that qualify for CRA eligibility. In addition,
the study seeks to explore changes within a narrow band of income
range of census tracts, from seventy to ninety percent of median
income, which would exacerbate the problem of narrow geographic
focus because tracts just above the cutoff for CRA eligibility are the
tracts that are most likely to benefit from CRA-induced changes to
bank practices. Lastly, the study does not include the effects of
increased home mortgage lending to low- and moderate-income bor-
rowers who choose to find homes in middle- and upper-income neigh-
283 Robert B. Avery et al., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., The Effects of the
Community Reinvestment Act on Local Communities (2003), available at http://www.fed-
eralreserve.gov/communityaffairslnationalCA-Conf-SusCommDev/pdf/cannerglen.pdf.
284 Id. at 27.
285 Id. at 28.
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borhoods. As described above, expanded access to credit for such
borrowers is an important element of CRA's success.
Two other studies lend support to the view of CRA's critics that
CRA does not benefit low-income communities. One study found
that banks that had been downgraded in their CRA ratings during the
years from 1990 to 1995 did not respond in the year after the down-
grade by increasing their targeted home mortgage lending to low-
income borrowers and communities. 286 Another study found that
banks rated "needs to improve" and "substantial noncompliance"
over the period from 1991 to 1997 did not increase their home mort-
gage lending to minority borrowers or reduce the disparities in denial
rates after receiving such a rating.287 Both studies indicate that the
examination process and ratings downgrades during the early and
mid-1990s may not have had an impact on the behavior of banks and
thrifts whose CRA performance was low or declining.
While both studies indicate that the CRA rating process may not
be effective for some banks, and that regulators ought to pay greater
attention to how to improve the performance of low ranked or
declining performers, four important cautions should be noted. First,
the studies focus on low or declining ratings. As one study notes,
banks trying to maintain satisfactory ratings do appear to increase
minority outreach. 288 Second, CRA also plays an important role
during merger reviews, and both the evidence on merger reviews spe-
cifically, 289 and the evidence described above in this Section on CRA's
effectiveness overall, suggest that CRA is helping to alter lender
behavior. CRA may have more bite for institutions seeking to
improve their ratings prior to a merger. Third, few banks are down-
graded or receive low ratings, 29° so the universe of banks is small for
those to whom low ratings or downgrades are the operative force of
CRA. Fourth, denial rates, which are used as one measure of per-
formance in one of the studies,291 are not a reliable measure of CRA
286 Drew Dahl et al., Community Reinvestment Act Enforcement and Changes in
Targeted Lending, 25 INT'L REGIONAL SCIENCE REV. 307, 318-19 (2002).
287 Keith D. Harvey et al., Disparities in Mortgage Lending, Bank Performance, Eco-
nomic Influence, and Regulatory Oversight, 23 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 379, 404-05
(2001).
288 Id. at 405.
289 See Part IV.B.2, infra.
290 See Dahl et al., supra note 286, at 312.
291 Harvey et al., supra note 287, at 390. The incorrect equation of denial rate with low
CRA rating has been made by other critics. Hylton charged that CRA uses loan rejection
rates as a measure of performance, when this would punish banks for outreach into harder
to serve communities. See Hylton, supra note 21, at 233 (implying that high rejection rates
lead to negative CRA evaluations). But see, e.g., FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL,
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT EXAMINATION PROCEDURES FOR LARGE RETAIL INSTI-
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performance. Regulators do not look at denial rates without controls
for the creditworthiness of the applicant, but rather at the share of
lending going to targeted borrowers, because denial rates could be
evidence either of discrimination or failure to use more flexible under-
writing standards on the one hand, or expanded marketing and out-
reach to low-income communities on the other. Increased denial rates
could be evidence of looking harder for creditworthy borrowers. The
study's second measure, of minority representation in the loan pool, is
a much better predictor of changed lender behavior, and it does not
suffer from this defect. On this measure, CRA again appears not to
influence low-rated institutions, but does "suggest, however, that insti-
tutions with already satisfactory performance may target improving
minority representation relative to lower-rated peer institutions as a
means of maintaining their CRA rating. '2 92 On balance, these studies
suggest caution in interpreting CRA examinations and ratings, in the
absence of merger reviews, as effective in changing the behavior of
low-rated institutions.
Home mortgage lending data represents the bulk of data avail-
able in understanding the role of CRA. There are, however, three
additional categories of data: small business data, community devel-
opment lending data, and community development investment data.
Moving from home mortgage lending to small business lending, evi-
dence from small business markets reinforces the view that CRA has
been effective. The 1995 changes to the CRA regulations imposed a
new requirement on large commercial banks and savings associations
to report on small business lending. In 2003, the most recent year for
which data is available, banks and thrifts subject to CRA's small busi-
ness reporting requirement originated $126 billion in loans to firms
with revenues under $1 million,293 nearly double the 1997 figure. 294
A recent empirical study found "that CRA does increase lending
to small businesses as intended. '295 The study suggests that CRA
increases the number of small businesses that can access credit by four
to six percentage points.2 96 The study found that CRA generally
TUTIONS 8 (1997) (listing factors to be considered in evaluating loans, with number and
volume of loans, not loan denials, considered under examination procedures), available at
http://www.ffiec.gov/cra/pdf/exlarge9.pdf.
292 Harvey et al., supra note 287, at 405.
293 See Fed. Fin. Inst. Examination Council, CRA National Aggregate Table 1, 2003, at
http://www.ffiec.gov/webcraad/cranaag.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2005). The earliest year
with comparable data is 1997. See id.
294 See Fed. Fin. Inst. Examination Council, CRA National Aggregate Table 1, 1997, at
http://www.ffiec.gov/webcraad/cranaag.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2005).
295 ZINMAN, supra note 103, at 2.
296 See id. at 20.
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increased access to credit for small firms, as intended by CRA, but the
evidence did not support a finding that CRA increased access to credit
for small firms located in low- and moderate-income areas, holding
other factors constant.297 Moreover, the study determined that the
increased lending to small businesses induced by CRA provided bene-
fits to the real economy in the form of increased payrolls and reduced
bankruptcies without any evidence that such lending either crowded
out other financing available to small businesses or adversely affected
bank profitability or loan performance. 298 It is somewhat remarkable
that studies of CRA show any effect on small business lending at all,
given that small business data collection is relatively new, data are not
as comprehensive, and the examinations for small business lending are
not as well developed as for home mortgage lending.
Aside from lending activities, financial institutions also have
increased their community development investments in low-income
communities under CRA.299 Although comprehensive data on
investments are not available and reporting is not standardized, one
can assemble some broad aggregate statistics using data from other
regulatory provisions.3°° For example, national bank community
development investments totaled $15 billion from 1965 to 2002, with
well over half of the investments coming during the last decade, when
CRA regulatory oversight intensified. 30 1 Banks have engaged in inno-
297 See id.
298 Id. at 3-4.
299 Under the regulations, "qualified investment" includes an "investment, deposit,
membership share [in a credit union], or grant that has as its primary purpose community
development," 12 C.F.R. § 25.12(s), as well as disposition of branch premises to minority
or women-owned institutions, 12 C.F.R. § 25.23(d) (2004).
300 12 C.F.R. pt. 24 (2004), implementing 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (Eleventh), 93a, 481, 1818
(2000) (investments designed to promote public welfare). Banks are required to use the
"Part 24" authority only for investments that otherwise would not be authorized for
national banks, 12 C.F.R. § 24.1(d), so data collected under this authority may understate
CRA-eligible investments; however, this data may overstate CRA-eligible investments
because not all such investments are within assessment areas or necessarily otherwise
included in the bank's CRA performance. The CRA investment test could be improved if
comprehensive, comparable data were available under that test.
301 See COMPTROLLER OF TIlE CURRENCY, 2002 DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL BANK COM-
MUNITY DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENTS 4, 6 (author's calculations), available at http://
www.occ.treas.gov/cdd/2002Part24Dir.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2005). A similar authority is
available for state member banks, and bank holding companies, as a "public welfare"
investment, see paragraph 23 of section 9 of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 338a
(2000), or a "community development" investment under Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R.
§ 225.25(b)(6) (2004). For recent investments, see FED. RESERVE BD., 2002 DIRECTORY,
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENTS, BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, STATE MEMBER
BANKS, http://www.federalreserve.gov/DCCA/Directory/cdi02.pdf (last visited Jan. 13,
2005).
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vative efforts to serve low-income communities through
investments. 302
Such investments are in addition to community development
loans, which are tracked under CRA. Community development loans
totaled $42.3 billion in 2003 alone, and $184 billion since 1996, when
community development loans were first reported under the revised
CRA regulations.30 3 Although careful econometric work has not
been done on community development lending and investment, the
scale and innovative types of activity suggest that it is plausible that
CRA has contributed to increased activity in these areas. Further
research would be warranted to examine these effects.
CRA's benefits appear to have been substantial, but are they
likely to continue? Changes in the financial services industry may
mean that CRA covers less and less of the financial services world.
Banks' and thrifts' share of financial assets has declined dramatically
since the end of World War II, from 63% to about 29% in 1999.304
Moreover, for business organization reasons unrelated to CRA, banks
and thrifts may pursue a greater portion of their lending activity
through affiliates not covered by CRA, particularly mortgage finance
company affiliates. According to the Joint Center, the reach of CRA
is likely declining:
In combination, the changing industry structure, along with the fact
that CRA expanded the capacity of all industry players to better
serve lower-income borrowers, has diminished the extent that
CRA-regulated organizations now lead the market. Econometric
analysis suggests that on average over the period 1993 to 2000, CRA
may have increased the share of loans going to CRA-eligible bor-
rowers by 2.1 percentage points (or from 30.3 to 32.4 percent).' Esti-
mates for individual years suggest, however, that the CRA impact
has declined from 3.7 percentage points in 1993 to 1.6 percentage
points in 2000. 30 5
302 See, e.g., RYAN TRAMMELL, FED. RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO, UNDER-
STANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INVESTMENT TEST EXAMINATION CRITERIA AND
INVESTMENT TEST RATINGS, 1 (2004) (finding that qualitative factors, not solely invest-
ment volumes, drive CRA investment test ratings), at http://www.frbsf.org/community/
resources/QIfinal.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2005).
303 Press Release, Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (July 26, 2004), at
http://www.ffiec.gov/hmcrpr/cra072604.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2005). A community
development loan is a loan, other than a home mortgage loan, that "has as its primary
purpose affordable housing for low- or moderate-income individuals, community services
targeted to these individuals, activities that promote economic development by financing
small businesses or small farms, or activities that revitalize or stabilize low- or moderate-
income neighborhoods." Id. Prior year data summed from yearly National Aggregate
Reports, at http://www.ffiec.gov/reports.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
304 LITAN ET AL., FINAL REPORT, supra note 243, at 9.
305 2002 JoINT CENTER CRA REPORT, supra note 226, at 135.
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In part, this decline may be less momentous than community-
based organizations suggest: Although assets subject to CRA are
declining as a share of financial assets, such assets continue to grow in
absolute terms.306 Moreover, as CRA-covered institutions develop
new products, train employees, and alter organizational structures to
meet the credit needs of low-income communities, such changes may
have important influences on uncovered affiliates of banks and thrifts.
In addition, CRA enforcement through mergers and acquisitions
will continue to be important. Consolidation in the banking industry,
after a brief respite during the recession of 2001-2002, has picked up
again, and long-term forecasts suggest that more likely will come.
30 7
Furthermore, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act made expansion into new
activities, such as insurance and securities, contingent on banks' CRA
performance. 30 8 Therefore, banking organizations will have to pay
attention to their CRA performance for many years to come as they
seek to enter new financial markets.
Admittedly, market and technological forces are tending to rein-
force access to some types of credit, particularly home mortgage loans
that are now easily commodified, as some critics of CRA have sug-
gested. In many ways, competition and CRA are driving in the same
direction. Nonetheless, market pressures also will mean that financial
intermediaries are under increasing pressure to serve the highest end
of the market where larger margins and the potential for cross-selling
exist. Increasingly, community banks and thrifts, and community
development financial institutions, may find that a larger portion of
the local market, in particular the market for small business loans, is
of less interest to larger banks and thrifts. This will open up new busi-
ness opportunities for smaller institutions, while CRA's effect on
larger institutions likely will push advances in commodified lending
markets, including home mortgages and credit-scored small business
loans that can be sold into the secondary markets. Thus, there will
likely be a continued need for CRA.
In sum, recent evidence shows that CRA provides important ben-
efits to low-income communities. Other factors undoubtedly contrib-
uted to the growth in lending to low-income communities during the
1990s, but careful studies have found support for a statistically signifi-
306 LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT, supra note 243, at 79; see also FDIC-Statistics on
Depository Institutions Report, available at http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/index.asp (comparing
total assets held by depository institutions on September 30, 2004, September 30, 2003,
September 30, 2002, and September 30, 2001).
307 See, e.g., Madeleine James et al., Playing to the Endgame in Financial Services, 4
McKINSEY Q. 170, 172 (1997).
308 12 U.S.C. §§ 2903(c), 1843(a)(1)(2) (2000).
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cant and economically important role for CRA. Given the difficulty
of finding such effects in policy analysis generally, these findings are
remarkable. These studies cast serious doubt on the contention of
CRA's critics that CRA provides little benefit to low-income commu-
nities and borrowers. Instead, these studies are more consistent with
the theoretical case for CRA set forth in Part III. That is, CRA
appears to increase lending to low- and moderate-income communi-
ties and minority borrowers more than one would predict based on
market forces and other factors. Still, one cannot tell whether this
increased lending is a result of forcing lenders to make bad loans, on
the one hand, or is a result of effectively overcoming market failures
and discrimination to lend to creditworthy borrowers, on the other
hand, without examining the costs incurred. I turn next to that topic.
B. The Costs of CRA Have Been Overstated
Critics charge that CRA imposes high costs on the banking
industry. Most importantly, in their view, CRA forces banks to make
unprofitable, risky loans that undermine the health of the financial
sector. If that were the case, such evidence would undermine the the-
oretical case for CRA based on market failures and discrimination.
Forcing banks to make bad loans would be evidence that CRA mat-
ters, but is not theoretically justified. Moreover, they argue that CRA
imposes undue burdens on the merger and acquisition process, and
therefore impedes efficiency in the financial sector. CRA also is
alleged to promote distortionary rent seeking by community groups
and bank regulators. Critics charge that CRA has high compliance
costs and that CRA's vague standards lead to uncertainty that further
burdens financial institutions. In addition, critics argue that the 1995
reforms to CRA did little to alleviate these burdens, as measured by
shareholder value. If these critiques were valid, they would cast sig-
nificant doubt on the efficacy of choosing CRA as a policy response to
market failures or discrimination. I take up these arguments in turn.
1. Profitability and Risk
Critics of CRA argue that if there were profitable loans to make
in low-income communities, banks and thrifts would already be
making them. For example, Macey and Miller argue that CRA
"impairs the safety and soundness of an already overstrained banking
industry" and "encourages banks to make unprofitable and risky
investment and product-line decisions .... 1-309 While acknowledging
that "[t]here is undoubtedly truth to the argument that profitable loan
309 Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 295.
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opportunities exist in low-income and moderate-income neighbor-
hoods, and that some of these loans would not be made if it were not
for the CRA[,]" Macey and Miller contend that such profitable loan
opportunities are sparse. In their view, there may be "a few profitable
loans," but the search costs of finding them will make such lending
unprofitable and "[t]he fact that there are some profitable loans to be
made in low-income and moderate-income communities does not
mean that greatly increasing lending in such communities is going to
be a profitable activity. '310 Because they find the existence of market
failures or discrimination to be unlikely, they doubt that "CRA is
plausibly going to increase the efficiency of lending by depository
institutions .... ,,an Thus, they charge that "CRA encourages deposi-
tory institutions to devote depositor funds to low-profit or losing pro-
positions in derogation of overall economic welfare .... "9312
Macey and Miller are correct to look to measures of profitability
and risk in assessing whether CRA improves the efficiency of lending
by overcoming market failures and discrimination, and that higher
search costs ought to be factored in when weighing the profitability of
CRA lending. Unfortunately, they present no serious evidence for
their claims.
Recent empirical evidence suggests that those costs were over-
stated significantly by CRA's critics. Instead, the evidence tends to
support the theoretical underpinnings of CRA as resting on market
failures and discrimination. Despite the significant increase in lending
to low-income communities during the 1990s described above, CRA
loans appear to be reasonably profitable-not "a few profitable
loans," but CRA lending generally. A Federal Reserve Board report
issued in 2000313 casts significant doubt on the claims made by critics
about the likely performance of CRA loans. Most institutions
responded that CRA lending was profitable or marginally profitable:
82% indicated that CRA-related home mortgage lending was profit-
able, 86% indicated that CRA-related home improvement lending
was profitable, 93% indicated that CRA-related community develop-
ment lending was profitable, and 96% indicated that CRA-related
small business lending was profitable. 314 The median difference
between return on equity for CRA home mortgage loans and all such
loans, and between CRA small business loans and all such loans, was
310 Id. at 319-320.
311 Id. at 319.
312 Id. at 321.
313 PERFORMANCE AND PROFITABILITY, supra note 220, 43-64.
314 Id. at 45, 52, 62, 58.
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zero.315 Most respondents reported that CRA lending was at least as
profitable as comparable non-CRA lending. 316 The profitability of
serving these borrowers and communities helped drive the increase in
CRA-eligible lending by banks and their affiliates between 1993 and
1998.317
Many respondents reported other benefits from such lending,
which suggest that CRA lending, while strengthening communities,
also is helping to improve profitability for banks. Some 81% of
respondents, for example, developed new business opportunities from
their CRA small business lending,318 while 71% of respondents cited
"source of additional profits" as a benefit of their community develop-
ment lending, and 96% cited promoting "community growth and sta-
bility. ' '319 These broader societal benefits also represent benefits for
the banks operating in these communities because they reduce the
risk of lending there. These additional benefits further contradict the
notion that CRA forces banks to engage in unprofitable activity.
Moreover, CRA loans do not appear to be overly risky. The loss
rates that surveyed banks and thrifts reported for CRA loans are quite
low. The median difference in charge-off rates (the net losses after
collections) between CRA home mortgage loans and all such loans
was zero.320 The institutions responding to the survey reported
weighted median charge-off rates of 0.18% on CRA-related home
mortgage loans and 0.40% on CRA-related small business loans. 321
About 70% of respondents reported credit losses for CRA home
mortgage lending that were the same as or less than losses for other
such lending, and 91% of respondents reported credit losses for CRA
small business loans that were the same as or smaller than losses for
all small business loans.322 Community development loans had a
median charge-off rate of zero.323 Generally speaking, the categories
of loans made pursuant to CRA-home mortgage, small business,
multifamily, and community development lending-have had rela-
tively low loss rates.
315 Id. at 46 & tbl.5a.
316 The exact percentages of responses of "about the same" or "somewhat higher" prof-
itability for CRA loans were 56% for home purchase and refinance loans, 72% for home
improvement loans, and 86% for small business loans. Id. at 45-46, tbl.3a, tbl.4a, tbl.5a.
317 See supra text accompanying note 243.
318 PERFORMANCE AND PROFITABILITY, supra note 220, at tbl.8.
319 Id. at tbl.6.
320 Id. at tbl.3c.
321 Id. at tbl.3e (home mortgage), tbl.5e (small business).
322 Id. at tbl.3d (home mortgage), tbl.5d (small business).
323 Id. at tbl.7c.
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Pushing further into low-income markets has not weakened
banks' profitability and soundness as White, Macey and Miller, and
others predicted. As one would expect, the performance and profit-
ability of CRA "special programs" is not as strong as the performance
and profitability of CRA loans in the institutions' general portfo-
lios.324 Special programs account for only 17% of CRA-eligible
lending as the Federal Reserve Board defines it.325 These programs
serve as the banks' and thrifts' lending "laboratories," employing new
and innovative strategies-such as lower downpayment require-
ments-to deliver credit to underserved borrowers. 326 Once these
strategies are refined, they often are "graduated" to borrowers in the
institutions' core product lines. Despite the programs' experimental
status, the Board reported that 61% of respondents found CRA spe-
cial programs to be profitable.327 Moreover, most institutions
reported low delinquency and charge-off rates; the median charge-off
rate on these programs was zero.328
The Federal Reserve Board survey finding that CRA loans gener-
ally are profitable is consistent with other studies. Federal Reserve
Board economists determined that, after adjusting for creditworthi-
ness and the benefits of the home mortgage interest deduction, banks
do not offer borrowers substantially lower mortgage rates to make
CRA-eligible loans.329 The evidence of any such subsidy is "economi-
cally and statistically insignificant. ' 330 Earlier studies found that insti-
tutions with strong CRA performance were as profitable as those with
less CRA activity. 331 Similarly, an earlier survey by the Federal
324 Compare, e.g., id. at 69 (profitability of special lending programs) with id. at 45
(home purchase and refinancing), 52 (home improvement), 58 (small business), and 62
(community development).
325 PERFORMANCE AND PROFITABILITY, supra note 220, at 66.
326 See Robert B. Avery et al., CRA Special Lending Programs, 86 FED. RES. BULL. 711,
717-19 (describing features of special lending programs) (2000).
327 PERFORMANCE AND PROFITABILITY, supra note 220, at tbl.14a.
328 Id. at tbl.14c.
329 GLENN B. CANNER ET AL., DOES THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT (CRA)
CAUSE BANKS TO PROVIDE A SUBSIDY TO SOME MORTGAGE BORROWERS? 5-6 (Fed.
Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series No. 2002-19, 2002), http://www.federalreserve.
gov/pubs/feds/2002/200219/200219pap.pdf. The upper bound on such a subsidy, if any, is
"tiny." Id. at 6.
330 Id. at abstract. A study by the Independent Community Bankers of America found
that about 61% of larger banks it surveyed provided interest rate concessions under CRA
and 41% of smaller banks provided such concessions, but the total dollar value of such
reported concessions was small, and the study did not attempt any econometric controls.
See GRANT THORNTON LLP, INDEP. CMTY. BANKERS OF AM., THE HIGH COST OF COM-
MUNITY BANK CRA COMPLIANCE: COMPARISON OF "LARGE" AND "SMALL" COMMUNITY
BANKS 15 (2002), at www.icba.org/files/PDFs/crareport.pdf.
331 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT LENDING BY DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS (1993); Glenn B.
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Reserve Bank of Kansas City had found that nearly all respondents
reported CRA lending to be profitable, though not as profitable as
other lending.332
That is not to say that the Federal Reserve Board's survey found
no differences in the performance of CRA loans and other loans. In
the survey, for example, 44% of respondents reported that CRA
home purchase and refinance loans were less or somewhat less profit-
able than other loans, and about half reported higher delinquency
rates for such CRA loans than for other loans.333 For these institu-
tions, CRA lending was indeed more costly. Moreover, as critics have
argued, CRA lending can entail greater risks and higher origination
costs. As noted by the Board's report,334 previous studies had found
that borrowers with higher loan-to-value ratios were more likely to
default, 335 and that a combination of negative home equity336 and a
"triggering" event such as job loss was correlated with delinquency
Canner & Wayne Passmore, The Community Reinvestment Act and the Profitability of
Mortgage-Oriented Banks 26 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series No. 1997-
7, 1997) (suggesting that "lenders active in lower-income neighborhoods and with lower-
income borrowers appear to be as profitable as other home purchase lenders," but noting
some limitations in study), at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/1997/199707/
199707pap.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2005); Glenn B. Canner & Wayne Passmore, The Rela-
tive Profitability of Commercial Banks Active in Lending in Lower-Income Neighborhoods
and to Lower-Income Borrowers, in PROC. 32ND ANN. CONF. ON BANK STRUCTURE &
COMPETITION, FED. RES. BANK OF CHICAGO 531, 546 (1996); David Malmquist et al., The
Economics of Low-Income Mortgage Lending, 11 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 169, 182 (1997)
(finding that "low-income lending generates higher gross mortgage-related revenues but
also higher costs," and also that "low-income lending is associated with a higher level of
credit losses but that low-income lending is no more and no less profitable than non-low-
income lending").
332 Larry Meeker & Forest Myers, Community Reinvestment Act Lending: Is It Profit-
able?, 1996 FIN. INDUSTRY PERSP. 13, 16-17.
333 PERFORMANCE AND PROFITABILITY, supra note 220, at tbls.3a, 3c.
334 See id. at 7-14 (summarizing previous research on performance and profitability of
CRA-related lending).
335 James A. Berkovec et al., Discrimination, Competition, and Loan Performance in
FHA Mortgage Lending, 80 REV. ECON. & STAT. 241, 245-47 (1998) (finding important
effects for high loan-to-value ratios and also noting smaller effects for higher housing-
expense-to-income ratios and lower income and liquid asset levels); R. Jeffery Green &
George M. von Furstenberg, The Effects of Race and Age of Housing on Mortgage Delin-
quency Risk, 12 URB. STUD. 85, 89 (1975) (concluding that mortgagor income has signifi-
cant impact on mortgage delinquency risk); George M. von Furstenberg & R. Jeffery
Green, Home Mortgage Delinquencies: A Cohort Analysis, 29 J. FIN. 1545, 1547 (1974)
(noting that "rising incomes also contribute significantly to raising the quality of home
mortgages").
336 Chester Foster & Robert Van Order, An Option-Based Model of Mortgage Default, 3
HOUSING FIN. REV. 351, 362 (1984); Roberto G. Quercia & Michael A. Stegman, Residen-
tial Mortgage Default: A Review of the Literature, 3 J. HOUSING RES. 341, 375 (1992).
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and default. 337 Affordable home mortgage products with significant
multiple risk factors also were found to be more prone to default.338
However, research also concluded that although borrower and neigh-
borhood income were inversely related to delinquency rates, the dif-
ferences were slight, and loan-to-value ratios were far more
important.339
The basic picture that emerges from the evidence regarding the
performance and profitability of CRA lending is this: CRA's critics
were generally wrong that CRA induces banks and thrifts to engage in
deeply unprofitable, overly risky lending. Instead, CRA lending
appears to be reasonably profitable and not overly risky. Most banks
and thrifts find such lending to be as profitable as other lending, but a
significant minority faces somewhat higher costs and weaker perform-
ance. Although the evidence regarding the performance and profit-
ability of CRA lending is open to conflicting interpretations, it is on
balance more consistent with the theory that CRA helps overcome
market failures and discrimination than with the theories of CRA's
critics that there were only "a few profitable loans" to be found.
The studies do not show, however, that CRA lending is generally
more profitable than other things that banks and thrifts could do with
their funds on a risk-adjusted basis. That is, the studies show that
CRA lending is generally profitable from an accounting or business
perspective, as profit would be thought of on an income statement,
and that most banks and thrifts generally do not see CRA lending as
out of line with other profits and risks they take. The studies do not
prove that CRA lending is always profitable in the formal, economic
sense of accounting profits from the activity exceeding those that
could be obtained from an alternative use of the firm's capital. 340 The
size of the difference between accounting profits and economic profit
depends on the relative capital constraint facing each firm. Thus, to
the extent that CRA induces firms to engage in lending that is profit-
able from an accounting perspective but may or may not be with
respect to the opportunity cost of funds, the effects of CRA on a
337 Dennis R. Capozza et al., Mortgage Default in Local Markets, 25 REAL EST. ECON.
631, 654 (1997); Kerry D. Vandell & Thomas Thibodeau, Estimation of Mortgage Defaults
Using Disaggregate Loan History Data, 13 J. AM. REAL EST. & URB. ECON. Assoc. 292,
314 (1985).
338 Michael K. Stamper, Revisiting Targeted-Affordable Lending: Fresh Evidence Finds
Far Lower Default Rate, 14 SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKETS 1, 17-18 (1997).
339 Robert Van Order & Peter M. Zorn, Income, Location and Default: Some Implica-
tions for Community Lending, 28 REAL EST. ECON. 385, 386-87 (2000).
340 See DENNIS W. CAROLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANI-
ZATION 334 (2d ed. 1994) (defining economic profits as revenues minus opportunity costs).
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firm's lending activity will be more binding the higher its capital
constraints.
2. Mergers and Acquisitions
Macey and Miller and other critics of CRA argue that it has
"impeded" bank mergers and acquisitions that improve the efficiency
of the banking system. They cite cases of delays in merger approvals
in order to hold public hearings and instances in which mergers were
abandoned because of CRA concerns. Moreover, they contend that
responding to CRA "protests" diverts essential bank resources into
"public relations" and "window-dressing." In addition, they view
increased lending as "an implicit tax that the CRA imposes on the
process of depository institution consolidation."'341
Critics are correct that merger reviews-which encompass anti-
trust concerns, deposit concentration limits, safety and soundness,
CRA, and other matters-add to the costs of mergers. Yet they sig-
nificantly overstate the contention that CRA is a costly barrier to effi-
cient mergers and acquisitions. There are three potential costs: the
costs of providing and assessing information about the bank's CRA
record, the cost of actual delay or disapproval, and the cost imposed
by the threat of delay or disapproval.
As to actual delay or disapproval, Treasury Department analysis
shows that CRA likely imposes little cost from disapproval or delay of
mergers, acquisitions, or other applications subject to CRA review.342
From 1985 to 1999, only 692 out of 92,177 applications subject to CRA
review received any adverse public comment-less than 0.7%.343 Of
those applications, most received adverse public comment or regula-
tory scrutiny on both CRA and other grounds.344 Only 1% of the
applications receiving comment-eight applications-were denied,
4% withdrawn, and 1% returned, for reasons that may or may not
have related to CRA, leaving 94% approved.345 Thus the agencies
denied less than one tenth of one percent of the applications subject
to CRA review.
Adverse CRA comments also generally lead to little delay.
Again, as with application approval data, data on application
processing times include CRA and all the other issues that regulators
341 Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 322-23.
342 TREASURY DEP'T, APPLICATIONS SUBJECT To CRA THAT WERE PROTESTED ON
CRA GROUNDS (July 7, 2000) [hereinafter APPLICATIONS SUBJECT TO CRA] (document
on file with author).
343 Id.
344 Id.
345 Id.
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must evaluate in an application. Since CRA's enactment, the bank
agencies processed 63% of applications facing CRA protests within 90
days, and processed 88% of such applications within 180 days. 346 Still,
I agree that there have been cases in which CRA protests likely
increased regulatory delays,347 and the time it takes to hold public
hearings and to evaluate public comments likely does increase the
costs of merger reviews. We do not have data on the costs to banks of
providing or to regulators of assessing information about CRA during
merger reviews even though such data would ideally form part of our
analysis of the costs and benefits of CRA in merger reviews.
Nonetheless, the 1995 regulations likely contributed to improved
processing, as did other changes in application reviews more broadly.
With respect to CRA, regulators exercise their discretion to ignore
frivolous comments, and the interagency staff guidelines indicate that
prior examinations are "an important, and often controlling, factor" in
assessing an institution's CRA performance during the course of
application reviews. 348 Processing times have improved under the
1995 CRA regulations: Almost 75% of all applications subject to
CRA review are now decided within 90 days and more than 94% are
decided within 180 days.349
Of course, critics would rightly argue that the lack of delay or
denial is not evidence that CRA is either ineffective in changing
behavior, or, conversely, without cost in doing so. If the benefits of
merging are high enough, the merger will proceed, despite the costs of
merger applications, including CRA. Banks and thrifts presumably
internalize the risk of delay or denial and modify their behavior to
minimize that risk. A recent study found that CRA review during
mergers had a significant effect on expanding lending to low-income
communities, controlling for bank characteristics. The study found
that banks increased their lending in "economically important" ways
to low- and moderate-income neighborhoods in anticipation of the
regulatory and public scrutiny from CRA that accompanies
mergers. 350 The effects were more pronounced for larger institutions,
346 Id.
347 See, e.g., Hibernia Corp., 72 FED. RES. BULL. 656 (1986); Somerset Bankshares, Inc.,
74 FED. RES. BULL. 619 (1988); First Union Corp., 76 FED. RES. BULL. 83 (1990).
348 Community Reinvestment Act; Interagency Questions and Answers Regarding
Community Reinvestments; Notice, 66 Fed. Reg. 36,620, 36,640 (July 12, 2001) (Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council).
349 APPLICATIONS SUBJECT TO CRA, supra note 342.
350 RAPHAEL BosTIc ET AL., REGULATORY INCENTIVES AND CONSOLIDATION: THE
CASE OF COMMERCIAL BANK MERGERS AND THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT, at 18
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. WP-2002-06, 2002), at http://www.chicago
fed.org/publications/workingpapers/papers/WP2002-06.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
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which face the most public and regulatory scrutiny during merger
applications, and the effects became stronger as public and regulatory
attention increased under CRA during the 1990s. 351 Thus, this study
of bank merger activity reinforces the earlier conclusion that CRA
review during merger applications appears to be working as intended.
The question then arises whether and how to measure CRA's
effectiveness in changing lending behavior as a cost. In my judgment,
this question collapses into the earlier inquiry into the substance of
the theoretical justification for CRA. This altered behavior might
constitute a significant, unjustifiable cost if CRA loans were not prof-
itable or were overly risky because such costs would undermine my
contention that CRA helps to overcome market failures and discrimi-
nation. Macey and Miller contend that "the costs of the uneconomic
loans that are the implicit price of CRA approval" are "significant. ' 35 2
Their factual conclusion follows not from evidence but inevitably from
their view that banks and thrifts would have made the loans if they
were profitable because that is how competitive markets work. But
the Federal Reserve Board's evidence suggests that CRA lending is
relatively profitable and relatively safe.353 This evidence is more con-
sistent with the theoretical justifications for CRA. Thus, the cost to
banks and thrifts during or in anticipation of the merger process that
arises from altered lending practices is likely to be relatively low and
justified by CRA's role in overcoming market failures and discrimina-
tion. As discussed earlier, the benefits to low-income communities
seem to be high, consistent with the view that CRA is helping to over-
come such market deficiencies. In sum, the critics overstated the costs
of CRA to efficient mergers for the same reason that they overstated
the costs of CRA to bank safety and soundness. Markets sometimes
do not work as well as they should, and CRA incentives do not appear
to result in costly lending.
3. Rent-Seeking
Macey and Miller-and prominent political figures such as
former Senate Banking Committee Chairman Phil Gramm of Texas-
argue that CRA creates fertile ground for pervasive "rent-seeking" or
"extortion" by community groups using the application process to
force banks and thrifts to make grants to their organizations. 354 In
351 Id. at 16-17.
352 Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 323.
353 See supra text accompanying notes 309-332.
354 Phil Gramm, The New Banking Legislation: The Financial Modernization for the
Twenty-First Century, 53 SMU L. REv. 371, 373 (2000); Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at
295-96.
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their view, "[m]any of these groups have become adept at using the
CRA as a vehicle for extracting payments from depository institu-
tions, either for their own maintenance and welfare or for their
favored causes." 355 They argue that "[p]roviding support and assis-
tance to the most effective local pressure groups and community activ-
ists is often the best way to purchase what amounts to an insurance
policy against the threat of a CRA challenge .... ",356 There are
undoubtedly cases of abuses of the kind alleged by CRA's critics, but
these critics overstate the extent of the problem, and understate the
extent to which community groups can play a role in overcoming
market failures.
Critics of CRA tend to lump grants to community groups and
rent-seeking together. In analyzing this question, I distinguish grants
to community groups that add value to banks, thrifts, and society gen-
erally by improving the ability of creditors to make sound loans, from
grants that waste resources by simply redistributing bank income for
community groups' private purposes. To the extent that community
groups engage in the latter activity, it is properly thought of as rent-
seeking and is socially wasteful. Rent-seeking has occurred when
transfers produce transaction costs but no social benefit, or more
broadly when the costs of transfers exceed the social benefit.357 To
the extent that community groups engage in the former set of activi-
ties, however, transfers may contribute to net social gains in over-
coming market failures and discrimination.
There are theoretical grounds for believing there is less rent-
seeking than critics suggested. The highly public nature of CRA
examinations and the resulting evaluations, merger reviews and the
availability of public hearings during such reviews, and written public
comments and publicized protests make rent-seeking difficult to con-
ceal. In addition, the involvement of regulators, banks, and a rela-
tively large number of community groups make capture of all the
relevant players much more costly. The fact that these players must
repeatedly interact with one another in the regulatory process
increases incentives for reasonable conduct.358
355 Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 333.
356 Id. at 335.
357 See generally Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft, 5
W. ECON. J. 3, 228 (1967) (explaining socially wasteful effects of rent-seeking); Anne 0.
Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291
(1974) (coining the phrase "rent seeking").
358 On the role of public involvement in improving the regulatory process, see IAN
AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGU-
LATION DEBATE 71-73 (1992) (explaining how involvement of private sector, regulator and
public interest groups can help to deter capture through "tripartism").
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In addition, available evidence suggests that rent-seeking under
CRA is not of the size or scale alleged. As noted above, only a small
percentage of applications receive public comment, and few are
delayed or denied on that basis. Banks and thrifts often promise to do
more lending during merger reviews. The fact that community pro-
tests succeed in convincing banks and thrifts to issue voluntary
pledges or even to make agreements with community groups to do
more CRA lending to low-income borrowers or communities is not
improper in and of itself. In fact, increased lending in such communi-
ties is precisely the point of CRA.
The banking agencies have not provided comprehensive data on
CRA agreements. Analysis by the National Community Reinvest-
ment Coalition, an umbrella organization of community groups, sug-
gests that only a small fraction of "CRA agreements," which are
themselves a small fraction of CRA activity engaged in by banks and
thrifts, result in payments-for services or otherwise-to the commu-
nity groups making the "protest. '359 According to their report, recent
disclosures required under the "sunshine" amendments to CRA have
revealed little evidence of the rent-seeking feared:360 Only 0.3% of
loans and investments committed under CRA agreements went to
operating support for community groups.361
Some of these payments may be improper, but even with respect
to agreements involving payments, one must examine whether the
payments are appropriate payments for services in furtherance of
making sound loans (such as home buyer credit counseling) or are
used for some unrelated purpose. One would need to analyze
whether these operating funds furthered the banks' ability to meet
their obligations under CRA before deciding whether to characterize
even these operating support funds as rent-seeking. Bank support for
community organizations is a legitimate way to help overcome market
failures. Such community organizations can reduce the costs of
acquiring and interpreting information about low-income borrowers
and communities, can help coordinate lending activities to overcome
collective action problems, and can share risk to reduce bank expo-
sure to problems of adverse selection and moral hazard that arise
from information asymmetries. In my view, the new requirements for
disclosure of these payments ought to minimize further any concerns
about improper rent-seeking by community-based organizations.
359 See NAT'L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COALITION, CRA SUNSHINE REVEALS BENEFITS
OF BANK-COMMUNITY GROUP PARTNERSHIPS 11 (2002), at http://69.36.186.20/policy/cra/
Sunshinejreportwithcovers.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2005).
360 Id.
361 Id. at 11. The CRA Sunshine provisions are found at 12 U.S.C. § 1831y (2000).
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A recent study by Bostic and Robinson confirms the view that
CRA agreements can enhance the performance of bank and thrift
lending. The study found that banks and thrifts increased their
lending significantly after entering into CRA agreements. 362 More-
over, the study found that CRA agreements that included a role for
community groups in mortgage counseling and technical assistance
resulted in higher levels of lending.363 These higher levels of lending
continued even after the terms of the agreements had ended, and the
effects were more pronounced the longer the agreement, providing
support for the view that CRA agreements had led institutions over
time to find profitable lending opportunities in low-income communi-
ties. 364 Bostic and Robinson's study thus undermines the argument of
critics who alleged that CRA agreements are generally a costly form
of rent-seeking.
4. Compliance Costs
As the critics note, banks and thrifts also face other costs of com-
pliance with CRA that should be weighed in evaluating whether CRA
is an efficient response to market failures and discrimination. These
compliance costs include, for example, paperwork burdens, examina-
tion time, compliance officers, and the geocoding of loan data.365
These types of costs are difficult to measure; regulators likely underes-
timate them, downplaying transition costs, while industry trade groups
tend to inflate them, often by conflating transition costs with ongoing
ones.
366
The bank and thrift regulators estimated in 1999 that the annual
compliance burden from CRA for data collection and reporting was
about 554 to 635 hours per year for large banks and about ten hours
per year for small banks, totaling nearly 1.25 million hours per year
and costing $35.4 million industry-wide.367 That year, such a compli-
ance burden would have constituted essentially 0% of the $6 trillion in
362 See generally Raphael Bostic & Breck L. Robinson, What Makes CRA Agreements
Work? A Study of Lender Responses to CRA Agreements (2003), http://www.chicagofed.
org/cedric/files/2003_confpaper-session5_bostic.pdf.
363 Id. at 20.
364 Id. at 18-19.
365 Related to compliance cost is the administrative cost to the banking agencies of
implementing CRA, including examinations, merger reviews, and, perhaps, the community
development staff who publish information about best practices and engage in outreach
with banks and community groups. Unfortunately, there is no data of which I am aware
that would shed light on the magnitude of these costs. Further empirical research would
usefully add to this analysis.
366 1 thank Howell Jackson for this insight.
367 Submission for OMB Review, 64 Fed. Reg. 29,083, 29,084, 29,086 (Treasury Dep't
May 28, 1999), and author's calculations based on id.
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bank assets and 3 billion hours of total bank employee time,368 and
less than 0.2% of the cost of bank regulation.369 Even though these
more recent estimates for large banks are much higher than they had
been at the time of the 1995 reforms, as regulators had underesti-
mated geocoding costs, the 1999 figures are strikingly low, and such
costs have likely decreased since 1999.370
Moreover, the 1995 regulations streamlined CRA compliance for
small banks. Small banks are not required to collect or report small
business or small farm lending data under CRA and examiners eval-
uate their performance based on data collected either in the normal
course of business or pursuant to other regulations, including the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). 371 In addition, small
banks are subject only to a streamlined lending examination, rather
than a full scope review under the lending, investment, and services
tests.372 The Independent Community Bankers of America (ICBA),
the trade group for small- to mid-sized banks, surveyed its member-
ship about the costs of CRA regulation.373 Although the study is
designed to highlight the high compliance costs of CRA, the data
reported in the study suggest otherwise. The mean employee cost for
CRA compliance was $84,445 per year for small banks, with average
assets of $216 million, and about $30,000 more per year for larger
"community" banks, with average assets of $666 million.374 CRA
368 Author's calculations based on CRA-Banks and Thrifts with Assets Over $250 Mil-
lion Sheshunoff Database (1998) (on file with the New York University Law Review).
369 This calculation derives from GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN, THE COST OF BANK REGU-
LATION: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 23 (1998) (estimating that total costs of bank regula-
tion in 1991 were $15.7 billion), at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/staffstudies/171/
ss171.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2005). Presumably, the total cost of bank regulation
increased between 1991 and 1999, thus the 0.2% estimate may even overstate the relative
cost of CRA data reporting.
370 Geocoding costs likely have come down significantly since then, now that the fixed
costs of new systems have been absorbed and loans can be entered automatically rather
than manually.
371 In part, this shifts some of the costs of compliance from small banks to the regula-
tors, who have to do more to assess the institution's lending than if the bank kept more
detailed data. This shifted compliance cost is borne in part, depending on the institution
regulated and the funding structure of the relevant federal agency, by general bank assess-
ments that support the relevant agency, in part by deposit insurance premia (to the extent
paid), and in part by taxpayers (to the extent that the agency is supported by interest on
reserves).
372 See 12 C.F.R. § 25.26 (2005) (small bank performance standards); § 25.42 (noting
that small banks are not required to collect data required under this provision).
373 GRANT THORNTON, supra note 330. The ICBA survey had only a 28% response rate
(276 responses to 1000 surveys) and thus should be treated with caution. Id. at 3.
374 Id. at 4, 13. The Independent Community Bankers of America (ICBA) surveyed
small banks, as well as larger "community" banks with assets up to $2 billion.
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employee costs as a percentage of assets were negligible-0.017% for
larger "community" banks, and 0.039% for small banks.3
75
Surveys of bank compliance officers also suggest that the 1995
reforms reduced the compliance burdens of CRA. The overall com-
pliance costs of CRA do not rank high, relative to previous years, in
the most recent ABA survey of compliance burdens.376 CRA ranked
ninth out of twenty laws and regulations studied, just after Flood
Insurance Rules. 377 This rank represents a dramatic improvement
over just a decade ago, when CRA often topped the ABA survey for
most burdensome regulation before the 1995 reforms. 378 And the
improvement came during a time of acknowledged increase in scru-
tiny of activ'ities regulated by CRA and improved CRA performance.
Critics of CRA also contend that the vagueness of CRA's stan-
dard leads to uncertainty about what will be required of banks and
thrifts in the CRA examination and merger process and that this
uncertainty itself raises compliance costs. 379 Costs may be higher
because lenders devote significant time and resources to documenting
activities that turn out to be relatively unimportant to the examina-
tion, or because uncertainty induces them to undertake activities that
in their best judgments are not safe and sound or profitable. One
might also categorize banks undertaking more CRA-eligible activity
than necessary to achieve the bank's desired rating as a cost, even if
the activity is profitable and sound. This additional activity may have
an opportunity cost from the bank's perspective. However, the addi-
tional CRA activity, if prudent, also confers a social benefit that must
be weighed in addition to the profit to the institution. Of course, the
obverse case would constitute a significant cost: That is, if banks and
thrifts underestimate the level of performance required to achieve a
satisfactory grade, their poor performance might lead to a lower-than-
expected grade, bad public relations, a lower likelihood of being
acquired, or a delay in a proposed merger.
375 Author's calculations, based on ICBA survey. See id.
376 Being Good Is Just the Beginning: The Nationwide Bank Compliance Officer Survey,
ABA BANKING J., June 2003, at 35.
377 The top ten of the twenty studied, in order from most costly to least, were Bank
Secrecy, Privacy, Truth in Lending, Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, Home Mort-
gage Disclosure Act, Truth in Savings, Fair Lending, Flood Insurance, CRA, and Elec-
tronic Funds Transfer Act. Id. at 35 (ranking higher in bank categories over $1 billion).
378 See Burden of Regulation: Bank Compliance Costs Equal More Than Half of
Industry Profits, BANKING POL'Y REP., July 6, 1992, at 5; see also AM. BANKING Ass'N,
Cur THE RED TAPE (Nov. 1992) (finding that CRA topped the list for "most time-con-
suming" regulation and "most headaches" among 34% and 40% of banks surveyed,
respectively) (on file with the New York University Law Review).
379 2002 JoIr CENTER CRA REPORT, supra note 226, at 117.
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Law Review
May 2005]
HeinOnline  -- 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 593 2005
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Although Macey and Miller charged that the pre-1995-reform
CRA process was so vague as to give regulators unfettered discre-
tion,380 recent evidence suggests that CRA generally was applied con-
sistently even during the early 1990s. A recent study analyzing CRA
examinations for several thousand commercial banks from 1990 to
1996 found that the scheduling of CRA examinations and the persis-
tence of examination ratings tracked home mortgage loan levels and
other key objective factors.381 In scheduling examinations, "supervi-
sors allocate[d] their resources toward institutions with observed
CRA compliance inadequacies. ' 382 Moreover, the "level of residen-
tial lending" influenced the CRA ratings of banks.383 That is, CRA
ratings were found to be primarily related to performance, not com-
munity "griping," extortion, or regulator arbitrariness. The study con-
cluded that "CRA enforcement during this period reflected, at least in
part, objective evaluation criteria. '384
The study's findings of relative congruence between rating and
performance undermine critics' charges of the inherent arbitrariness
of standards. Furthermore, the study focused on the period prior to
full implementation of the 1995 reforms. Regulator consistency likely
has improved substantially under the 1995 reforms, which focus more
on objective measures of lending, investment, and services. Still,
critics are right to focus on the importance of consistent application of
standards, and to look for ways in which regulators can perform better
in that regard, both within and across banking agencies.
Shareholder value is another possible measure of compliance
costs. One study argued that the 1995 CRA reforms had little effect
on shareholder value and so did not reduce compliance costs. 385 The
problems faced by event studies, which seek to measure the way in
which an event, such as a regulatory change, enhance shareholder
value as measured, usually, by stock price, in general are well
380 Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 326-29; see also Leonard Bierman et al., The
Community Reinvestment Act: A Preliminary Empirical Analysis, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 383,
398 (1994) (identifying "apparent subjectivity involved in the awarding of rankings" as
"most troubling problem in the administration of the CRA").
381 Drew Dahl et al., The Timing and Persistence of CRA Compliance Ratings, 23 J. FIN.
SERViCES RES. 113, 114 (2003).
382 Id. at 123.
383 Id. at 130.
384 Id. at 113.
385 David P. Ely & Kenneth J. Robinson, Is the Community Reinvestment Act in Need of
Further Reform? Evidence from Equity Markets During the 1995 Reform Process, 23 J. FIN.
SERVICES RES. 59, 75 (2003).
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known.386 Carefully designed event studies nevertheless can shed
light on regulatory changes designed to enhance shareholder value.387
Yet an event study of a reform (such as the 1995 CRA regulatory
amendments) whose purpose was not solely to increase shareholder
value, but rather to reduce compliance costs, increase lending, and
focus on "performance, not paperwork," is more complicated to eval-
uate from an event-study perspective. For example, the CRA reforms
may have had zero net effect on shareholders, while shifting compli-
ance costs from less productive processes to investments that lead to
more effective lending. In addition, given that the 1995 CRA reforms
continued to employ a standard, with room for regulatory discretion,
it is not surprising that the reforms did not generate a measurable
increase in shareholder value immediately after the final rule was
released. Gains (or losses) to shareholders would take a long time for
even informationally efficient financial markets to transmit, as banks,
thrifts and their regulators gained experience under the new CRA
standards. As the authors acknowledge, their results "could also
reflect substantial uncertainty over the benefits and costs that might
arise from reform until it becomes clear how the new rules will be
implemented. "388
In sum, the critics have significantly overstated the costs of CRA.
CRA lending does not appear to be unprofitable and overly risky.
There is little evidence that CRA has had a significant chilling effect
on efficient mergers and acquisitions; instead, merger reviews seem to
contribute to increased levels of CRA lending. Charges of rampant
rent-seeking by community groups based on anecdotal evidence do
not seem to be supported by the record, although there may be indi-
vidual cases of abuse. 389 While it is difficult to measure all of the com-
pliance and administrative costs of CRA, available evidence suggests
that such costs are quite low by a number of important measures of
regulatory burden.
The relatively low costs and high benefits of CRA support the
theoretical case that CRA is helping to overcome market failures rea-
sonably efficiently. If market failures and discrimination were absent,
one would have expected studies to find little or no independent role
386 See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuck et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Cor-
porate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1792-93 (2002) (discussing problem of confounding
events).
387 See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part I:
Technique and Corporate Litigation, 4 AMER. LAW & ECON. REV. 141 (2002).
388 Ely & Robinson, supra note 385, at 65 n.3 (citation omitted).
389 Needless to say, however, I have not examined every case of alleged misbehavior
and there may have been individual instances of such problems.
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for CRA and highly unprofitable, risky lending when such a role is to
be found. The evidence instead tends to support the opposite conclu-
sion: Market failures and discrimination likely persist, and CRA
appears to be helping to overcome them. Moreover, the empirical
case undermines critics' contentions that CRA is poorly designed to
overcome these failures. Instead, the evidence tends to support the
view that CRA is a plausible policy response to these problems. With
the foregoing analysis as a foundation, the next Part reexamines from
both a theoretical and empirical perspective the critics' contentions
that the approach of using a standard for CRA, rather than a rule-
based regime, is flawed.
V
CRA's STANDARDS APPROACH COMPARED TO A
RULES APPROACH
Many of the criticisms of CRA described in Part II find at their
root a criticism of the decision to employ a standard rather than a
rule. Critics' arguments about uncertainty, regulatory discretion, and
rent-seeking, as well as policy arguments in favor of safe harbors or
tradeable obligations, boil down to arguments in favor of rules as
opposed to standards. In this Part, I first defend the choice for CRA
of something closer to a standard rather than something closer to a
rule, and draw some broader implications for the standards versus
rules debate more generally. Parts V.B and V.C reject proposals to
integrate tradeable permits and safe harbors, respectively, into CRA.
Both of these proposals would make CRA a more rule-based regula-
tory regime. Although there are some advantages to both proposals, I
will argue that they would likely not be preferable to the current
approach.
A. CRA's Standard Compared to a Rule
The CRA statute and its implementing regulations can be charac-
terized as employing an approach closer to legal standards than rules.
Schlag defines rules as having an "empirical" trigger and a "deter-
mined" response while standards are defined as having an "evalua-
tive" trigger and a "guided" response. 39° Another way of thinking
about standards and rules is to think of them as lying on a continuum,
from mechanistic, computer-programming-type rules (e.g., if a = 1,
then go to c), which provide an "empirical" trigger with a "deter-
mined" response, to open-ended standards that require judgment
390 Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 382-83 (1985).
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(e.g., decide whether this action is "just" based only on "human expe-
rience"), which provide an "evaluative" trigger with a (quite loosely)
"guided" response. Actual legal rules and standards fall somewhere
between these extremes.
The CRA statute directs banking agencies to "assess the institu-
tion's record of meeting the credit needs of its entire community" and
to "take such record into account" in evaluating applications for
mergers, acquisitions, and branch openings and closings. 391 The struc-
ture of the agencies' responsibilities under the statute is evaluative
and guided rather than determined. Under the regulations, a bank's
or thrift's "performance under the tests and standards in the rule is
judged in the context of information about the institution, its commu-
nity, its competitors, and its peers. '392 That is, bank regulators pro-
vide no fixed requirement for banks to undertake a certain level of
activity, but rather make a judgment about the institution's perform-
ance in the context in which it is operating.
As the statute's standard is implemented, first through regulation,
then examiner guidance, and finally individual examinations and
merger reviews, repeated many times across institutions, experience
will suggest patterns of regulatory response that could be articulated
as something like "rules." Financial institutions and regulators
develop experience that in a given market with given constraints, a
given level of lending is "enough"-all to the good in terms of predict-
ability. If it were not so cumbersome, one could label the results of
such iterative learning a "rule derived from a standard" or a "learned-
rule-standard," or some such hybrid, and nothing would be lost in
terms of my argument here. I am not relying on the label of "stan-
dard" as such, but on the fact of contextualism and bottom-up engage-
ment to suggest the features of this approach that are promising.
The debate over whether standards or rules should be preferred
has a long pedigree.393 Three basic approaches emerge in this debate.
First, scholars have identified philosophical underpinnings of rules
391 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a) (2000).
392 Joint Final Rule, Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156,
22,162 (May 4, 1995) (codified at Community Reinvestment Act and Interstate Deposit
Production Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 25.21(b) (2003)).
393 See, e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72-73 (1944); MARK
KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987); FREDERICK SCHAUER,
PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-
MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 149-55 (1991); Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards, and
Precautions in Payment Systems, 82 VA. L. REV. 181, 185 (1996); Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1688 (1976);
Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101,
101-07 (1997); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781
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and standards. 394 Second, other scholars have rejected the notion that
formal distinctions between rules and standards have any meaning.395
A third group of scholars has attempted to discern general principles
for deciding when standards or rules are more appropriate. 396 Among
the last group, law-and-economics scholars have used transaction-cost
economics to argue that the higher cost of articulating rules ex ante is
worthwhile when many people engage in the activity being regulated,
multiplying the ex post transaction costs many times over.397 Yet
translating transaction-cost theory into application is difficult because
it is hard to measure the costs and benefits of alternative rules and
standards formulations.
Critics of CRA have argued that its standards approach results in
arbitrary and inefficient enforcement, permits rent-seeking by
banking agencies and community groups, and violates basic notions of
the rule of law.398 CRA's critics tend to espouse rhetoric that would
support the notion that deep philosophical differences underlie the
distinction between rules and standards, but the anti-formalists are
right that standards can be made to look like rules, and vice versa,
undermining the importance of such a gulf. Legal directives can take
forms arrayed on a continuum from those that are more standard-like
to those that are more rule-like. Thus, for the purposes of analyzing
CRA, I adopt a pragmatic approach and ask whether something like
the standards approach of CRA is preferable to a more rules-based
approach.
The lack of certainty in standards for meeting community needs
under CRA does have ex post compliance costs. Lacking a numerical
target imposed by regulators makes it more difficult for firms to know
whether their CRA initiatives will result in the rating they seek. Firms
may "overcomply" with CRA, particularly given the social norm of
(1989); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988);
Schlag, supra note 390.
394 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 393, at 1685 (arguing that standards reflect altruism
while rules reflect individualism); Rose, supra note 393, at 609 (suggesting that debate is
over what our relationship with strangers should be).
395 See, e.g., Radin, supra note 393, at 819 (arguing that every application of rule
involves reinterpretation of it); Schlag, supra note 390, at 383 (arguing opposition between
rules and standards is "arrested" dialectic).
396 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 393, at 1710 (listing qualities associated with rules and
standards).
397 See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 393, at 562-63. But see Posner, supra note 393, at
103-04 (arguing that logic of economic optimization implied by Kaplow's approach leads
to infinite regress rather than basis for decisionmaking); Rose, supra note 393, at 609 (criti-
cizing law-and-economics approaches).
398 See supra Part II.
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disapprobation that accompanies a low rating.399 Each examiner may
review bank performance using implicitly different standards, leading
to inconsistent evaluations even by a single regulator. Examiners may
vary in their standards across regulators and regions, magnifying the
likelihood of inconsistency. The lack of precision in setting a standard
is a matter of degree, and the pre-1995 CRA standard was widely criti-
cized for vagueness and circularity. 400
Nonetheless, there are strong reasons for preferring a standard to
a rule for CRA. First, a standard is likely to be more efficient than a
rule in this context. Kaplow suggests that the cost of rulemaking will
be higher ex ante than the cost of developing a standard. 401 How
much higher will depend in part on how detailed the rule must be to
cover the array of factual situations in which it is supposed to apply. It
would be quite costly to come up with a rule for CRA that was
nuanced enough to fit the myriad contexts in which financial institu-
tions lend. One would want to adjust for local market conditions;
competition; the structure of the local housing market; the presence or
absence of community organizations helping with screening and edu-
cating potential borrowers; the strength of local homeowners and civic
organizations; local, state, and federal funds available for homeowner-
ship assistance; the particular characteristics of the bank or thrift; and
other factors. Delineating these factors in advance would be enor-
mously costly, and even so there would be a high risk of getting them
wrong. Moreover, the factors are likely to have to be changed over
time to keep up with rapid changes in the market. Even developing
the current approach under CRA required an extensive notice and
comment process. This extensive process drove the ex ante costs of
CRA closer to the costs of developing a more detailed rule. Thus,
CRA's standard may already have been costlier to develop, ex ante,
than an even more general standard, and a more detailed rule would
have been costlier still.
To lower costs ex ante, one could adopt a simple set of rules
instead. One might imagine a system that involved levying fines on
banks for failure to comply with numerical lending targets. Setting
fines for violations of CRA would comport CRA enforcement more
closely with other areas of bank regulation. In the 1990s regulatory
reform process, the regulators considered including fines for banks
achieving only a "substantial noncompliance" rating on their examina-
399 For a strong form of this argument, see Posner, supra note 393, at 113-16, describing
the overcompliance with the social norm against wearing Western-made motorcycle hel-
mets in the Soviet Union.
400 See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 326-27.
401 Kaplow, supra note 393, at 562-63.
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tion, but dropped the idea, in part because other agencies opined that
such fines were not authorized by the statute. 40 2
Yet CRA's contextual standard has significant advantages ex post
over an approach with fines for violating rules. Clear, quantitative
requirements on all firms would be ex post inefficient, at least given
the existing framework for examinations and merger reviews. 40 3 Dif-
ferent firms have different cost structures, scope and scale, and
operate in markets with different demographics and competitive
structures. Firms make loans at different times under different market
conditions. Setting a single rate (or rates) of lending in advance would
likely cause some firms to be unable to meet the standard despite
their best efforts, cause others to make uneconomic loans, and cause
still others to meet the rule without any serious effort to lend to low-
income borrowers. Moreover, such a rule would become stale over
time, and would not easily be adapted to changing market conditions.
By contrast, the CRA standards permit banks to respond to local
needs based on their own institutional organization, market assess-
ments, and business plans, without being judged on the basis of
national norms. Rather, examiners look to local context and business
strategy. The flexibility provided by the performance context assess-
ment is one of the most critical aspects of the CRA regulation. It
permits the locally based decisionmaking contemplated by Congress
in enacting CRA. Standards also diminish the extent to which regula-
tors need fear that CRA would lead to "credit allocation," since the
bank makes the judgment about whether, and to whom, to extend a
loan.40 4 The CRA standard can evolve with changes in the market at
relatively low cost.
402 See Joint Final Rule, Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg.
22,156, 22,158 (May 4, 1995).
403 At some much larger number of CRA reviews it would be possible to make transac-
tion costs swamp these substantive benefits. That is, advocates of rules are correct that ex
post efficiency does depend, in part, on the number of transactions.
404 Although critics label CRA "credit allocation," regulators have avoided quotas or
approaches involving the government in decisions about the precise level of lending or the
proper parties to which to lend. See, e.g., Alan Greenspan, Economic Development in
Low- and Moderate-Income Communities, Remarks at a Community Forum on Commu-
nity Reinvestment and Access to Credit: California's Challenge (Jan. 12, 1998), at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1998/19980112.htm (last visited Mar. 30,
2005); see also PERFORMANCE AND PROFITABILITY, supra note 220, at 95-96:
The legislative history indicates that the Congress did not intend for the CRA
to result in government-imposed credit allocation. The expectation, rather,
was that banking institutions would be proactive in seeking out and serving
viable lending opportunities in all sections of their communities. At the same
time, it was expected that lending activities would be undertaken in a manner
consistent with the safe and sound operation of banking institutions. The regu-
lations that implement the CRA reflect these goals. They provide for flexi-
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More broadly, a second reason to prefer a CRA standard over a
rule is that using standards, together with a process for iterative public
comment, permits banks and local communities to participate in the
formation of the legal directive. This participation occurs not simply
in the notice and comment process for rulemaking, but in each
instance of the application of the CRA standard in an examination, or
merger review, both of which are made public. Use of a standard with
public participation in its application has two main benefits: accuracy
and legitimacy.
CRA lets banks help to shape the content of the standard in
CRA's application to them, in their local context, during their CRA
evaluation and in merger applications. This increases the likelihood
that the performance will be analyzed according to the regulated
entity's view of an appropriate standard for the institution, as com-
pared with either an industry-wide numerical target for lending40 5 or
regulator judgment alone. On its own, such participation might raise
important concerns about regulatory capture, but CRA examinations
and merger reviews are made public, and CRA engages citizen partici-
pation in the standard setting at the same time.
CRA examinations, merger reviews, and development of a per-
formance context permit greater citizen participation in the formation
of the assessment, which may also increase its accuracy and its legiti-
macy. CRA assessment through public disclosure, rating the institu-
tion's performance, and taking public input permit greater citizen
participation in the decision about application of the standard. The
public is more likely to view application of the standard as legitimate
if the public has been engaged in the administrative process. This pro-
cedure may be even more important in contexts, such as CRA, in
which regulators are given significant discretion in interpreting a
statute. While public participation in detailed rulemaking is also a
means to enhance legitimacy, that participation occurs only at the
moment of the notice and comment process required for rulemaking
under the Administrative Procedure Act. By contrast, the process of
encouraging public participation in application of the standard is an
important means to enhance the accountability of the regulatory agen-
cies beyond the notice and comment period. Moreover, the iterative
process of public engagement also enhances the expertise of local
bility and direct that performance be evaluated in the context of the specific
circumstances faced by each institution.
405 For analysis of Klausner's proposal for tradeable obligations based on numerical
targets and Swire's proposals for safe harbors based on numerical targets, see infra Parts
V.B & V.C.
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organizations, which in turn improves the potential performance of
loans made in their community, the very purpose of the Act.
In that regard, public engagement in application of the standard
may be a useful model in other contexts for enhancing the accounta-
bility of regulatory agencies and the legitimacy of regulatory action.4 °6
By encouraging public engagement throughout the life of the law,
such an approach is more likely to enhance legitimacy. 40 7 While
public involvement in implementing a standard that requires regula-
tory discretion adds to the transaction costs of CRA implementation,
the benefits of civic engagement also should be weighed. This kind of
"bottom-up" lawmaking through public engagement in implementing
standards can have important advantages over clear rules.408 Once a
rule is established, there is much less room for meaningful citizen par-
ticipation in its application. That is, standards can open up the possi-
bility for meaningful civic engagement.
Third, some of the downsides critics generally associate with stan-
dards, such as arbitrary and unaccountable decisionmaking and
agency or regulated entity rent-seeking, are mitigated in the case of
CRA. The regulator's CRA review in examinations and merger appli-
cations becomes public and so can be subjected to analysis, and com-
pared to other CRA reviews by the same and other bank agencies,
both as to individual institutions and across the industry. The review
includes notice and comment proceedings, often with the opportunity
for hearings, which enhances transparency and permits all affected
406 There has been some increased attention recently to enhancing public participation
in the administrative process. See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 358, at 71
(arguing that public participation can enhance accountability and reduce capture);
Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REv. (forth-
coming 2005) (on file with author) (calling for increased public participation in rule-
making through new specialized independent agency); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in
Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543 (2000) (advocating greater private sector role in
administrative process in order to enhance accountability). For an early proponent of
greater citizen involvement, see Roger C. Cramton, The Why, Where & How of Broadened
Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525 (1972) (calling for
greater public participation in rulemaking). For a skeptical view, see generally Mark
Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible
Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411 (2000).
407 For an example testing the empirical link between participation and perceptions of
legitimacy, see Michael E. Morrell, Citizens' Evaluations of Participatory Democratic Pro-
cedures: Normative Theory Meets Empirical Science, 52 POL. RES. Q. 293, 317-18 (1999)
(finding that public acceptance of decisionmaking increased with frequency of public
participation).
408 Cf PETER H. SCHUCK, THE LIMITs OF LAW: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERN.
ANCE 452 (2000) (describing bottom-up forms of law as presenting low administrative
costs, embeddedness, and high legitimacy); see also Orin L. McCluskey, The Community
Reinvestment Act: Is It Doing the Job?, 100 BANKING L.J. 33, 57 (1983) (coining phrase
"regulation from below" to describe role of community groups under CRA).
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parties to provide input. Regulators, community organizations, and
banks and thrifts have repeated interactions over time on the same
issues, unlike parties who appear before a judge only once. The itera-
tive nature of these interactions increases the incentives for consistent,
reasonable, and reliable analyses from all three of the major players-
regulators, the public, and banks. The continuing role for the public
in implementing the standard helps to diminish the possibility that the
agencies will be captured by the entities that they regulate.40 9 These
factors increase accountability and minimize the opportunities for
abuse.
Fourth, the form of a legal directive as a standard rather than a
rule conveys social meaning and affects enforcement.410 The form of
the legal directive can enhance compliance because the law helps
create social norms, reveals instances in which actors transgress those
norms, and contributes to compliance even absent legal consequences.
Public engagement with the meaning of CRA's standard can reinforce
a norm of access to credit. If the public cares about the social norm of
access to credit, and if creditors care about their reputation with the
public, CRA's effectiveness can be enhanced through public accept-
ance of the social norm. Of course, as critics of standards suggest, the
social norm may push behavior beyond what is efficient or fall short of
what was intended by the promulgators of the standard.
CRA's broad standards and "enforcement" mechanisms-public
disclosure of examination results and consideration of the institution's
CRA performance during merger applications-have long been
derided by both proponents and detractors of CRA. Community
advocates urge stricter rules and harsher consequences of failure.
Bankers lament the lack of clear rules or safe harbors and the intru-
sive role of the public. Yet it is this interplay, this conversation,
between banks and communities that is one of CRA's chief virtues. A
rule setting forth lending requirements would cut off this dialogue. It
would also send a message that banks are to disregard creditworthi-
409 See AYREs & BRArnAWAITE, supra note 358, at 71-73 (arguing that public interest
groups can help to prevent capture). In other countries where the concern over corruption
is larger, and transparency more lacking, detailed rules might be preferable to standards on
grounds of legitimacy even if citizen input is minimal, assuming the rule itself is not sub-
stantively oppressive. I am not making a claim that standards with citizen input are more
legitimate than detailed rules in all circumstances, but rather that in the context of the
application of CRA to banks and thrifts in the United States, the standards approach likely
enhances the legitimacy of CRA. The same point is of course true with respect to effi-
ciency; if government is ineffectual or incompetent, rules might be preferable on efficiency
grounds.
410 See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of
Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503 (2000) (providing comprehensive
account of aims and features of expressive theories).
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ness, business strategy, and local context, which is not the goal of
CRA. In this respect, CRA's legal directive appropriately takes the
form of a standard rather than a rule.
CRA's broad standard expresses the value of inclusion in lending.
Because interpretation of CRA's standard requires community input,
CRA expresses an inclusive ideal of participation in rulemaking that
should be counted among the law's benefits. The expressive effects of
law should be considered alongside the operational effects.411 Even
welfare economists acknowledge that expressive factors, like other
non-consequentialist factors, may be included in concepts of utility or
well-being that aggregate to social welfare. 412 Thus, under either an
expressive or a utilitarian theory of value, to the extent that CRA's
norms of inclusion resonate with low-income, moderate-income, and
minority borrowers, such expression ought to be regarded as a benefit
of CRA. CRA conveys that borrowers who have been left out of the
economic mainstream ought to be treated with respect by lenders and
regulators alike. This expressive function of CRA can bring real ben-
efits, as attested to by members of these communities.
B. CRA's Standard Reasonably Addresses Market Failures and
Does So Better than Tradeable Obligations
In Part IV, I argued that CRA's standard was a reasonable policy
response to market failures and discrimination in low-income commu-
nities. Michael Klausner argued at the time of the 1995 CRA reforms
that CRA was the wrong response to market failures that he deemed
likely to exist in low-income communities and that a rules-based
regime would be preferable. 413 In particular, he contended that CRA
impedes specialization among banks in serving low-income communi-
ties and makes it difficult for banks to internalize information exter-
nalities, either directly or indirectly through lending consortia. 414
Klausner argued that banks and thrifts could not invest efficiently in
the expertise needed to lend successfully in all the low-income com-
munities within their assessment areas. 415 Moreover, he argued, if
many banks and thrifts seek to serve the same low-income area, each
lender will not be able to internalize its information costs, as suc-
411 Cf id. But see Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000) (arguing that expressive theories are not persuasive).
412 Cf Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961,
1009 (2001) (asserting that "welfare economics takes into account any effect of a legal rule
that is pertinent to anyone's well-being," while criticizing fairness-based theories of policy
evaluation).
413 Klausner, supra note 21, at 1564.
414 Id. at 1574.
415 Id. at 1574-75.
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cessful lending will benefit competitors in that area.416 Furthermore,
with large numbers of creditors involved, he argued that coordination
to develop loan consortia would be more difficult.417 In addition,
Klausner suggested that competition from big banks seeking to meet
CRA obligations would hurt specialized lenders focusing on low-
income areas. 418 Klausner argued that less competition among banks
for scarce loans in low-income areas, rather than more competition,
would permit banks to internalize more of their costs and develop
expertise in low-income areas. 41 9
Instead of CRA, Klausner suggested a rule, in the form of a
quota for lending to low-income borrowers that could be met by
trading obligations among banks.420 In his view, a tradable quota
would permit banks to specialize in lending to particular communities
where they could invest in information or in funding loans rather than
originating them. Specialization would mean less competition, greater
cost internalization, and easier coordination among fewer lenders
seeking to form loan consortia in low-income areas. Lastly, he argued
that a tradeable quota would cost less than the discretionary standards
implicit in CRA.421
Based on nearly a decade of experience since the 1995 reforms,
evaluated in detail in Part IV, I argue that CRA is reasonably aimed
at overcoming the market failures both Klausner and I believe to exist
in low-income communities, and that the current CRA standard is
preferable to the rules-based, quota-and-trade system Klausner
proposed.
First, fostering competition among banks and thrifts in serving
low-income areas is good, not bad. Banks generally do not want to be
the sole lender in a low-income community. Banks perceive less risk
when other lenders are serving a low-income community after
applying their own credit criteria regarding property values and neigh-
borhood characteristics, loan terms, and borrower credit scores.
Larger volumes of lending from diverse sources add liquidity to the
market and help to overcome incomplete markets; that added
liquidity decreases the riskiness of each bank's loan. CRA fosters
competition among banks and thrifts in serving low- and moderate-
income communities in a variety of ways. At bottom, banks and
thrifts have an affirmative obligation under CRA to lend in their
416 Id. at 1576.
417 Id. at 1577.
418 Id. at 1575.
419 Id. at 1574-75.
420 Id. at 1580.
421 Id. at 1585-91.
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entire communities.422 Moreover, they are judged, in part, based on
an assessment of their market share in low-income communities as
compared to their peer institutions. 423
Second, CRA has helped, not deterred, banks in developing spe-
cialization in serving low-income communities. One important type of
specialization spans geographic areas: innovation in developing prod-
ucts that meet the credit needs of low-income areas with manageable
risks. And CRA does encourage banks to develop specialization in
serving particular geographic areas. For example, banks partner with
Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) and commu-
nity-based organizations to penetrate low-income markets where they
have not operated at scale before. 424 CRA encourages banks to do
this directly, through the investment test,425 and indirectly, because
banks view partnering with these specialized entities as important
ways to meet their obligations under the investment, lending, and ser-
vices tests.426
Third, competition from banks and thrifts under CRA has
helped, not hurt, specialized lenders; these lenders complement, but
do not replace, large institutions. Under CRA, banks and thrifts have
entered markets where only specialized institutions such as
ShoreBank, the grandfather of the community development banking
sector, had worked before. But the effect of entry has been positive.
ShoreBank and other institutions like it demonstrated the possibility
of lending in low-income communities and have partnered with banks
on an ongoing basis. Specialized lenders provide local expertise,
cover some of the costs of lending in low-income areas (such as finan-
cial education and counseling), and take portions of the risk of a par-
ticular loan or project that banks do not want to bear. In turn, banks
have invested in CDFIs in record numbers, spurred in part by the
CRA investment test.427 Investments in CDFIs strengthen the ability
of banks and thrifts to serve low-income markets. As banks offer ser-
vices once only offered by CDFIs, the local institutions move further
"downstream," reaching lower-income or harder-to-serve borrowers
and developing new approaches that mainstream institutions later
may find cost-effective. Specialized lenders play important roles in
422 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(3) (2000).
423 Community Reinvestment Act and Interstate Deposit Production Regulations, 12
C.F.R. § 25.22(b)(2)(i) (2003).
424 See supra note 221.
425 See Community Reinvestment Act and Interstate Deposit Production Regulations,
12 C.F.R. § 25.23 (2003).
426 See supra note 221.
427 Id.
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low-income communities, but they are no substitute for robust and
competitive markets that include mainstream banks and thrifts.
42 8
Fourth, CRA provides a pre-commitment device that actually
helps banks coordinate lending to reduce information costs. Because
CRA requires all insured depositories to lend to their entire commu-
nities, it reduces the free-rider problems that otherwise would plague
loan consortia. In other words, even though Klausner is right that a
monopoly also would avoid the problem of free riders, CRA can
reduce or eliminate the problem of under-production from externali-
ties by requiring banks to compete to lend in these communities in
any event. CRA thus serves as a pre-commitment device to coordi-
nate lending and overcome collective action problems. As evidence
from the last decade that I evaluated in Part IV attests, CRA has
spurred the development of loan consortia to learn how to serve low-
and moderate-income communities more effectively. The 1995 regu-
lations treat loans made by such consortia as "community develop-
ment lending" rather than home mortgage or small business lending.
Yet community development lending is an important part of an insti-
tution's performance under the CRA lending test. Moreover, institu-
tions can and do easily move consortia home mortgage or small
business loans onto their own books as home mortgage or small busi-
ness originations or purchases when appropriate, where they "count"
toward the CRA lending test.429
Lastly, CRA after the 1995 reforms provides much of the flexi-
bility and other benefits Klausner's proposal for tradeable obligations
would have offered. 430 And it does so without the downside of fixed
quotas for lending, which are not required for a trading system to
428 See supra Part IV.
429 See Community Reinvestment Act and Interstate Deposit Production Regulations,
12 C.F.R. § 25.22(a)(3), (d) (2004); Joint Final Rule, Community Reinvestment Act Regu-
lations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156, 22,166 (May 4, 1995) (codified at Community Reinvestment
Act and Interstate Deposit Production Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 25.21(b) (2003)) ("Loans
originated directly on the books of the institution or purchased by the institution are con-
sidered to have been made directly by the institution, even if the institution originated or
purchased the loans as a result of its participation in a loan consortium.").
430 CRA shares some traits with the kind of output regulations Klausner favors. Output
regulation, increasingly favored in the environmental protection context, usually sets a
numerical target for performance rather than requiring a firm to undertake certain speci-
fied actions that would affect the target. For example, an environmental output regulation
might set a level for emission of a particular pollutant, but permit the firm to figure out
how to meet that emission standard. Output regulation can be more efficient than input
regulation because it lets firms choose how to shape conduct to meet output requirements.
See generally STIGLrrZ, supra note 26, at 230-31 (differentiating between "performance-
based"-or "output"-regulations and "input" regulations). Firms presumably have
greater expertise in figuring out which technology and management practice it can most
efficiently use to meet the numerical target.
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work. Under the 1995 reforms, banks and thrifts get equal CRA con-
sideration for both originating and purchasing eligible loans,431 cre-
ating a sort of trading system. Institutions can rely on the origination
expertise of others to purchase loans on the robust market for CRA
loans. The development of this CRA loan market increases liquidity
and reduces loan prices. It also improves transparency in CRA loan
pricing, providing valuable information to regulators, communities,
and banks and thrifts themselves about the performance and profit-
ability of CRA lending.
C. The Standards Approach Compares Favorably with
Safe Harbors
Peter Swire argued prior to the 1995 reforms that "enforcement"
of CRA through both regular examinations and reviews after "epi-
sodic" protests of applications for mergers ought to be replaced with a
safe harbor for institutions that achieve some given level of CRA per-
formance.432 As Swire explains, safe harbors are, in effect, a partial
rules-based regime.433 In his view, a safe harbor would provide a
strong incentive for banks to make more loans or invest in CDFIs at
lower compliance costs. This proposal was an effort to strengthen
CRA in reaction to an earlier period thought to have been character-
ized by high bureaucratic burden and weak CRA results. Under his
proposal, regulators would set a target level of community develop-
ment investment.4 34 If a bank met the target, the institution would not
undergo CRA examinations or face CRA scrutiny during merger
CRA is similar to output regulation, in that under the 1995 revisions, regulators no
longer look to such "input" factors as how many community meetings the bank held, but
rather to the bank's actual performance in meeting community credit needs. Moreover,
banks and thrifts rely on their own expertise and judgment in meeting community credit
needs. Compared with input regulation over credit practices, for example, requiring a cer-
tain kind of underwriting, this type of output regulation provides for greater flexibility and
enhances rather than stifles innovation. CRA, however, lacks numerical targets normally
associated with output regulation, and employing a standard, rather than a rule, for output
regulation is unusual.
431 The current regulation treats loans originated and purchased the same, and asset-
backed securities as investments. In principle, one could measure, regardless of the struc-
ture, which firm bears the origination cost, the servicing cost, and the credit risk; quantify
such factors as a percentage of the loan; and then assign a portion of each loan corre-
sponding to each bank's share. In practice, the expense is highly unlikely to make the
effort worthwhile. Banks should be able to provide examiners with information about
their business strategy and to allocate securities to the investment or lending test according
to that strategy. Examiners could make qualitative judgments about the extent to which
the firm is serving credit needs however the activity is categorized.
432 Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 21, at 349, 359-65.
433 Id. at 350.
434 Id. at 352.
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applications. Variations of the Swire proposal, under which banks
receiving an "outstanding" rating on their most recent examination
would not face CRA scrutiny during merger reviews, were discussed
in 1995, and have been introduced in Congress repeatedly since
then.435
A safe harbor based on a bank's CRA rating has a number of
disadvantages compared to the current approach. First, a bank's CRA
rating can become stale. Circumstances can change after an examina-
tion, examiners may miss evidence with respect to a particular market,
or applications may involve new markets not covered under the exam-
ination. Banks and thrifts usually are examined every two to three
years. A bank's performance may change significantly in the interim.
The "safe harbor" would prevent regulators from considering such
matters.
Second, CRA ratings are not conclusive. The ratings are
intended to reflect a bank's performance in meeting the credit needs
of its entire community. But an outstanding rating does not necessa-
rily mean that the depository institution's record is exemplary in every
market that it serves. Many of the communities served by depository
institutions are not evaluated during an examination. In the case of
large banks serving multiple markets, regulators only sample a portion
of these markets to determine the lender's CRA rating. In addition,
CRA performance in larger communities where the lender is more
active generally receives more weight.436 Thus, a bank may receive a
"satisfactory" CRA rating even when there is documented poor per-
formance in small communities. 437
Third, providing a safe harbor would eliminate or severely curtail
the role of the public in shaping regulatory norms. As I argue more
fully in Part V.A, public engagement in setting CRA standards, while
costly, is a value worth preserving. Under the safe harbor proposals,
public input would be confined to regular examinations. It would be
inefficient and costly for small community organizations to provide
extensive comment on every bank examination. Public comment is
more focused, and the public is more likely to be genuinely engaged,
in the context of a change in a financial institution that is likely to
have a significant impact on the community. Materials received
during application processes often provide relevant and valuable
information to regulators on an institution's CRA performance, and a
435 See, e.g., H.R. 2491 104th Cong. § 2304 (1995) (vetoed by President Clinton); H.R.
3567, 104th Cong., § 323 (1996); H.R. 31, 105th Cong. § 4 (1999).
436 See, e.g., CRA PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: CITIBANK, supra note 217, at 13.
437 See, e.g., id. at 40.
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safe harbor would diminish the likelihood of obtaining such
information.
Under the Swire proposal, regulators would set numerical targets
for investment and other activities, and institutions meeting that
target would not even be subject to examination.438 The public role in
CRA examinations would be eliminated. Numerical targets would
ignore important contextual factors that influence a bank's or thrift's
ability to make sound loans in low-income communities. If the targets
are set too high, safe harbor could encourage banks to make less prof-
itable and riskier loans than under the current approach, which takes
into account the performance context within which the institution
operates. A numerical target thus raises serious objections on the
grounds of regulator-mandated, inefficient credit allocation. More-
over, without regular CRA examinations, regulators would have no
context in which to learn about how the best institutions meet the
community's credit needs-which would seriously hamper the regula-
tors' ability to set appropriate numerical targets and also would
undermine regulators' ability to share information about best prac-
tices with other institutions. Such sharing of best practices lowers the
cost of innovation and provides significant benefits to banks and the
communities that they serve. Fixed numerical targets, whether
promulgated as a rule or a safe harbor, should be eschewed.
Fourth, the 1995 CRA regulations provide incentives for banks to
achieve outstanding CRA ratings that safe harbors would not. The
frequency of CRA examinations is based in part on previous CRA
performance. Moreover, in CRA reviews during mergers, the regula-
tors place great weight on the previous CRA examination. 439 Despite
some cases to the contrary, a strong prior CRA record is usually an
indicator for successful completion of CRA reviews during mergers."n0
Regulatory discretion, rather than a safe harbor, provides the mode
for analysis and the incentive for performance. Thus, current policy
combines efficient use of agency resources with incentives for good
performance, while ensuring that new information that comes to light
during applications can be properly assessed. The current approach
thus approximates the incentives Swire sought to achieve, without
losing CRA's flexibility and responsiveness to local concerns and
changing market conditions.
438 Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 21, at 352.
439 See generally Community Reinvestment Act: Interagency Questions and Answers
Regarding Community Reinvestments; Notice, 66 Fed. Reg. 36,620 (July 12, 2001).
440 But see Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 328-29, 334-37 (citing examples of com-
munity protests of institutions that generally had received good CRA ratings on prior
examinations).
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As part of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act
(GLBA), Congress codified additional incentives for small banks with
good CRA ratings. Rejecting Senator Gramm's proposals for both a
complete small-bank exemption from CRA and a safe harbor for
small banks with outstanding CRA ratings, Congress enacted a provi-
sion that generally increased the time between CRA examinations for
small banks with outstanding and satisfactory CRA ratings. Under
the Act, small banks with outstanding ratings will generally be
examined every five years.4 4 1 Small banks with satisfactory ratings
generally will be examined every four years.442 Notwithstanding these
provisions, small banks still will be examined in connection with appli-
cations for deposit facilities and mergers, and may be examined more
frequently when the regulator determines that there is reasonable
cause.443 While in my judgment such time periods are too long, they
do provide an incentive for small banks with less frequent mergers to
perform better under CRA. Unlike safe harbors, the Act retains reg-
ulators' discretion to examine banks more frequently when appro-
priate and to undertake a CRA review when small banks merge or
apply for deposit facilities, which can have significant effects on local
communities.
In a sense, one of the GLBA changes acts in ways that are similar
to a safe harbor. If all of the insured depositories in a holding com-
pany obtained a CRA rating of satisfactory or better on their most
recent CRA examination, the holding company can engage in newly
authorized financial activities in insurance and securities. The proce-
dure for engaging in activities that are financial in nature generally
does not provide for an application or any hearing or public comment
process. Thus, there is no opportunity for the public to comment on
CRA (or any other matter) at that time. An institution with a satis-
factory CRA record can engage in newly authorized financial activi-
ties even if new information comes to light that casts doubt on its
CRA performance, at least until its next CRA examination. More-
over, if the next CRA examination brings the institution to a rating
below satisfactory, it need not divest itself of newly authorized enti-
ties; rather, it may not acquire any new entities or engage in any new
financial activities going forward until it regains its satisfactory status.
Empirical research in a few years may begin to shed light on whether
441 12 U.S.C. § 2908(a)(1) (2000).
442 Id. § 2908(a)(2).
443 Id. § 2908(b)-(c).
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the CRA requirement of GLBA has helped to continue to keep CRA
relevant or is insufficiently attentive to current CRA performance.
444
VI
THE SCOPE OF CRA
Critics have charged that CRA has an overly narrow focus, both
in terms of its geographic scope and the institutions it covers. In their
view, narrow geographic scope harms low-income communities by dis-
torting banks' decisions about where to locate and lend money, and
narrow institutional scope harms banks and thrifts by targeting regula-
tory burdens and incentives to some, but not all, financial
intermediaries. 445 Both arguments raise plausible concerns, and the
precise geographic and institutional contours of CRA are not essential
to its success. On balance, however, I think something like the current
approach is reasonable and defensible. I suggest why that is so, and
offer some direction for ways in which the scope of CRA might be
reasonably altered.
A. Geography
1. CRA is Not Anachronistically "Localist" in Its Operation
Critics charge that CRA had its origins in "localist" rhetoric that
has no place in the globalized financial marketplace. 446 In a sense,
they are correct. Some support for CRA has been, and is, rooted in
old-fashioned notions that the local bank should lend locally or even
that the local bank should use funds raised locally to lend locally. The
idea that all local depositor funds should be recycled only into local
loans, taken literally, would undermine geographic diversification,
starve local communities of outside capital, and impede the efficient
flow of capital. Moreover, today, bank geographic restrictions have
largely given way to real competition in interstate banking and to mas-
sive consolidation in the industry. 447 Many banks lend across a wide
geographic area, as well as over the Internet. Credit scoring reduces
the need in some contexts for local knowledge, especially as to the
lowest risk borrowers. Banks raise funds on national and interna-
tional capital markets and accept deposits from a wide variety of
sources. An emphasis on local lending loses a lot of its meaning in this
444 For an early assessment, see LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT, supra note 243, at
13-14, describing interviews with banks and thrifts that suggest that CRA requirements of
GLBA will continue to provide strong incentives for performance.
445 See supra Part II.D.
446 See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 303.
447 See supra note 449.
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context. Moreover, geographic and other diversification of assets is
an important element of most banks' safety and soundness.
Still, there are some reasons to favor local lending, in the sense of
having some local presence from which banks gain expertise and use
their superior knowledge to find creditworthy borrowers and make
profitable loans. Community-development financial institutions and
bank and thrift CRA programs have shown that local knowledge can
be an important determinant in finding creditworthy borrowers that
otherwise would have been overlooked.448 Moreover, studies of bank
small business lending have shown that geography has not disap-
peared as a factor in lending even in competitive, national credit mar-
kets. When large banks merge, they often lose market share in small
business loans that instead are offered by local players.449 As to these
local institutions, geographic distance still matters.450 Most small busi-
nesses rely on lenders with a local presence for credit.451 This is con-
sistent with a theory of informational advantage for local creditors in
assessing highly opaque small business assets and other data.
452
Yet supporters of CRA need not rely on localist theories, given
that market failures and discrimination provide adequate theoretical
foundations for CRA. Overcoming market failures from information
externalities and collective action problems does require a focus on
some "place" where information will be produced and volume and
448 See supra notes 220-224.
449 See, e.g., Robert B. Avery & Katherine A. Samolyk, Bank Consolidation and Small
Business Lending: The Role of Community Banks, 25 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 291, 294 (2004)
(finding that small banks gain market share from large banks during consolidations); David
A. Carter et al., Do Small Banks Have an Advantage in Lending? An Examination of Risk-
Adjusted Yields on Business Loans at Large and Small Banks, 25 J. FIN. SERVICES RES.
233, 234 (2004) (finding that small banks have informational advantage in evaluating small
business loans); Jonathan A. Scott, Small Business and the Value of Community Financial
Institutions, 25 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 207, 208 (2004) (discussing small-bank informational
advantages).
450 KENNETH P. BREVOORT & TIMOTHY H. HANNAN, COMMERCIAL LENDING AND Dis-
TANCE: EVIDENCE FROM COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT DATA 1 (Fed. Reserve Bd.,
Feb. 2004) (on file with New York University Law Review) (finding that "distance is nega-
tively associated with the likelihood of a local commercial loan being made and that deter-
rent effect of distance is consistently more important, the smaller the size of the bank," and
moreover that importance of distance appears to be increasing rather than decreasing in
recent years).
451 JONATHAN A. Sco-rr ET AL., CREDIT, BANKS, AND SMALL BUSINESS-THE NEW
CENTURY app.2 tbl.9 (Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. Research Found. Ed., 2003) (finding
median travel time of six to ten minutes between small business and its bank), at http://
www.nfib.com/object/3747922.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2005); Myron L. Kwast et al.,
Market Definition and the Analysis of Antitrust in Banking, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 973, 986
(1997) (finding median distance at or under six miles between small businesses and their
bank providers of most credit products).
452 See, e.g., Arnoud W.A. Boot, Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?, 9 J. FIN.
INTERMEDIATION 7, 9-12 (2000).
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Law Review
May 2005]
HeinOnline  -- 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 613 2005
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
liquidity increased. To the extent that discrimination is rooted in a
lack of knowledge or understanding of local minority communities-
made worse by the costs of trying to control agents' behavior-the
same may be said of discrimination. That is, overcoming discrimina-
tion may require CRA's kind of focus on getting loan officers, for
example, to think differently about low-income communities by
actively seeking out loans in low-income neighborhoods.
Besides, CRA's current formulation does not lean heavily on
localist policies. Large institutions operate across wide geographic
areas and can raise funds and make loans consistent with their nation-
wide (or international) business plans. Institutions are not measured
based on how the size of their lending in a particular location relates
to the size of their deposits in that location, but rather to their asset
size as a whole, and the lending of their peer institutions and other
contextual factors.453 Loan consortia, as well as the active secondary
market for CRA loans, which permits banks to purchase loans in
order to enhance their CRA performance, further diminish the local
character of CRA-eligible lending.
2. CRA Does Not Cause Banks to Avoid Low-Income
Communities
If financial institutions could avoid CRA's requirements by stra-
tegically choosing their location, CRA's efficacy in encouraging banks
to serve low-income communities would be undermined significantly.
Macey and Miller suggested that CRA created incentives for banks
and thrifts to avoid opening deposit facilities in low-income communi-
ties because of the expense of complying with CRA.454 Their conten-
tion was subject to some doubt even at the time that they made it, but
today, under the revised rules, that view is clearly incorrect. Under
the 1995 regulations, assessment areas "[c]onsist generally of one or
more [metropolitan statistical areas] . . . or one or more contiguous
political subdivisions, such as counties, cities, or towns" that include
the census tracts "in which the bank has its main office, its branches,
and its deposit-taking ATMs, as well as the surrounding [census tracts]
in which the bank has originated or purchased a substantial portion of
its loans. 455 A bank or thrift "may adjust the boundaries of its assess-
ment area(s) to include only the portion of a political subdivision that
it reasonably can be expected to serve. '456 However, assessment
453 Community Reinvestment Act and Interstate Deposit Production Regulations, 12
C.F.R. § 25.21(b) (2003).
454 Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 295-96; see also Hylton, supra note 21, at 233.
455 12 C.F.R. § 25.41(c).
456 Id. § 25.41(d).
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areas "[m]ay not reflect illegal discrimination" and "[m]ay not arbi-
trarily exclude low- or moderate-income geographies. '45 7 Banks can
delineate their assessment areas as they see fit, subject only to these
regulatory requirements.
The current definitions for assessment areas render Macey and
Miller's critique inapt. Assessment areas are not small spots on a map
in the few blocks around a bank branch. Rather, assessment areas are
generally drawn broadly to comport with political boundary lines,458
and would include whatever range of neighborhoods measured by
income, race, and other demographics that are contained in such
boundaries.459 Putting a branch into a low-income neighborhood in a
metropolitan area where a bank operates does not affect the bank's
obligations under the lending test, which already will be based on the
entirety of the community's income spectrum. Moreover, the regula-
tion bars "arbitrarily exclud[ing]" low- or moderate-income areas
regardless of whether the bank has a branch in such a neighbor-
hood.46° Finally, regulators have discretion to evaluate a bank's
investments and community development lending outside its assess-
ment areas, diminishing the importance of the area's precise
boundaries. 461
Nonetheless, changes in the assessment area definitions may be
helpful. Assessment areas, which are somewhat tied to geographies
surrounding deposit-gathering facilities, provide a reasonable stan-
dard for most institutions. However, in an era in which banks collect
deposits, raise funds, and make loans across state and national bor-
ders, and over the Internet, "community" will need redefinition. A
more tailored approach might permit institutions to define more
broadly their own low- and moderate-income target markets or
emphasize different product and geographic markets in different con-
texts, with strong anti-gerrymandering protections. For example, a
bank might compete with non-bank lenders to make affordable loans
to subprime borrowers in areas where it has no branches, rather than
emphasizing prime loans in a tight market where it does have
branches. Adopting a more flexible approach to assessment areas is
457 Id. § 25.41(e).
458 See generally id. § 25.41(c).
459 See, e.g., CRA PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: CITIBANK, supra note 217, at app. C-2
(describing assessment area as all counties in New York metropolitan area except Putnam
County).
460 12 C.F.R. § 25.41(e)(3).
461 See, e.g., id. § 25.23(a) (noting that agencies may consider investments in "a broader
statewide or regional area that includes the bank's assessment area(s)"); § 25.12(i)(2)(ii)
(defining community development loans as including loans that benefit "a broader state-
wide or regional area that includes the bank's assessment area(s)").
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more complicated for the agencies to administer and in some ways
riskier for banks and community organizations than the current
approach. Nonetheless, CRA will need to evolve with the market-
place to remain effective. A prudent course is for the agencies to
experiment with a flexible approach to delineating assessment areas in
the strategic plan option.
B. Applying CRA to Insured Depositories Is Justified
Critics of CRA argue that it makes little sense to apply CRA to
banks and thrifts while exempting credit unions, independent mort-
gage companies, and other finance companies-let alone securities
firms, insurance companies, and non-financial companies-from sim-
ilar regulation.462 They argue that applying CRA to these institutions,
but not to others, disadvantages banks relative to non-banks in the
financial system, and that such a unique burden is both unfair and
inefficient. 463 They argue that there is no net subsidy to banks, and
that if there is such a subsidy, it does not justify CRA.464 There is
some validity to the critique, in the sense that banks and thrifts are
asked to bear some of the costs of overcoming informational and
other barriers to lending in low-income and minority communities,
while the positive externalities from such bank lending are shared by
other market participants.
Nonetheless, I will argue that applying CRA to banks and thrifts
is not as illogical, inefficient, or unfair as critics suggest. Federally
insured depository institutions benefit from government subsidies,
including deposit insurance, access to the Federal Reserve Board's
discount window, and the Reserve Board's role in the payments
system. 465 The largest institutions also likely benefit from "too big to
fail" subsidies, explained below, and a wide range of institutions
across asset size receive subsidies through membership in the Federal
Home Loan Banks. This Section first provides a brief overview of
these and other subsidies and then explains why such subsidies pro-
vide some justification for applying CRA to banks and thrifts. Finally,
the Section explains how depository institutions' specialized role in
462 See supra note 96.
463 See id.
464 See supra notes 94-95.
465 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insures deposits held in FDIC-member
banks and thrifts up to $100,000 per account. The Federal Reserve Board provides access
to credit through its "discount window" for members of the Federal Reserve System in the
event that they are unable to access funds through the market. The Board guarantees
payments among banks and has sponsored and provided the backbone for the payments
system. For further details, see infra Part VIB.
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financial markets, and their role in overcoming market failures, pro-
vides support for CRA's application to them.
1. Subsidies to Banks and Thrifts
Deposit insurance subsidizes banks and thrifts by lowering their
cost of capital. As Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has
described:
[A] major reason the Congress is called upon to involve itself in...
financial markets is the safety net. Institutions covered by it receive
a subsidy because insured depositors correctly perceive their risk
exposure as virtually zero. These depositors?and other creditors
who benefit from the stability brought to the banking system by the
safety net?are willing therefore to provide funds to banks at much
lower rates than are available to competing institutions.466
Most banks receive the benefits of deposit insurance at no annual
cost to them.467 While these rules strongly need reform, better risk-
based pricing would not fully eliminate the governmental subsidy
because the government effectively acts as a backstop to the FDIC in
case of catastrophic losses or systemic failures. 468 In ordinary circum-
stances, the government subsidy probably benefits small banks dispro-
portionately to their asset size. Small banks rely more on insured
deposits for funding than large banks do. Furthermore, small banks
466 The Financial Services Act of 1990: Hearing on H.R. 10 Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 70 (1998) [hereinafter The Financial Ser-
vices Act of 1990] (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of Federal Reserve Board),
available at http://www.federalreserve.govfboarddocs/testimony/1998/19980617.htm (last
visited Apr. 14, 2005).
467 Under rules prescribed by the Deposit Insurance Fund Act of 1996, almost all
banks-92%-do not pay annual deposit insurance premiums. Memorandum from Arthur
J. Merton, Director of the Division of Insurance and Finance, FDIC, to Board of Directors,
FDIC 16-17 (May 5, 2004), available at http://www.fdic.govldeposit/insurance/risk/2004-02/
bif 2004_02.pdf. More than nine hundred institutions have never paid any premiums for
deposit insurance, and many institutions that have grown rapidly have paid low premiums
compared with their coverage. The Federal Deposit Insurance System and Recommenda-
tions for Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 47
(2002) [hereinafter The Federal Deposit Insurance System and Recommendations for
Reform] (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of Federal Reserve Board), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2002/20020423. Even the weakest
institutions pay only a $0.27 premium on every $100 of deposits. FDIC, RISK-BASED
ASSESSMENT SYSTEM: AsSESMErr RATE SCHEDULE AND FICO RATES, available at http://
www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/risk/assesrte.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2005).
468 The Federal Deposit Insurance System and Recommendations for Reform, supra note
467, at 46 (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of Federal Reserve Board) ("[Wle
should not delude ourselves that even a wider range in the risk-based premium structure
would eliminate the need for a Government backup to.the deposit insurance fund, that is
eliminate the Government subsidy in deposit insurance.").
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would have a relatively hard time attracting funding in the absence of
deposit insurance because they would be perceived as riskier.
Large banks and thrifts also likely benefit from a market percep-
tion that regulators will not let large institutions fail because the con-
sequences to the financial system would be too severe. Regulators
fostered this perception through a series of interventions, including in
one instance an explicit "too big to fail" policy statement.469 Impor-
tant legal changes at the end of the 1990s significantly curtailed the
discretion regulators have to bail out uninsured depositors.470 Yet the
market perception likely persists, and plausibly so, that the govern-
ment will intervene to assist large institutions and that such assistance
will benefit creditors and shareholders even if they must bear some
loss in the process.471 Banks uniquely receive subsidies from other
sources as well. The Federal Reserve Board's sponsorship of the pay-
ments network, 472 and its low cost provision of riskless financial settle-
ment by guaranteeing large payments among banks,473 are additional
sources of subsidy to the banking system. 474 Direct access to the
Federal Reserve Board's discount window provides assurance to the
469 See Harold A. Black et al., Changes in Market Perception of Riskiness: The Case of
Too-Big-to-Fail, 20 J. FIN. RES. 389, 404-05 (1997) (finding that 1984 announcement of
OCC's explicit "too big to fail" policy resulted in increases in institutional holdings in bank
holding companies, even among those not named by Comptroller, providing evidence of
indirect subsidy to banks from policy).
470 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1831 (2000) (requiring prompt corrective action); § 1823(c)(4)
(requiring least-cost resolution). Congress enacted both sections in the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA), Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat.
2236, 2253-75 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
471 See JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 248 (3d ed.
2001) (noting "the widespread public perception (substantially confirmed by handling of
Continental Illinois National Bank failure) that certain banks are 'too big to fail"'); CRAIG
FURFINE, THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF MORAL SUASION: EVIDENCE FROM THE RESCUE
OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 25-28 (2002) (finding that large, complex banking
organizations saw their cost of funds decline after Federal Reserve Board's intervention
when hedge fund Long Term Capital Management collapsed in 1998, although such effects
are difficult to disentangle from investors' general "flight to safety" following LTCM col-
lapse), http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/workingpapers/papers/wp2002-11 (last vis-
ited Apr. 14, 2005).
But see The Federal Deposit Insurance System and Recommendations for Reform,
supra note 467, at 48 (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of Federal Reserve Board)
(arguing that "the market clearly believes that large institutions are not too big for unin-
sured creditors to take at least some loss").
472 See FED. RESERVE BD., FEDERAL RESERVE'S KEY POLICIES FOR THE PROVISION OF
FINANCIAL SERVICES, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/pricing/default.
htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
473 Kenneth Jones & Barry Kolatch, The Federal Safety Net, Banking Subsidies, and
Implications for Financial Modernization, 12 FDIC BANKING REV. 1, 3 (1999).
474 The Financial Services Act of 1990, supra note 466, at 72 (testimony of Alan
Greenspan, Chairman of Federal Reserve Board) ("The markets place substantial values
on these safety net subsidies [specifically the discount window and riskless financial settle-
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market about banks' and thrifts' stability, and provides liquidity to
banks that otherwise could not borrow at all. It therefore allows insti-
tutions to obtain lower cost of funds, regardless of whether they actu-
ally draw on the window and take advantage of the price the Board
charges. Lastly, banks benefit from subsidies through government-
sponsored enterprises and other government programs, some of which
subsidize lending to low- and moderate-income borrowers and others
of which simply provide a lower cost of funds to banks and thrifts.475
Admittedly, the gross subsidies to banks are offset to some degree by
the costs of bank regulation, including reserve requirements to the
extent that they exceed what banks would hold in the absence of the
requirements. 476
Given that insured depositories receive significant governmental
subsidies, the question remains whether such subsidies provide any
justification for applying CRA to banks and thrifts. The first-best
policy response to bank subsidies is to reduce such subsidies
directly.477 However, each of these first-best solutions to reduce bank
and thrift subsidies has faced enormous political opposition and would
ment], clearly in excess of the cost of regulation. . . . [W]ere it otherwise, some banks
would be dropping their charters.").
475 For example, bank and thrift members of the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB)
system accrue ninety percent of the $3 billion in flows of governmental subsidy to the
FHLBs, in the form of lower cost advances and higher dividends, while only ten percent is
passed on to home buyers in lower mortgage rates. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL
SUBSIDIES AND THE HOUSING GSEs 25-28 (2001) [hereinafter CBO STUDY 2001], avail-
able at http://ftp.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/28xx/doc2841/GSEs.pdf . Some portion of the subsidy
that accrues to banks is passed on to non-home-mortgage borrowers of the banks.
476 See Jones & Kolatch, supra note 473, at 7. Whether a net subsidy exists sparked
vociferous debate during negotiations over financial modernization, with the Federal
Reserve Board taking the self-interested position that such a subsidy was significant and
thus new activities should be undertaken in affiliates within a holding company, and the
OCC taking the self-interested position that no such subsidy exists, so that new activities
could be undertaken in subsidiaries of national banks. Id. at 10-15. The debate was effec-
tively resolved by legislating "firewalls" between the bank and its affiliates and subsidiaries
such that any net subsidy could not be passed through effectively to other entities engaged
in new activities. Id. at 13.
477 For example, one could reduce subsidies from deposit insurance by establishing
better risk-based pricing and ensuring that all institutions pay some premium. Regulators'
refusal to intervene in financial markets could reinforce the perception that there is no
institution "too big to fail." The Federal Reserve Board could continue to move towards
more market-based pricing of access to the payments system and the discount window.
See, e.g., Press Release, Federal Reserve Board (Oct. 31, 2002) (noting changes to discount
window regulations that would result in credit being provided through discount window at
rates above target federal funds rate), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/
bcreg/2002/200210312/default.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).
• Government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) subsidies that are passed through to banks and
thrifts could be reduced through higher capital standards and other means.
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entail significant costs. 478 Given that we live in a second-best world in
which these subsidies to banks and thrifts will remain, simply
removing CRA would not restore credit markets to a "free market."
Existing subsidies, taxes, and regulations distort the free market in a
variety of ways. Government-subsidized secondary market partici-
pants and insurance programs hold a good portion of the credit risk of
bank and thrift lending to low- and moderate-income and minority
borrowers. 479 As a theoretical matter, one cannot assert, given these
distortions, that moving from an "nth" best world with CRA to the
next best world without CRA would be efficient. In a regulated, sub-
sidized credit market world, it is not improper to ensure that some
portion of the subsidy goes to a public purpose by applying CRA to
banks and thrifts. 480
2. Role in Financial Markets
Given that market failures have plagued low-income communi-
ties and minority households have faced discrimination in credit and
housing markets, 481 I have argued that government regulation has a
role in overcoming these problems. In my judgment, it is reasonable
for government policy to focus on the role that depository institutions
ought to play in overcoming them. Banks play a special role in finan-
cial markets by focusing on relational lending and investing in tech-
478 Deposit insurance reform legislation invariably includes increases in the amount sub-
ject to deposit insurance, and even better risk-based pricing would leave some significant
governmental subsidy remaining. Refusal to intervene in financial markets is an important
principle to announce in the abstract, but officials faced with difficult choices and uncertain
information often intervene to prevent financial collapse. Pricing payment system services
at true market rates might result in socially suboptimal development of payment networks.
See, e.g., Barr, supra note 3, at 222 (arguing that Federal Reserve Board should consider
lowering prices for certain electronic payment services in order to expand access to
banking services for poor individuals). Efforts to reduce GSE subsidies by increasing cap-
ital requirements and affordable housing goals while reducing indicia of government sup-
port have faced enormous political opposition. Moreover, squeezing subsidies out of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac simply may balloon subsidies going to the FHLBs and
insured depositories. See White, supra note 8, at 54-55. Furthermore, FHLB "reform"
has tended to expand, rather than restrict, use of subsidized advances. Given the fungi-
bility of money, nominally restricting use of advances, rather than reducing them, is
unlikely to prevent FHLB members from absorbing the advances as undifferentiated subsi-
dies in any event.
479 See, e.g., Glenn B. Canner et al., Distribution of Credit Risk Among Providers of
Mortgages to Lower-Income and Minority Homebuyers, 82 FED. RES. BULL. 1077, 1089
(1996) (finding that "FHA is the primary bearer of credit risk for home purchase loans to
lower-income and black or Hispanic borrowers and in lower-income and minority
neighborhoods").
480 Cf., e.g., White, supra note 8, at 52 (explaining why eliminating GSEs would not
necessarily lead to more efficient policy outcomes).
481 See supra Part II.
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niques to "thicken" the markets within which they operate by
generating and analyzing information on opaque values.482 This role
is distinct from that of capital markets,483 which focus on information-
rich, transparent, and larger firms. 484 It is even distinct from that of
independent mortgage companies, which focus on transactions rather
than relationships and thus have not similarly developed the technolo-
gies and expertise that permit banks to manage higher-risk bor-
rowers. 485 Instead, most of these loans from independent mortgage
companies are packaged and sold on the secondary market where
risks are spread more broadly. In sum, it was reasonable for Congress
to look to insured depositories to overcome market failures and dis-
crimination, given their specialized role in credit markets, and the
governmental subsidies that banks and thrifts receive. Given the evi-
dence on the performance and profitability of CRA loans, CRA does
not appear to be a significant drag on the profitability or soundness of
the banking industry, which reinforces the view that relying on banks
and thrifts to overcome these market failures is a reasonably efficient
choice.
3. Credit Unions
The fact that credit unions are not subject to CRA is an anomaly
in this regard. There is little justification for not extending CRA to
credit unions, most of which enjoy federally insured deposit insurance,
are subject to comprehensive regulation and supervision, and benefit
from many of the same types of subsidies available to banks and
thrifts. Moreover, credit unions enjoy tax exemption not available to
banks and thrifts and are chartered with a public purpose to serve
482 See, e.g., CANNER ET AL., supra note 329, at 3, 11.
483 See id. at 2 (discussing differences between bank loans and capital market instru-
ments); see also Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas, Equity, Bonds, and Bank Debt Capital
Structure and Financial Market Equilibrium Under Asymmetric Information, 108 J. POL.
ECON. 324 (2000) (developing model of financial market segmentation); Arnoud W.A.
Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?, 55 J. FIN. 679
(2000) (describing specialized role of banks in relationship lending being altered by compe-
tition from other banks and capital markets); Arnoud W.A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor,
Financial System Architecture, 10 REV. FIN. STUD. 693 (1997) (describing specialized role
of bank credit when information is costly and monitoring of moral hazard is important).
484 On the role of financial intermediation in enhancing the efficiency of markets, see
ALLEN & GALE, supra note 115, at 469.
485 CANNER ET AL., supra note 329, at 10-13. This may help to explain why subprime
lenders focus on making loans to existing home mortgage borrowers as to whose
creditworthiness others already have invested in learning.
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"persons of modest means. '486 For that reason, CRA, or something
like it, should be extended to credit unions.487
4. Affiliates
As financial institutions increasingly rely on a broad range of
affiliations to carry on their businesses, 488 it is both possible and desir-
able to take account of affiliate activity while respecting the fact that
CRA applies only to insured depositories. For example, CRA regula-
tions already provide that evidence of illegal credit practices will
affect an institution's CRA rating.489 The laws governing such credit
practices are equally applicable to banks and thrifts and non-deposi-
tory creditors. Illegal credit practices of an affiliate that has been
included at the option of the depository institution for purposes of a
CRA examination are relevant to its rating, but so too should be the
illegal credit practices of affiliates not so included. Given the cost of
examining all affiliates for such practices, enforcement of other credit
laws should occur through risk-based examinations of affiliates. 490
The results of such compliance examinations should be taken into
account in the performance context under CRA.
Permitting banks, at their option, to include activities of affiliates
in meeting the credit needs of their community, with current safe-
guards against gerrymandering, is consistent with this approach. It is
also critical to an accurate measure of CRA performance. Some bor-
rowers may be ending up in a bank's subprime unit, or subprime affil-
iate, when in fact they could qualify for a mortgage on better terms.
The regulators now give CRA consideration for "promoting" bor-
rowers from the subprime to the prime market, 491 and banks and
thrifts should thus have in place procedures to ensure that borrowers
with good credit histories get access to their prime mortgage units.
Moreover, the other agencies should adopt the current approach
of the OCC, which considers a bank's subsidiaries' assets in deter-
486 Credit unions are tax exempt, 12 U.S.C. § 1768 (2000), because their mission is to
serve "individuals of modest means," 12 U.S.C. § 1751 (2000).
487 1 advocated this position as part of the Treasury team that developed a proposal to
extend community investment obligations to credit unions, but the measure was defeated
and was not included in the Credit Union Membership Access Act, Pub. L. No. 105-219,
112 Stat. 913 (1998) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1759 (1994)).
488 See, e.g., LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT, supra note 243, at 45.
489 12 C.F.R. § 25.28(c) (2004).
490 That is, the regulators could determine whether evidence suggests that an affiliate
poses a risk of engaging in abusive practices, and then devote examination resources to
investigating the extent of any such practices.
491 Community Reinvestment Act; Interagency Questions and Answers Regarding
Community Reinvestments; Notice, 66 Fed. Reg. 36,620, 36,628 (July 12, 2001).
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mining the performance context in which a bank operates.492 The
assets and activities of all of the affiliates of a bank should also be
considered in assessing the performance context within which a bank
meets its obligations under CRA. After all, a bank's affiliates are
hardly irrelevant to the bank's business decisions, including how to
meet the credit needs of their communities. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act made a financial holding company's commencement of newly
authorized activities, or its merger with newly authorized entities, con-
tingent on satisfactory CRA performance by all of the affiliate banks
or thrifts. A bank's affiliates have a strong interest in ensuring ade-
quate CRA performance by all the insured depositories of the holding
company.
Holding companies provide scale economies to their subsidiaries
in complying with bank regulations.493 Banks that are part of holding
companies face lower regulatory burdens from the same regulation
than their non-affiliated counterparts of similar size. Thus, affiliation
should generally be weighed, not ignored, in determining tradeoffs
between regulatory burdens and benefits. Banks that are part of
holding companies have available to them the range of expertise of
the holding company, which is useful for developing programs to meet
community needs under CRA. The holding company and its subsidi-
aries can offer a range of services to the bank in helping the bank
meet its CRA performance goals, such as innovative loan products,
securitization, or expertise in investment and other matters. These
affiliates do affect a bank's CRA performance, and the bank should
therefore be assessed, taking the expertise and resources of the parent
institution into account. The agencies should thus include the assets
and activities of affiliates in assessing performance context for CRA
examinations of banks and thrifts, as part of an effort to ensure the
appropriate institutional scope for CRA.
In sum, there is some force to critics' arguments that CRA is too
narrowly focused geographically on communities surrounding bank
branches, and too narrowly focused institutionally on banks and
thrifts rather than other market participants. Nonetheless, the
problems associated with this narrow focus are less significant than
critics allege, and the bases for the current approach are stronger than
492 See OCC Bulletin 97-26,.July 3, 1997 (noting that examiners should consider subsidi-
aries in bank's performance context); Letter from Julie L. Williams, Acting Comptroller,
OCC, to Congressman Bruce L. Vento, May 8, 1998 (noting that "OCC exam-
iners ... include operating subsidiary assets when assessing a national bank's capacity for
community reinvestment").
493 See ELLIEHAUSEN, supra note 369, at 26 (noting economies of scale for compliance
with ongoing regulations).
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critics admit. In particular, banks and thrifts enjoy a range of govern-
mental subsidies, and given the constraints of the second-best world in
which we live, it is not improper to ensure that some portion of those
subsidies goes to a public purpose by applying CRA to banks and
thrifts. With respect to geographic scope, the 1995 reforms provided
for a more inclusive and flexible approach to defining communities
that minimizes the potential downside of focusing on a bank's deposit
taking facilities. Still, reforms focused on greater flexibility with
respect to assessment areas and affiliates are warranted.
VII
CRA COMPARED WITH OTHER CREDIT
MARKET REGULATIONS
Critics of CRA have argued that if the government must inter-
vene in credit markets, it should do so through other means. The
presence of market failures is an insufficient determinant of policy.
The government may be ill-equipped to intervene and may choose
strategies that either make the problems worse or cost more than their
benefits. Government agencies might not possess the requisite infor-
mation to regulate effectively, the agencies may not be able to induce
the private sector responses sought, the bureaucracy might not faith-
fully execute the laws, or the political process might lead Congress or
the bureaucracy to create laws that improperly favor the regulated
entities or some other preferred groups.494 The extent of these
problems cannot be assessed in the abstract. One needs to compare
CRA with alternative systems for redressing market failures and dis-
crimination.495 Thus, to evaluate CRA, I compare it to a series of
other policies designed to expand access to capital.
I classify credit market policies into five types. First, CRA sets
forth a broad affirmative obligation on insured depository institutions
to lend in their service areas. Second, negative prohibitions, such as
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA),496 bar discrimination
against minority borrowers. Third, disclosure laws may be thought of
as having two subtypes. Some laws, such as the Home Mortgage Dis-
closure Act (HMDA),497 assist in the enforcement of other legal rules
or social norms by requiring public disclosure of lending data. Other
494 See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 26, at 8-10.
495 See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 98-121 (1994); STIGLITZ,
supra note 26, at 76-90 (applying such types of comparative analysis).
496 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 (2000).
497 12 U.S.C. § 2801 (2000). The Federal Reserve Board implements HMDA under
Regulation C, 12 C.F.R. pt. 203.1 (2004).
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disclosure laws, such as the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 498 provide
information to consumers to ensure a well-functioning market and are
backed by enforcement of the disclosure requirement. Fourth,
Congress enacted substantive regulation restricting certain loan prod-
ucts in the Home Owners Equity Protection Act (HOEPA).499 Fifth,
government subsidies are pervasive in the housing credit market. 500
I compare CRA to these other modes of credit market regulation,
and I also compare CRA to demand-side subsidies in the form of
income redistribution. I argue that on many measures, CRA is no
worse, and in some cases better, than these alternatives. Further com-
parative institutional analysis based on empirical research will be crit-
ical to understanding the relative efficiency of these laws. For our
purposes here, I only wish to contend that an exploration of the trade-
offs involved in other approaches suggests that, contrary to critics'
claims, the presence of these other laws does not present a compelling
rationale for elimination of CRA. In an ideal world, we might have a
different mix of laws, but given the constraints of the world we live in,
it is not unreasonable to include CRA as part of the mix, rather than
eliminating it from the mix.
A. CRA Compared with Fair Lending Law
Critics of CRA contend that, if CRA is aimed at redressing racial
discrimination, the government simply should enforce ECOA
instead.50 1 ECOA prohibits creditors from discriminating in the pro-
vision of credit on the basis of "race, color, religion, national origin,
sex or marital status, or age. ' 502 For home mortgage lending, that
prohibition also is reinforced by the Fair Housing Act of 1968.503 As
with other antidiscrimination laws, ECOA prohibits both animus-
based discrimination and statistical discrimination, as measured by the
disparate treatment and disparate impact tests.5°4 ECOA's rule that
statistical discrimination is prohibited, as opposed to a rule that subsi-
498 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1602(aa), 1639(a)-(b). The Federal Reserve Board implements
TILA under Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 (2004).
499 Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 151, 108 Stat. 2190, 2190 (1994) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1601
(2000)).
500 See, e.g., White, supra note 8, at 46 (arguing that it "is possibly only a slight exagger-
ation to claim that when it comes to housing and especially home ownership, the ethos of
public policy has been (and continues to be) 'too much is never enough"').
501 Klausner, supra note 21, at 1563-64.
502 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (2000).
503 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2000). The Fair Housing Act also covers other forms of discrimina-
tion in residential real estate transactions beyond fair lending violations.
504 See Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,266, 18,268,
18,269-70 (Apr. 15, 1994).
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dized creditors for deciding not to engage in such discrimination, is
based on our deeply rooted sense that distinctions based on race, even
if "rational" in the short run, are wrong. Thus the law prohibits the
conduct rather than subsidizing adherence to the rule.
Empirical evidence suggests that ECOA seems to help increase
lending to minorities. For example, the share of bank and thrift
lending to low- and moderate-income borrowers and areas that went
to minority borrowers increased from twenty-one percent to twenty-
eight percent from 1993 to 1999.505 Most of the increase occurred
during a period of intense Justice Department focus on enforcing fair
lending laws from 1993 to 1995.506 HMDA data also show improve-
ments in lending to minority and low-income borrowers.50 7
Yet, relying on ECOA lawsuits alone to advance antidiscrimina-
tion norms has its own limitations. Few ECOA lawsuits have been
brought. Developing proof of lending discrimination is costly and dif-
ficult. When credit scoring is not the sole basis for a lending decision,
lenders have a high degree of discretion, particularly in the case of
applicants who are neither highly qualified nor unqualified. Even
when credit scoring is the sole basis, disparate treatment might arise
when creditors subjectively evaluate data before entering it into the
credit system, provide different levels of assistance to borrowers in
completing credit applications, or permit overrides of credit scoring in
close cases. Given the complex and proprietary nature of credit
scoring systems, and the difficulty of proving that any two applicants
are similarly situated except for race, disparate treatment on the basis
of race is hard to prove.
Disparate impact analysis is often no easier. Creditors have
essential information about their loan portfolio and proprietary credit
evaluation systems and the weights placed on all the variables in their
system. Plaintiffs do not have such information, and creditors resist
revealing their methodology because of competitive concerns. 508
ECOA's disparate impact test as currently formulated cannot easily
detect discriminatory overages, yield spread premiums, or risk-based
pricing because of the difficulty of identifying the factor causing the
505 LITAN ET AL., FINAL REPORT, supra note 243, at 27.
506 ld. The Justice Department cases resulted in important consent decrees. See Con-
sent Decree, United States v. Long Beach Mort. Co., No. CV-96-6159 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 5,
1996); Consent Decree, United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Vicksburg, No. 5-94-CV-
6(B)(N) (S.D. Miss., Jan. 21, 1994); Consent Decree, United States v. Shawmut Nat'l
Corp., No. 93-CV-2453 (D. Conn., Dec. 13, 1993); Consent Decree, United States v.
Decatur Fed. Savings and Loan Assoc., No. 1-92-CV-2198-CAM (N.D. Ga., Sept. 17,
1992).
507 See supra notes 227-229.
508 See Ross & YINGER, supra note 110, at 316.
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discriminatory effect, as opposed to factors appropriately based on
objective measures not related to race. Moreover, because ECOA
focuses on the policies of each lender, ECOA has difficulty addressing
the different experience of minority borrowers relying on different
lenders than white borrowers in highly segmented subprime, as com-
pared to prime, markets, even though the market-wide effect on
minorities could be significant.509
ECOA's weaknesses do not necessarily imply that CRA is the
only, or even the best, answer to credit market discrimination. ECOA
itself sets out important antidiscrimination norms, and should be
strengthened. Banking regulators could pay greater attention to
rooting out problems arising from disparate impact. The FTC and the
Justice Department could be given greater resources to investigate fair
lending abuses, together with investigatory authority. Building on the
strength of HMDA, a disclosure law requiring creditors to disclose the
borrower's credit score and the creditor's rate sheet could help
address price discrimination. 510 A new law on product regulation
could bar the payment of yield spread premiums, which dispropor-
tionately fall on minority borrowers. 511
Still, each of these new measures would have their own costs, and
CRA plays an important role in reinforcing the antidiscrimination
principles underlying ECOA and in expanding access to credit for
minority borrowers. CRA may help uncover and remedy some prac-
tices with discriminatory effects that both disparate treatment analysis
and disparate impact analysis, as they are currently formulated, have
difficulty detecting or remedying. Moreover, minority households are
disproportionately represented among low- and moderate-income
households and in low- and moderate-income communities. CRA has
encouraged banks and thrifts to increase their lending in such commu-
nities significantly, and minority households now constitute a larger
share of such lending than they did a decade ago. CRA's focus on
low-income neighborhoods may address structural inequalities facing
African Americans and other minorities more effectively than
ECOA's disparate impact standard, which is hemmed in, on one side,
by equal protection jurisprudence limiting consideration of race to
assist minorities and, on the other, by the business necessity defense
509 See id. at 33. But see Cason v. Nissan, No. 3:98-0223, 212 F.R.D. 518 (M.D.Tenn.
2002) (ECOA suit based on discriminatory overages in automobile market leading to set-
tlement order).
510 See supra notes 207-210. A full exploration of this proposal is beyond the scope of
this Article. For more on this proposal and the concept of "cross modal" policies, see Barr,
supra note 8.
511 See Barr, supra note 8.
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permitting the use of factors that have an adverse effect on minorities
if such factors are justified by business necessity. 512
CRA can help to overcome the legacy of decades of official and
private-sector discrimination reflected in segregated, low-income
neighborhoods, while ECOA is only addressed to discrimination by
current market participants. In addition, by encouraging banks and
thrifts to get to know these communities, CRA may help to overcome
cultural barriers to equality. Moreover, CRA goes beyond ECOA's
focus on credit discrimination to address broader market failures
affecting low-income borrowers and communities, from collective
action problems, information externalities, information asymmetries,
and neighborhood externalities. Overcoming these market failures
not only improves the functioning of the market, but also furthers
antidiscrimination goals. While CRA helps to reinforce ECOA, fair
lending laws are no substitute for CRA.
B. CRA Compared with Disclosure Law
Disclosure laws are perennial favorites in the legal literature,513
and I agree that disclosure can help improve the home mortgage
credit market. However, I take issue with disclosure advocates on
three grounds. First, as I will explain below, disclosure serves a
broader set of purposes than usually posited. Second, I have a
healthier dose of skepticism about the effectiveness of disclosure in
helping overcome market failures than legal scholars have recently
espoused.514 Third, I thus argue that disclosure is no substitute for
CRA.
1. Types of Disclosure Laws
There are two basic types of disclosure: disclosures designed to
improve market efficiency by making consumers better shoppers, and
disclosures designed to help regulators enforce other laws and push
markets towards compliance with social norms. The Truth in Lending
512 See, e.g., Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three,
117 HARV. L. REv. 493, 499 (2003) (lamenting "the growing tendency of equal protection
jurisprudence to obscure the dynamics of group hierarchy and to truncate the memory of
historical discrimination").
513 See, e.g., Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics
and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1230-37 (2003);
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471, 1533-37 (1998).
514 See Camerer et al., supra note 513, at 1232-35 (arguing that TILA "provides poten-
tially substantial benefits to those who are less than rational" and "may save some con-
sumers, otherwise uninformed, from possible catastrophic outcomes, such as losing their
homes").
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Act (TILA) represents the first type. TILA requires disclosures to
consumers regarding the cost of loans.515 This type of disclosure seeks
to remedy asymmetric information and improve market competition
and efficiency through price disclosure, which would make it easier to
comparison shop.516 It is this type of disclosure that scholars who
favor disclosure usually advocate.
HMDA represents the second type of disclosure. HMDA
requires most home mortgage creditors to disclose annually to the
public information about home mortgage loans made or purchased, as
well as loan applications denied. 517 Regulations require disclosure of
race, ethnicity, sex, and income of borrowers. HMDA is not designed
to enhance borrower information, but rather to increase the ability of
the public, regulators, and fair lending enforcement agencies to assess
whether lenders are engaged in discriminatory practices and how
lenders are meeting their CRA obligations. These broader disclosures
are designed to reinforce positive social norms, promote market effi-
ciency, and enhance the regulatory effectiveness of other laws. The
collection and public disclosure of information is an essential under-
pinning of CRA and ECOA in expanding access to credit. Because
HMDA does not include information on creditworthiness, loan terms,
or property characteristics, HMDA data alone provide poor measures
of discrimination. However, wide availability of these data has
empowered the public to assess financial institution performance.
Public debate over the large gap between loan denial rates for whites
515 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 226.17 (2001).
516 See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000) ("The Congress finds that ... competition among the
various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extension of consumer credit
would be strengthened through informed use of credit. [Furthermore, ilt is the purpose of
this subchapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will
be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him .... "); Kathleen
C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of
Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1255, 1280-81 (2002) (describing opportunities that
information asymmetries provide for predatory lenders and brokers); Alan Schwartz &
Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 635 (1979) ("Because more consumers will
become informed if information acquisition costs are decreased, reducing these costs is
thought to be the preferable response to the problem of imperfect information." (footnote
omitted)).
517 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801, 2803 (2000). HMDA was enhanced significantly in 1989, for
example, by requiring data to be not only reported to the regulators, but also disclosed to
the public. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 1211, 103 Stat. 183, 524-26 (1989) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000)). The Federal Reserve Board recently
amended its HMDA regulations to require lenders to report certain price information
about high-cost loans. HMDA reporting could be improved further by requiring informa-
tion on interest rates and fees. See Barr, supra note 198, at 459 (suggesting further
reforms).
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and blacks likely contributed to increased lending to minorities in the
1990s.
2. Problems with Disclosure Laws
TILA disclosure likely improves transparency in the market, and
thus efficiency, even if not all consumers understand the disclo-
sures. 518 Yet we should be concerned not only with an efficient
market in the aggregate, but also with efficiency within markets
serving low- and moderate-income households, and with the conse-
quences of inadequate disclosures for affected consumers. Although
TILA facilitates comparison shopping by consumers, in some cases
too much information is provided for consumers to use, and in other
cases too little. Even outside of the subprime market, there is little
reason to think that consumers understand most aspects of mortgage
transactions. 519 Decision theory suggests a need for simplicity: Indi-
viduals faced with complex problems simplify them to one or two
major decisions.520 The need for simplicity conflicts, however, with
the goal of producing comprehensive disclosures that permit con-
sumers to comparison shop based on the real price of loans.
In addition, borrowers trust mortgage brokers to provide them
with full and accurate information and to provide them with the best
loan product. Yet it is in the broker's interest to provide the borrower
with the highest rate loan that the broker can convince the borrower
to accept. Brokers can earn higher yield spread premiums for placing
borrowers into more expensive loans than ones for which the bor-
rower could qualify. Even in competitive retail consumer markets for
simple products (e.g., a box of Cheerios in a grocery store) price dis-
persion can persist. 521 In home mortgage transactions, borrower
understanding of complicated home mortgage terms is likely to be
518 See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 516, at 630.
519 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. AND THE DEP'T OF Hous. AND
URBAN DEV., JOINT STUDY ON THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT AND THE REAL ESTATE
SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT 9, 17, 62 (1998) (noting consumers' difficulty in under-
standing mortgage terms with or without disclosure), available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/boarddocs/RptCongress/tila.pdf.
520 See, e.g., Jonathan Baron, Thinking and Deciding 43-68 (3d ed. 2000); RoBIN M.
HOGARTH, JUDGMENT AND CHOICE 4-6 (1980); SCoTr PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 107-88 (1993).
521 See Dennis Carlton & Jeffrey Perloff, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 437-41
(3d. ed. 2000) (citing empirical examples of price dispersion in retail markets); see also
Vernon L. Smith et al., Competitive Market Institutions: Double Auctions vs. Sealed Bid-
Offer Auctions, in PAPERS IN EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 201, 201-20 (1991); Vernon L.
Smith & Arlington W. Williams, An Experimental Comparison of Alternative Rules for
Competitive Market Exchange, in PAPERS IN EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, supra, at 172,
172-99 (using experimental design to establish price dispersion in competitive markets).
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much lower. Thus, transactions for home mortgages present an even
greater possibility for price differentials based on race, sophistication,
willingness, and ability to shop for better terms, or other factors. 522
Moreover, with credit scoring, creditors know whether borrowers
qualify for less expensive loans under the lenders' pricing schedules,
while most borrowers do not realize this about themselves. 523
Unfortunately, TILA is extraordinarily complex.524 The efficacy
of disclosures is diminished by inadequacies in the nature and timing
of disclosures,525 their limited effect on consumer behavior, and con-
sumers' cognitive limitations. TILA disclosure may not actually be
noticed, read, or understood.526 TILA disclosures may also inundate
the consumer with too much information to process. 527 Moreover,
low-income and minority buyers are the least likely to shop for alter-
nate financing arrangements. 528 Lastly, these problems are exacer-
522 See Jackson & Berry, supra note 164, at 63. Ayres has documented similar price
discrimination in automobile sales and other markets. See AYRES, supra note 158, at
19-44.
523 Credit reports and credit scores will now be available to borrowers upon request.
See Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-159, §§ 211-12, 117
Stat. 1952, 1968-69 (2003) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2003)).
524 See, e.g., Emery v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 71 F. 3d 1343, 1346 (7th Cir. 1995) (describing
ineffectiveness of TILA in conveying relevant information and concluding, "[s]o much for
the Truth in Lending Act as a protection for borrowers"); Thomas A. Durkin, Consumers
and Credit Disclosures: Credit Cards and Credit Insurance, 88 FED. RES. BULL. 201, 208
tbl.9 (2002) (finding that seventy-five percent of respondents either agreed somewhat or
agreed strongly that TILA credit card disclosures are complicated).
525 William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage
Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and
Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083, 1128-30 (1984); Jonathan M. Landers & Ralph J.
Rohner, A Functional Analysis of Truth in Lending, 26 UCLA L. REV. 711, 715-16 (1979)
(discussing timing problem under prior law). Early disclosure is now required by Regula-
tion Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.19(b) (2004) (requiring certain disclosures "at the time an applica-
tion form is provided or before the consumer pays a non-refundable fee, whichever is
earlier"); id. § 226.5a (requiring disclosures "on or with a solicitation or an application to
open a credit or charge account"); id. § 226.5b (requiring disclosures related to "open-end
credit plans secured by the consumer's dwelling ... at the time an application is provided
to the consumer"), although borrowers will have expended some search effort prior to
disclosures.
526 Elizabeth Renuart, Comment, Toward One Competitive and Fair Mortgage Market:
Suggested Reforms in a Tale of Three Markets Point in the Right Direction, 82 TEX. L. REv.
421, 432 (2003).
527 Eskridge, supra note 525, at 1133-35; Landers & Rohner, supra note 525, at 722-25.
For home mortgage and other "closed end" loans, this problem is likely not as bad as for
credit card and other "open end" loans because, for closed end loans, the APR is put in a
box on the disclosures.
528 See, e.g., Jeanne M. Hogarth & Jinkook Lee, Consumer Information for Home Mort-
gages: Who, What, How Much, and What Else?, 9 FiN. SERVICES REV. 277, 283 (2000)
(noting that lower-income and minority households are less likely to comparison shop for
home mortgages). But see Jeanne M. Hogarth & Jinkook Lee, The Price of Money: Con-
sumers' Understanding of APRs and Contract Interest Rates, 18 J. PuB. POL'Y & MAR-
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bated in the subprime market, making disclosure laws less likely to be
effective for borrowers in the subprime market.529
Moving from the first type of disclosure law to the second, the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act requires a shift in thinking about
both the purpose of disclosure and the mode of enforcement. HMDA
contains no substantive legal rule, but reveals information about the
extent to which creditors may be falling short of meeting the credit
needs of minorities or low- and moderate-income communities. Even
if no enforcement action is taken under ECOA, and even if no
mergers are denied under CRA, HMDA data can change creditor
behavior. That may be so because the public cares, in general, about
the social norm of equal access to credit, and because the creditors
care sufficiently about their reputation with the public.
Yet the social norm expressed through HMDA may push
behavior beyond what is efficient or fall short of what was intended by
the promulgators of the standard. HMDA would be less effective
without other laws, including CRA. Relying on HMDA alone to
overcome market failures and discrimination could in theory lead to
overenforcement of antidiscrimination and community investment
norms. HMDA information does not contain measures of
creditworthiness, loan terms, or property characteristics that influence
creditor decisions. Therefore, relying solely on HMDA data showing
disparities in rates of lending and loan denials to members of different
races can lead to overstatements of lending discrimination. Similarly,
HMDA data do not provide any context for understanding creditors'
ability to lend in low-income communities, so banks and thrifts might
face undue pressure to make unsound loans if the data are not
contextualized.
Conversely, relying solely on public disclosure could lead to
underenforcement of equal protection norms and would likely be
insufficient to overcome market failures. The need to maintain good
public relations is assuredly an important component of why HMDA
matters. Without fair lending laws, however, HMDA's disclosure
might convey less approbation because ECOA increases the sanction
from, and itself reinforces, the societal norm against discrimination.
Similarly, without CRA, disclosure under HMDA that a bank did
little lending in low-income communities would have little conse-
quence unless two conditions were met. First, there would have to be
a societal norm, apart from CRA, that failure to lend to low-income
KEFING 66, 70 (1999) (noting that "[i]ncome was not associated significantly with
consumers' understanding of the APR-CIR relationship").
529 See supra Part III.C.
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borrowers and communities was morally wrong. Second, the public
would have to enforce that norm against banks and thrifts in a manner
that replicates the enforcement power of CRA ratings and merger
reviews. Public approbation alone is unlikely to be sufficient to
change corporate conduct unless shareholders and customers care
enough about the norm, and have a sufficiently definite view of its
contours, that they will penalize the firm for noncompliance with it.
CRA may help to develop such a norm, and it provides strong incen-
tives for banks and thrifts to comply.
3. Disclosure Reforms Compared with CRA
Both TILA and HMDA play important roles in improving credit
markets, and reforms of such laws to improve their efficiency would
likely contribute to improvements in credit markets. TILA has likely
contributed to improved efficiency and fewer abuses, and public dis-
closure of HMDA data has likely helped to spur more lending to low-
and moderate-income and minority borrowers. Disclosure laws can
and should undoubtedly be simplified and refined to improve price
transparency. 530
In addition, financial education can play a role in helping con-
sumers understand disclosures better. It is hard to find scholarly liter-
ature that does not end a discussion of disclosure with a call for
consumer financial education.531 The problem is that expenditures for
financial education lead to strong positive externalities, so it is quite
difficult to induce private market participants to offer financial educa-
tion to the borrowing public at anything like the scale it would take to
make a difference.
The federal government also could help to reduce information
externalities by producing, analyzing and disseminating information
about low-income borrowers and communities. This third type of dis-
closure-aimed at neither borrowers (as is TILA) nor at the public
and regulators (as is HMDA), but at the banks and thrifts them-
530 See, e.g., Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(RESPA), Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (2000));
Simplifying and Improving the Process of Obtaining Mortgages to Reduce Settlement
Costs to Consumers, 67 Fed. Reg. 49,134 (July 29, 2002) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt.
3500) (proposing significant simplification). But see Comments of the Staff of the Bureau
of Economics, the Bureau of Consumer Protection, and the Office of Policy Planning of
the Federal Trade Commission, Before the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, in the Matter of Request for Comment on Proposed Amendments to the Regula-
tions Implementing the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, Docket No. FR-4727-P-01
(Oct. 28, 2002) (arguing that HUD's proposal would not assist consumers), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/11.
531 See supra note 516.
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selves-may improve market efficiency by lowering information costs.
Still, a central aspect of the information creditors need-whether this
type of borrower in this neighborhood is credit worthy-is best mea-
sured by lending itself.
More fundamentally, the current structure of the home mortgage
market in low-income communities strongly suggests that disclosure
alone would not be enough to overcome, even in theory, the market
failures or discrimination that this Article earlier explored. Disclosure
laws are no substitute for CRA. CRA gives strong incentives to banks
and thrifts, those most able to alter their behavior in response to the
problem of information externalities, information asymmetry, and col-
lective action.5 32 CRA can enhance competition-and thus can
improve efficiency and transparency-in fragmented markets where
information asymmetry, coupled with a wide range of price and term
differentials, mean that disclosure seems unlikely on its own to signifi-
cantly affect market structure. Moreover, CRA encourages banks and
thrifts to engage in the kind of contact with low-income communities
that may be required to overcome cultural, discriminatory, and other
non-rational barriers to lending. CRA also enlists expert agencies to
further its goals, rather than relying solely on the public to change
creditor behavior either in response to HMDA data or through TILA
disclosures. Furthermore, CRA is better positioned than disclosure
laws to overcome the collective action problem in providing financial
education, which generates significant positive externalities. CRA
encourages banks and thrifts to partner with community organizations
to provide financial education to low-income households, both
because such education helps banks and thrifts to meet the CRA ser-
vices test,533 and because such education likely bolsters their ability to
make sound loans to creditworthy borrowers in fulfillment of the
CRA lending test.
C. CRA Compared with Abusive Practice Prohibitions
CRA is designed to expand access to credit, but it can and should
also play a role in combating abusive lending practices by enhancing
competition from banks and thrifts in serving low-income borrowers
and neighborhoods. In contrast to the affirmative obligation inherent
in CRA to expand access to credit, the dominant form of public policy
addressing predatory lending practices is product regulation: Con-
532 Cf., e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE CosTS OF ACCIDENTS 24-39 (1970) (discussing
"cheapest cost avoider").
533 See Community Reinvestment Act; Interagency Questions and Answers Regarding
Community Reinvestments; Notice, 66 Fed. Reg. 36,620, 36,628 (July 12, 2001) (describing
financial education as an example of community development services).
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gress enacted HOEPA in 1994 to respond to unscrupulous lending
practices in the subprime home equity mortgage market. 534 For some
"high cost" loans, HOEPA imposes restrictions on certain contract
provisions, provides for enhanced disclosures, and enhances remedies
for violations. 535 In addition to product regulation, HOEPA provides,
directly and indirectly, for enhanced disclosures for borrowers facing
high cost loans. Directly, HOEPA enhances disclosure by requiring
creditors to disclose mortgage terms three days in advance of closing.
Indirectly, HOEPA product restrictions would tend to drive more of
the cost of the loan into the APR because lenders cannot use the pro-
hibited mortgage terms to cover costs. With more of the cost of the
mortgage reflected in the APR, it would be easier for consumers to
understand the costs of the loan and comparison shop.
Given the existence of a law designed to address problems of the
subprime sector, why look to CRA at all? As a theoretical matter,
HOEPA is underinclusive. It is designed to address a problem of abu-
sive practices, rather than overcoming broader market failures or dis-
crimination. Moreover, as a practical matter, HOEPA's record has
been decidedly mixed.5 36 In response, a Treasury-HUD report pro-
posed a four-part approach to curbing predatory lending.537 Many
534 Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 151, 108
Stat. 2190 (1994) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000)).
535 Under current Federal Reserve Board regulations, HOEPA now covers mortgage
refinancing loans and closed-end home equity loans with annual percentage rates more
than eight percentage points above the yields on comparable Treasury securities or loans
with certain points and fees that exceed eight percent of the loan amount or an amount
adjusted for inflation (just under $500 for 2004). Truth in Lending, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,604
(Dec. 20, 2001) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). HOEPA restricts prepayment penalties,
balloon payments, and negative amortization under some circumstances. Id. at 65,605.
Lenders are forbidden from engaging in a pattern or practice of making high-cost loans
without regard to the borrower's ability to repay from income (rather than from home
equity). Id. For any mortgage loan, the Federal Reserve Board has regulatory authority to
prohibit acts or practices that the Board finds to be unfair, deceptive, or designed to evade
HOEPA. Id. The Board can also prohibit acts or practices in connection with refinance
loans that the Board finds to be abusive or not in the interest of the borrower. Id.
536 See, e.g., HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 191 (gathering extensive evidence of
predatory practices despite HOEPA).
537 See id.; Barr, supra note 198. The plan called for changes that would improve con-
sumer literacy and disclosure, prohibit harmful sales practices, restrict abusive terms and
conditions, and improve overall market structure. Id. None of the legislative changes have
been enacted, but the Federal Reserve Board issued a rule addressing the harmful sales
practices and abusive terms often associated with high-cost mortgages using its existing
authority under HOEPA. Truth in Lending, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,604 (Dec. 20, 2001) (codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). This rule takes significant steps towards limiting abusive practices, but
congressional action would improve matters further. See supra note 198. Rule changes
made in December 2001, under the Board's HMDA authority, complement its efforts on
predatory lending by requiring disclosure of certain rate spreads and of whether a loan
exceeds HOEPA triggers. Federal Reserve System, Home Mortgage Disclosure; Final and
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other improvements to abusive practice regulation are possible, but
politically unlikely.
CRA, by contrast, could play an increasingly important role in
overcoming market failures and discrimination, and thereby reducing
abuses. Banks and thrifts can, and should, play an important role in
improving competition in the credit market for lower-income con-
sumers. Competition from banks and thrifts can help to drive out
abusive practices and improve price transparency in these markets.
CRA still has a long way to go in this regard. For example, low-
income borrowers may be ending up in a bank's subprime unit or affil-
iate when they could qualify for better terms. Recognizing this fact,
regulators now give CRA consideration for promoting borrowers
from the subprime to the prime market.5 38 Banks and thrifts should
have in place procedures to move borrowers with good credit histories
into their prime units. Moreover, to bolster CRA's capacity to make
more of a difference in overcoming problems in the subprime market,
subprime affiliates should also be seen as a part of the performance
context for evaluating banks and thrifts under CRA. 539 By promoting
competition from banks and thrifts in serving low-income neighbor-
hoods and borrowers, CRA can help thwart abuses in the subprime
market without the risk of cutting off access to credit that overly
restrictive product regulation might entail.540
CRA has other advantages over HOEPA's product regulation
approach. CRA covers all bank and thrift loans, not simply loans that
are "high cost." CRA is designed to expand access to the full array of
credit products by overcoming market failures, not simply to weed out
bad actors or discourage predatory lending. The effectiveness of
HOEPA and state anti-predatory lending laws also relies in significant
part on policing brokers, who are numerous, small, and difficult to
monitor, as well as independent finance and mortgage companies,
which are generally not subject to comprehensive supervision, instead
Proposed Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 7,221 (Feb. 15, 2002) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 203). The rule
could be strengthened by requiring disclosure of all rate spreads, points, and fees, as well as
other loan characteristics. See Barr, supra note 198, at 459.
538 Community Reinvestment Act; Interagency Questions and Answers Regarding
Community Reinvestments; Notice, 66 Fed. Reg. 36,620, 36,622 (July 12, 2001).
539 See supra Part VI.B.4 (arguing that affiliates should be part of performance context).
540 Moreover, consumer loans should play a more central role in CRA examinations.
Currently, such loans are only considered at the option of the bank, or in cases where
consumer lending constitutes a core feature of the depository's lending activities. As evi-
denced by the rise of non-bank consumer lending in low-income communities, some low-
income individuals have consumer credit needs that are not being met by banks. Greater
competition in the consumer market might help drive out sharp practices. The agencies
should consider ways of encouraging banks to assess how their consumer lending could
contribute to meeting CRA obligations.
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of CRA's focus on regularly examined and supervised banks and
thrifts. In addition, HOEPA's product regulation approach is more
prescriptive than CRA, and it is unlikely that any of CRA's critics
would prefer more extensive product regulation to the flexible
approach provided under CRA. CRA does not dictate that banks or
thrifts provide or withdraw any particular loan product or service, but
leaves decisions about business strategy and product design to the
banks and thrifts. Lastly, unlike HOEPA, which focuses on ending
the worst abuses, CRA attempts to overcome market failures in order
to bring low-income households into the financial services
mainstream.
D. CRA Compared with Subsidies
One alternative to CRA is to rely more on subsidies, either to the
private sector or to households. At some level, subsidies can become
substitutes for regulation. If the government pays private sector par-
ticipants a sufficient amount, for example, they will look harder for
creditworthy borrowers in low-income, moderate-income, or minority
communities in the same way that they would under a regulatory
regime. Developing such a subsidy regime is not without difficulties.
First, one would need to decide whether the particular market
participants or taxpayers should bear the cost of addressing the
market failure. For example, if lenders practicing statistical discrimi-
nation are paid sufficiently, presumably they would be willing to stop
engaging in that form of discrimination. The question is whether we
as a society think that private market participants should be permitted
to engage in "rational" discrimination. In that area, ECOA bars sta-
tistical discrimination.541 That is, we prohibit discrimination even if it
is "rational" and we do not think taxpayers should have to pay to stop
market participants from employing statistical discrimination on a
prohibited basis. Presumably, society would have an even greater
aversion to subsidizing institutions to get them to stop discriminating
on the basis of racial animus. Subsidies to overcome market failures,
by contrast, do not arouse the same sense of moral disapproval, and so
might be a more appropriate policy choice in that context. Critics of
CRA argue that the costs of overcoming market failures in low-
income communities should be born by society as a whole, not by
banks. 542
541 See Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,266, 18,267-68
(Apr. 15, 1994).
542 See, e.g., Klausner, supra note 21, at 1592; Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 296;
White, supra note 21, at 290-91.
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Law Review
May 2005]
HeinOnline  -- 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 637 2005
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
But critics rarely reach the second point: One would need to
determine whether it is likely that one could provide the amount of
subsidy necessary to have the desired effect without generating unde-
sirable windfalls to recipients. In principle, subsidies should be used
"to make marginal private costs equal marginal social costs, and to
make marginal private benefits equal to marginal social benefits. ' 543
In practice, this is hard to do. Substantively, it is hard to get private
market actors to respond to government subsidies unless the subsidies
are robust. Politically, it is hard to prevent the subsidies from
becoming too robust. Previous experience suggests both that suffi-
cient incentives are hard to create and that windfalls would be difficult
to control if the incentives are sufficient.
1. Supply-Side Subsidies Through the Government Sponsored
Enterprises and the Federal Housing Administration
Subsidies are pervasive in the home mortgage market.544 Most
housing subsidies are not well-targeted at overcoming market failures
to improve access to credit for low- and moderate-income borrowers,
or at redressing housing discrimination. Rather, they mostly subsidize
the "American dream" of homeownership for all. Subsidies to home
mortgage credit include government insurance (through the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA), the Government National Mortgage
Association (Ginnie Mae)) and government-sponsored enterprises
(GSEs), 545 including the Federal National Mortgage Association
(Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(Freddie Mac), and the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system.
Tax expenditures and grant programs, including the home mortgage
interest and property tax deductions, as well as a wide range of other
programs, also subsidize housing markets. I leave analysis of the
housing subsidies in the tax code for others.546 Here I focus only on
543 STIGLITZ, supra note 26, at 224 (discussing fines).
544 See, e.g., White, supra note 8, at 46.
545 "In general, GSEs are financial institutions established and chartered by the federal
government, as privately owned entities, to facilitate the flow of funds to selected credit
markets ...." CBO STUDY 2001, supra note 475, at 1 n.2.
546 See generally PETER BRADY ET AL., REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN THE UTILIZATION
OF THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION (Office of Tax Analysis, OTA, U.S. Dep't of
Treasury, Paper 88, Aug. 2001) (finding that subsidy from mortgage interest deduction ben-
efits high-income homeowners more than twice as much as homeowners earning at or
below median), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/ota88.pdf;
EDWARD L. GLAESER & JESSE M. SHAPIRO, THE BENEFITS OF THE HOME MORTGAGE
INTEREST DEDUCTION (Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 1979, Oct.
2002) (demonstrating that home mortgage interest deduction largely benefits upper
income, married homeowners who would have owned homes in any event), at http://
post.economics.harvard.edu/hier/2002papers/2002list.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
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comparing CRA to FHA and the GSEs as illustrative of widespread
housing subsidies.547
During the Great Depression, Congress established FHA, the
FHLBs, and Fannie Mae to fill a gap left by the collapse of the private
mortgage insurance industry "under the weight of a default rate
approaching 50 percent and foreclosures exceeding 1,000 per day."
548
FHA, which operates within HUD, insures home mortgage loans
made by private lenders in the event of default.549 Ginnie Mae, also
within HUD, provides a credit enhancement to pools of FHA loans
and places them for sale on the secondary market. The housing
GSEs-Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHLBs-were created to
"provide liquidity and stability to the home mortgage market." 550
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issue debt to buy and hold mortgages in
portfolio and insure mortgage-backed securities issued to investors.
551
The FHLBs were created to provide short-term loans ("advances") to
thrifts in order to stabilize mortgage lending in local markets.
552
Today, FHLB membership is broad, including commercial banks, and
advances to members can be issued on a variety of collateral and used
for any purpose. 553
The GSEs benefit from their relationships with the federal gov-
ernment in a variety of ways. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are
exempt from state and local taxation, 554 are exempt from Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) registration, 555 can borrow from
the Treasury,556 and issue debt that banks and thrifts can hold under
547 In addition to subsidies in the credit markets, subsidies affect other aspects of the
home mortgage transaction. Such non-credit-market subsidies alter the market context for
home mortgage credit and themselves may be alternatives to subsidizing the credit market.
548 Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 172, at 358.
549 DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET SUMMARY 13 (Feb. 3,
2003), available at http://www.hud.gov/about/budget/fy04/budgetsummaryu.pdf.
550 Fed. Subsidies for the Housing GSEs Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insur-
ance, and Gov't Sponsored Enter. of the Comm. on Fin. Servs. 1 (2001) (statement of Dan
L. Crippen, Director of Congressional Budget Office), available at http://financialser-
vices.house.gov/media/pdf/052301cr.pdf; see also U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GOVERN-
MENT SPONSORSHIP OF THE FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION AND THE
FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION 1 (1996) [hereinafter TREASURY
STUDY].
551 TREASURY STUDY, supra note 550, at 2. Fannie Mae was a government corporation,
but Congress divided its functions into two parts, and Fannie Mae became a GSE in 1968.
Id. at 18. Ginnie Mae, the part that remained government-owned, insures securities of
FHA loans. Id. at 19 n.5.
552 CBO STUDY 2001, supra note 475, at 7.
553 Id. at 3-4, 7.
554 Id. at 13.
555 See MBS DISCLOSURE REPORT, supra note 142, at 4, 23-24, 28.
556 CBO STUDY 2001, supra note 475, at 13-14.
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capital standards that favor the GSEs over private conduits. 557 Most
importantly, the GSEs?similar to the largest banks558?benefit from
the credit enhancement of an implicit guarantee that the federal gov-
ernment will intervene in the event of financial collapse.5 59 Measuring
the subsidy provided to the GSEs is the subject of intense debate. 560
Estimates are sensitive to assumptions about the funding advantages
GSEs receive and about how to model the pass-through to bor-
rowers.561 For present purposes, the point estimates are not critical. I
will assume that the amount of the subsidy is some nontrivial amount
above zero.
The GSEs contribute to access to home mortgage credit for low-
and moderate-income households. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's
performance has generally met or surpassed the affordable housing
goals that HUD sets for them from the time that the goals first were
formally promulgated in 1992 through subsequent revisions that have
increased the goals over time.562 However, the share of GSE
557 Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. A, § 3(a)(2)(vi)-(viii) (2004).
558 See supra text accompanying notes 469-471.
559 Despite the disclaimer by both the federal government and the GSEs that there is no
federal guarantee, there is a general belief by the market to the contrary. That belief may
arise because of the GSEs' congressional charters, the indicia of federal support, or the
notion that they are "too big to fail." The implicit guarantee permits the GSEs to issue
debt at a lower cost, and to hold less capital than similar private firms. CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, ASSESSING THE PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC
10-11 (1996), available at http://ftp.cbo.gov/0xx/doc13/Fanfred.pdf.
560 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) found that the benefits accorded to the
GSEs were worth $13.6 billion, of which Fannie Mae received $6.1 billion, Freddie Mac
$4.6 billion, and the FHLBs $3.0 billion. CBO STUDY 2001, supra note 475, at 2. CBO
estimated that a "little more than half ($7.0 billion) of that total subsidy in 2000 passed
through" to mortgage borrowers through lower interest rates on conventional, conforming
loans. Id. at 1. CBO did not calculate the benefits of the affordable housing goals in
determining the net GSE subsidy. CBO estimated that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
retained $3.9 billion (thirty-seven percent) of the subsidy for their shareholders or other
stakeholders. Id. at 5. As for the FHLBs, CBO estimated that they passed on only $300
million of their $3 billion subsidy to mortgage borrowers, with ninety percent of the sub-
sidy accruing to the benefit of the FHLB member banks or reducing interest rates on other
types of loans borrowed from FHLB members. Id.
561 Compare id. at 22 (finding that GSE securitization lowers interest rates on conven-
tional, conforming mortgages), with ANDREA HEUSON ET AL., CREDIT SCORING & MORT-
GAGE SECURITIZATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR MORTGAGE RATES AND CREDIT
AVAILABILITY 6-8, 41 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Finance and Economics Discussion Series No.
2000-44, Dec. 21, 2000) (arguing that lower interest rates lead to higher levels of securitiza-
tion, not reverse), at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2000/200044/200044pap.pdf
(last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
562 See OVERVIEW OF THE GSE's HOUSING GOAL PERFORMANCE, 1993-2001 (2002)
[hereinafter OVERVIEW] (comparing statistics on annual housing performance to articu-
lated goals), at http://www.huduser.org/datasets/GSE/gse2001.pdf (last visited Mar. 30,
2005); OFFICE OF POL'Y DEV. AND RES., U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., ISSUE
BRIEF No. 5: HUD's AFFORDABLE LENDING GOALS FOR FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE
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purchases financing affordable housing under the goals lagged behind
that of the primary market during the 1990s.5 63 In the early 1990s, the
GSEs held less of the credit risk associated with lending to low-
income or minority borrowers and areas than did FHA and Ginnie
Mae, as well as depository institutions, both as a share of the GSEs'
own activities and as a share of the market.564 In addition to the
affordable housing goals, other factors contributed to this activity,
such as the GSEs' business strategies, the effects of CRA, HMDA,
and ECOA, and the shift in the primary mortgage market towards
greater levels of lending to low-income borrowers. Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac have also contributed, however, to affordable housing in
other ways. For example, both GSEs sponsor home counseling pro-
grams, train loan originators and support community organizations to
increase affordable lending. The GSEs have also increasingly used
more flexible underwriting criteria for loan purchases.
The FHLBs also provide modest subsidies for affordable housing
and community development through the Affordable Housing
Program and Community Investment Program. However, the bank
members of the FHLBs enjoy extensive low-cost advances that essen-
tially subsidize the full range of bank activities.5 65 In addition, the
MAC 3 (2001) (describing revision for 2000), at http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/
gse.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2005); SUMMARY: HUD's PROPOSED HOUSING GOAL RULE
1-2 (2004) (describing proposal for goals for 2005 through 2008), at http://www.hud.gov/
offices/hsg/gse/summary.doc (last visited Mar. 30, 2005). In 1992, Congress enacted a new
affordable housing requirement for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. HUD had set up the
first affordable housing goals regulation for Fannie Mae in 1978. See TREASURY STUDY,
supra note 550, at 54 n.15. The GSE definition of low- and moderate-income households,
one-hundred percent of area median income, includes households with higher incomes
than as defined for CRA. OVERVIEW, supra, at n.2. Under CRA, low- and moderate-
income households are defined as having incomes less than eighty percent of area median.
12 C.F.R. § 25.12 (n) (2005).
563 Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., Proposed Rule, HUD's Regulation of the Federal
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Cor-
poration (Freddie Mac), 24 C.F.R. pt. 81, App. A, at 27, 58, 62 (2000); TREASURY STUDY,
supra note 550, at 56-61.
564 See Glenn B. Canner & Wayne Passmore, Credit Risk and the Provision of Mort-
gages to Lower-Income and Minority Homebuyers, 81 FED. RESERVE BULL. 989, 1000 tbl.3,
1004 tbl.4 (1995). The authors surmised that primary market participants performed better
because they had greater access to information about the creditworthiness of borrowers or
the conditions of neighborhoods and used greater flexibility in underwriting than did the
GSEs. Id. at 1000-01.
565 CBO STUDY 2001, supra note 475, at 5. The FHLBs made $16.8 billion in net
advances to members in 2002, with $490 billion outstanding at the end of that year. FED.
RESERVE BD., FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE Z.1, FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS
OF THE UNITED STATES, FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS FIRST QUARTER 33, 78, 124, (2003)
(listing dollar levels and flows for Government Sponsored Enterprises), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/Z1/Current/20030605/zl.pdf.
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FHLBs have begun to experiment with untargeted secondary market
operations in the hopes of competing with the other GSEs.
In contrast to the GSEs, FHA is operated by the federal govern-
ment. FHA specializes in serving borrowers who make "low down
payment[s], have high debt-to-income ratios, and/or have tarnished
credit. ' 566 These borrowers tend to be first-time, minority, or low-
income and tend to live in low-income or minority-concentrated
neighborhoods. 567 A higher share of FHA lending goes to low-
income and minority borrowers, and low-income areas, compared to
the GSEs.568 During the 1990s, the share of FHA lending going to
low- and moderate-income minority borrowers grew more rapidly
than did the share of conventional lending to those borrowers.569
FHA also serves a role in regions with falling wages, increasing unem-
ployment, and dropping house prices.570 At times, FHA has com-
peted with conventional lenders.5 71 As the conventional market
serves the more creditworthy portion of FHA's pool of borrowers, 572
adverse selection will leave FHA with higher risk. That problem is
exacerbated because FHA lags the private sector in risk manage-
ment. 573 The FHA portfolio is becoming riskier.574
In sum, government subsidies generate windfalls for the GSE
shareholders and others. GSE subsidies are not transparent, making
it difficult for the public to weigh their costs and benefits. FHA subsi-
566 SARAH ROSEN WARTELL, SINGLE-FAMILY RISKSHARING: AN EVALUATION OF ITS
POTENTIAL AS A TOOL FOR FHA 11 (2002), at http://www.mhc.gov/papers/wartell.doc (last
visited Mar. 30, 2005).
567 Id. at 11-14. FHA's success in serving first-time homebuyers may be overstated,
since studies suggest that these households would become homeowners anyway at a later
age. See Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 172, at 367.
568 See WARTELL, supra note 566, at 11 (noting FHA role in serving minorities); Canner
et al., supra note 479, at 1089 (same); Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 172, at 362
(same).
569 See TREASURY STUDY, supra note 550, at 64.
570 Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 172, at 362.
571 In part, this may be a sign of success. FHA's innovative underwriting practices,
when they work, can be replicated by the private market. Id. at 363-66.
572 See, e.g., WARTELL, supra note 566, at 17 (noting that PMI Mortgage Insurance
Company increased portion of high [loan-to-value ratios (LTV)] loans insured to ten per-
cent of their insured loans and that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had increased portion of
high LTV loans purchased to four to six percent).
573 See id. at 16; THOMAS H. STANTON, THE PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS ENDOWMENT
FOR THE BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT, CREDIT SCORING AND LOAN SCORING: TooLS FOR
IMPROVED MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS 4 (1999), available at http://
www.pwcglobal.com/gx/eng/indissue/endowment/images/credit.pdf.
574 See WARTELL, supra note 566, at 21 ("For FHA loans, delinquency and foreclosure
rates have grown while these rates for conventional loans have dropped; average LTVs
[loan-to-value ratios] have increased; borrowers are carrying greater debt burdens; and
credit scores appear to be declining.").
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dies are more transparent because the cost of the subsidy appears as
user fees and as an item in the federal budget.575 The cost of trans-
parency is, however, direct taxpayer liability for the FHA. FHA may
not have the management capacity and technical expertise to manage
risk as effectively as private market participants.
Seen in light of the tradeoffs involved with dominant existing sub-
sidy regimes through the GSEs and FHA, the tradeoffs involved in
CRA should be viewed as quite reasonable. Although the costs and
benefits of both CRA and the GSE subsidies are not fully transparent,
CRA has important advantages over existing subsidy approaches.
Needless to say, CRA provides no windfall to banks and thrifts. CRA
targets all its efforts at expanding access to credit and financial ser-
vices for low- and moderate-income borrowers and communities, so
there is no wasted effort on generalized policies subsidizing housing
consumption. CRA is less risky than subsidies through GSEs or FHA.
If CRA increased risk because of expanded lending to low-income
borrowers, that risk would be diffused over the well-diversified port-
folios of thousands of depositories, all of which are comprehensively
supervised for safety and soundness and required to hold adequate
capital. 576 Moreover, banks and thrifts have expertise in finding
creditworthy borrowers and in using extensive risk-mitigation tech-
niques that are more difficult for secondary market participants to
operate. It is certainly possible to design subsidies far better than the
ones we have, but experience should augur caution. It is difficult to
design general subsidies that are effective, generate little windfall for
recipients, and protect taxpayers. In this context, it makes little sense
to abandon CRA as a strategy for overcoming market failures and
discrimination.
2. CRA Compared with Targeted Supply-Side Subsidies
In addition to subsidies to the secondary markets or to banks and
thrifts more generally, targeted subsidies to specialized community
development lenders can be an important means of expanding the
reach of these lenders, as well as banks and thrifts. Indeed, many
critics of CRA argue that targeted subsidies are to be preferred.5 77 I
575 GSE activity is noted in federal budget documents, even though the GSEs are not
"on budget." See TREASURY STUDY, supra note 550, at 25.
576 See generally, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (2000) (prompt corrective action); 12 C.F.R.
Part 3, App. A (2004) (minimum capital).
577 See, e.g., Calomiris et al., supra note 21, at 654-57 (arguing for government programs
to subsidize community development banks); Hylton, supra note 21, at 225 (promoting
ethnic lending); Klausner, supra note 21, at 1580-92 (discussing success of SouthShore
Bank); Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 21, at 354-59, 367-68 (arguing for investment in
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have long been an advocate of targeted subsidies as a strategy to
expand access to capital and financial services for low-income commu-
nities.5 78 Appropriately designed subsidies can, in principle, help to
overcome market failures and improve social welfare at a reasonable
cost. Nonetheless, as I will explain below, I do not believe that CRA
should be abandoned in favor of such subsidies.
One prominent example of targeted subsidies that both critics of
CRA and I agree should be supported is the Treasury Department's
Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund, estab-
lished in 1994.579 The CDFI Fund is designed to create a national
network of financial institutions focused on low-income communi-
ties. 580 The CDFI Fund has provided over $535 million to locally
based, private sector CDFIs, as well as mainstream banks and
thrifts.5 81 The Fund's investments have helped its awardees to
increase their capitalization, develop stronger infrastructure and oper-
ations, and expand their reach. 582
However, the small size and scale of CDFIs suggests that it would
be inefficient to switch from relying on the banking system to a system
based solely on such specialized lenders. 583 Moreover, without the
impetus of CRA, it is doubtful that banks and thrifts would have
invested so heavily in CDFIs over the last decade. CRA gives strong
impetus for banks and thrifts to provide loans, investments, and ser-
vices to CDFIs. Such activity directly receives consideration under
CRA examinations. Moreover, support for CDFIs bolsters the ability
of banks and thrifts to serve their communities. Eliminating CRA in
favor of CDFIs would thus require an even greater infusion of govern-
mental funds to continue CDFI growth, and CDFIs might also lose
community development banks); Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 346 (citing example of
community development credit union), 344-45 (promoting ethnic lending).
578 See, e.g., Barr, supra note 3, at 128-29; Barr, supra note 198, at 453-55.
579 Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-325, § 104, 108 Stat. 2166, 2166 (1994) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4703 (2000)).
580 See id. at § 107, 108 Stat. at 2172.
581 See DEP'T OF TREASURY, CDFI FUND OVERVIEW, at http://www.cdfifund.gov/over-
view/index.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
582 In 2001, the Fund's $74 million in CDFI awards leveraged $150 million in outside
capital for CDFIs, and its $45 million in incentives to mainstream banks and thrifts brought
$244 million in investments in CDFIs and another $1.1 billion in direct loans in low-income
communities. The CDFI Fund found that its 106 awardees from fiscal years 1996, 1997,
and 1998 had made $3.5 billion in community development loans and investments since
receiving their award, or $31 in financing for each dollar received from the Fund. See
DEP'T OF TREASURY, FY 1999 ANNUAL SURVEY PRELIMINARY FINDINGS: CDFI PRO-
GRAM-CORE COMPONENT (2001), at http://www.cdfifund.gov/news/pdf/1999_COREFY_
Survey.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
583 Compare, for example, the $535 million in CDFI Fund investments, from 1993 to
2000, see id., with the more than $800 billion in CRA loans over the same time period.
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out on the technical expertise, business judgment, and advice that
banks have brought to the table over the last decade. In addition,
there would be enormous costs incurred in shifting to a system of
targeted subsidyS 84 Lastly, the CDFI Fund is subject to the vagaries
of the annual appropriations process. The Fund has seen its budget
cut in half over the last four years and now has been proposed to be
effectively eliminated in the Administration's most recent budget.585
3. CRA Compared with Income Transfers or Demand-Side
Subsidies
Assume for the moment that the purpose of credit market regula-
tion is to redistribute "something" to the poor so that afterwards their
social welfare is higher. The public finance literature usually assumes
that income is a good proxy for social welfare, and that the "some-
thing" being redistributed should thus be income. 58 6 That income
redistribution should be confined to the tax and transfer system and
should not be a goal of legal rules is a familiar assertion in public
finance, and with good reason. At least in principle, income transfer
usually can be accomplished at lower cost than if redistribution were
accomplished by changing legal rules. Kaplow and Shavell take the
strong form of this argument, contending that legal rules should never
take account of distributional consequences and should aim only for
efficiency. 587
Macey and Miller argue that CRA could be characterized as a tax
on banks and thrifts aimed at redistribution and that income transfers
584 More serious objections could be made to switching to a system in which the govern-
ment delivers the benefit directly-a system in which the government directly provided
loans and other banking services to low-income communities. This approach would
require the government to create a loan distribution system parallel to the banking sector.
Not only would the transition costs be enormous, but the government probably would do
badly at providing financial services in this way. Even if the government were good at it,
such services would unfairly compete with the private sector.
585 See DEP'T OF TREASURY, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL
YEAR 2006, at 258 (2005), available at http://a255.g.akamaitech.net/7/255/2422/07feb200514
15/www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy06/pdf/budget/treasury.pdf.
586 See Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal
Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157, 161 (2003).
587 See also Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for
Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797 (2000). Kaplow and Shavell argue
that legal rules should not be modified to favor the poor because "society can instead use
the income tax system (here interpreted to include programs that transfer income to the
poor) to redistribute income." Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor
the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income,
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821, 822 (2000). But see Logue & Avraham, supra note 586, at 161
(arguing that legal rules may optimally redistribute social welfare under some circum-
stances). See generally Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 98; Kaplow & Shavell, supra.
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Law Review
May 2005]
HeinOnline  -- 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 645 2005
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
should be preferred in accomplishing this goal.5 88 CRA is not, at least
not explicitly, aimed at redistribution, but rather at correcting per-
ceived market failures. Even if the goal of CRA were to be recast as
income redistribution, it is not obvious that the tax-and-transfer
system should be preferred over CRA. One may want to use legal
rules in place of transfers because income taxation is itself distortio-
nary, 589 and income transfers may have high administrative or compli-
ance costs. 5
90
If income is transferred as an in-kind subsidy, the costs may be
higher than "cash" transfers-or even legal rules. 591 Nor is transfer-
ring income as "cash" without controversy. To begin with, there is no
consensus on the appropriate distribution of income. Moreover, even
if one were to decide how much income to redistribute, the means are
contentious. The inefficiencies associated with the welfare system are
well known.592 Similarly, the literature debating tax expenditures is
voluminous. 593 Furthermore, the distinction between tax and transfer
programs and regulations is not obviously meaningful conceptually,
and questions about program design, regulatory structure, and the
appropriate incidence of the tax-whether on banks or other tax-
588 Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 296.
589 STIGLITZ, supra note 26, at 462-63.
590 For example, government income transfers to the unbanked often require costly
financial services transactions to convert a check into cash. See Barr, supra note 3, at 134.
591 See generally STIGrrz, supra note 26. First, in-kind subsidies are considered less
efficient than cash subsidies because the recipient may only use the in-kind subsidy for
specified purposes. See, e.g., id. at 254-58 (presenting arguments concerning substitution
versus income effect). To the extent that the recipient undertakes the specified actions to
the same degree as if given a cash grant, the in-kind subsidy costs more to administer. To
the extent that the subsidy changes behavior, the subsidy does not increase the recipient's
welfare to the same degree as if she had received a cash subsidy to pursue her own prefer-
ences. Second, in-kind plans are paternalistic in telling the heterogeneous recipients that
they should derive utility from the provision of a particular service. See generally Edgar K.
Browning, A Theory of Paternalistic In-Kind Transfers, 19 ECON. INQUIRY 579 (1981). In-
kind mechanisms may impose a higher value on a service than an individual may have
given it. Third, in-kind programs are often more administratively costly than direct trans-
fers. See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 26, at 397.
592 See, e.g., COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE 2000
GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIALS & DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDIC-
TION OF THE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, Appendix L, Monitoring the Effects of Pre- and
Post-TANF Welfare Reform Initiatives (17th ed. 2000) (discussing administrative costs,
compliance costs, disincentives to work, and other inefficiencies).
593 For the debate over tax expenditures, see generally STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS
TO TAX REFORM (1973); Boris I. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Tax
Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967); Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Tax Expen-
diture Budget: A Critical View, 54 TAX NOTES 1661 (1992); Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incen-
tives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct
Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970); Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency
and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973 (1986).
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payers-in relation to the tax structure generally, all would remain.594
That is, the decision to run the redistribution through the tax system
does not eliminate any of the theoretical or policy tradeoffs involved
in a regulatory system. For example, to decide whether it is "fair" for
banks to pay the tax, one would need to decide, among other things,
whether the current level of taxation of banks is itself "fair." In addi-
tion, transition costs from laws that redistribute income to a tax and
transfer program would diminish the benefits of such a change.
Still, if the main goal of CRA were to redistribute income, as a
theoretical matter it would seem more desirable and efficient simply
to eliminate CRA and other credit market regulation and subsidies
and to shift to a much more progressive income tax. If regulations
and subsidies are intrinsically inefficient and one assumes away transi-
tion costs, provides that the tax and transfer system chosen will be the
most administratively efficient possible, and ignores the political diffi-
culty of the task, then income redistribution through significant
expansion of the tax and transfer programs may be preferable.5 95 But
all these conditions seem unlikely to hold in the real world.
One also could think of credit market regulation as about redis-
tributing not income, but access to credit. 596 Suppose that society
seeks neither to correct market imperfections, nor to guard against
discrimination, nor to redistribute income, but instead to redistribute
access to credit to low- and moderate-income and minority house-
holds. Why would society have this goal? Redistribution of home
mortgage credit might advance a goal of spreading the positive exter-
nalities associated with owning a home.597 Redistribution of mortgage
credit also would have "expressive" value, 598 by conveying that low-
income and minority households are full members of our society
because they can participate in the "American dream" of home
ownership.
If this is the intended form of redistribution, then CRA may be
more efficient than income redistribution. Income is, after all, only a
594 See, e.g., David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 995 (2004).
595 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 98.
596 For a thoughtful discussion of the role of legal rules in distributing non-income
goods, see Logue & Avraham, supra note 586, at 161, discussing the different types of
redistributive policy tools for non-income goods.
597 See GLAESER & SHAPIRO, supra note 546, at 3 (describing positive externalities from
homeownership and from housing consumption).
598 On "expressive" benefits, see generally Anderson & Pildes, supra note 410. But see
Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
1363 (2000) (arguing that expressive theories of law are not persuasive conceptually). I
discuss this further in exploring the benefits of standards over rules in supra Part V.
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proxy for social welfare. Directly redistributing the thing that society
wishes to redistribute may be less costly than using income redistribu-
tion to achieve the same aim. Society may have to redistribute a large
sum of income to underserved borrowers to induce the credit markets
to leave them as well-off as they are with current regulations and sub-
sidies. Moreover, it would be hard to convey the same "expressive"
effect regarding inclusion in the American dream through income
redistribution if some aspect of the difficulty these households have in
accessing credit markets is not solely due to their income. For
example, if racial discrimination, market failures, lack of wealth, poor
credit history, or neighborhood racial or income characteristics are
factors, then income redistribution alone would likely be inadequate
to address them.
The broader point is that CRA is not justified primarily by redis-
tributive goals, but by the need to address market failures and dis-
crimination. It would be highly inefficient to attempt to redress these
market failures by increasing the incomes of millions of individuals,
regardless of whether they attempt to access the home mortgage
market and regardless of whether they would experience barriers to
credit from market failures or racial discrimination.5 99
Critics of CRA often point to alternative means of effectuating
CRA's goals without adequately addressing whether these alterna-
tives would, in theory and in fact, perform better. Yet, all five policy
approaches to overcoming market failures and discrimination, as well
as policies to redistribute income, involve tradeoffs. None of them is
clearly superior to the tradeoffs involved in CRA. Given the political,
economic, and practical constraints of policymaking, and the imper-
fect nature of highly regulated and subsidized credit markets, CRA is
reasonable policy and should not be eliminated in favor of these other
policy approaches.
CONCLUSION
The Community Reinvestment Act has been widely criticized by
leading scholars. Critics have contended that CRA lacks any theoret-
ical grounding, both because, in their view, competitive credit markets
render alleged market failures and discrimination illusory, and
because in their judgment CRA is an ill-considered policy response to
market failures or discrimination even if they did exist. They have
alleged that the costs of CRA are considerable in lost profits, high
599 But see Calomiris et al., supra note 21, at 645-46 (arguing that income transfers
would redress moral hazard by increasing ability of households to make larger downpay-
ments that would demonstrate "attachment" to their homes).
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risk, and regulatory burden. They have contended that CRA impedes
efficiency in the financial system and burdens banks and thrifts and
not other market participants. Critics have contended that the stan-
dard used under CRA is vague, empowering rent-seeking by commu-
nity groups and regulators alike, and should be abandoned, or at the
very least replaced with safe harbors or clear rules. Others have
pointed to alternative strategies to achieve CRA's aims, such as dis-
closure, fair lending enforcement, subsidies, and the tax and transfer
system. In their view, CRA should be abandoned.
This Article takes aim at these criticisms on theoretical, empir-
ical, and comparative grounds. As a theoretical matter, I have
explained how market failures, discrimination, and the combined
force of these problems lay a solid theoretical foundation for the Act.
Market failures in low-income communities stem from a range of
sources. I have shown how information externalities can produce
credit constraints that affect creditworthy borrowers in "thin" mar-
kets. Relying on Stiglitz and Weiss, I have also explained why the
problem of credit rationing, which derives from information asymme-
tries between lenders and borrowers that give rise to adverse selection
and moral hazard, is more acute for low-income households, who have
a greater difficulty than other households in demonstrating their
creditworthiness and avoiding the credit-rationing trap given their low
incomes and low wealth. I have also shown how these informational
failures can lead to a collective action problem in which creditors
delay entry into low-income markets. Neighborhood externalities
exacerbate these barriers, as do agency problems in financial institu-
tions and in the market more broadly. Low-income markets can
become stuck, with low volume and liquidity blocking creation of a
complete market.
The Article has demonstrated that CRA constitutes a reasonable
policy response to these market failures. CRA helps to overcome
information externalities, for example, by inducing lenders to increase
their activity in low-income communities, helping to build volume and
liquidity in low-income markets. CRA helps mitigate collective action
problems by providing an effective means for banks to commit to
increased lending and coordination mechanisms that decrease infor-
mation costs and increase market thickness. CRA also provides
incentives for banks and thrifts to reform corporate structures to over-
come agency problems, and CRA can be part of an overall strategy to
reverse negative neighborhood externalities from low levels of home-
ownership and investment.
The Article also explored racial discrimination. As a theoretical
matter, I described how credit rationing models explain the possibility
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for discrimination based on racial animus to persist even in reasonably
competitive markets, and why statistical discrimination is even more
immune to competitive pressures. I explored the empirical evidence
that indicates that discrimination likely persists in credit markets,
although such evidence is not incontrovertible. I also described the
problem of price discrimination, particularly in fees paid to mortgage
brokers. The market failures and discrimination that I describe find
more acute manifestations in the subprime market, through which
low-income and minority households often borrow, particularly for
refinancing. I analyzed how CRA could play an important role along-
side the Equal Credit Opportunity Act in helping to redress problems
of racial discrimination, and could, but has not yet, played a key role
in ending abuses in the subprime sector by fully overcoming market
failures that stymie bank and thrift entry. Further competition from
banks and thrifts in the subprime sector would likely diminish oppor-
tunities for abuse.
The Article marshaled considerable empirical evidence that CRA
is helping to overcome market failures and reduce discrimination in
significant ways and at relatively low cost. Home mortgage and other
credit expanded dramatically during the 1990s for low-income and
minority households. I evaluated a series of empirical studies, some of
which I directed, that controlled for a wide range of factors, and found
statistically significant evidence that CRA is providing real, economi-
cally meaningful benefits to low- and moderate-income and minority
households. For example, one study found that the effect of CRA on
home mortgage lending was equivalent to a 1.3 percentage point drop
in unemployment over the time period studied.
The Article also analyzed extensive evidence about the costs of
CRA and argued that the relatively low costs of CRA are more con-
sistent with the theory I have advanced that CRA is helping to over-
come market failures and discrimination, than with the theories of
CRA's critics. The Article showed that these costs were seriously
overstated by CRA's critics, in part because they dismissed the signifi-
cance of market failures and discrimination and the role that CRA
could play in overcoming them. CRA lending is reasonably profitable
and not overly risky. CRA does not appear to be a drag on the effi-
ciency of banks and thrifts or the financial sector as a whole. The
rampant rent-seeking feared by critics finds little support in the evi-
dence, and compliance costs have also been significantly overstated.
Although the benefits and costs of CRA as we have them are not,
strictly speaking, summable, even a rough sense of the costs and bene-
fits of the regulation suggests that it is, on net, socially beneficial, and
consistent with the underlying theories justifying CRA. My conclu-
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sions have been based on a wide range of empirical studies, but I rec-
ognize that further empirical research will be warranted as credit
markets continue to evolve.
Turning to the form of the legal directive of CRA, I argued that
CRA more closely approximates a standard, rather than a rule. Con-
trary to the views of CRA's critics, I contended that there are signifi-
cant benefits to this approach. Employing a standard is likely
somewhat less costly than a rule ex ante, even given the extensive
notice and comment process employed in the 1995 revisions to the
regulation. More importantly, and contrary to the general literature
on rules and standards, the CRA standard appears superior to a
detailed rule, even ex post. The CRA standard provides the flexibility
needed to assess banks based on local context and business strategy
rather than a one-size-fits-all national rule. Permitting the meaning of
the standard to vary according to local context and to change over
time as the market evolves increases the likelihood that CRA will
remain both relevant and efficient. Those who favor rules over stan-
dards ex post highlight the transaction costs associated with standards
but fail to take appropriate account of the substantive benefits of flex-
ible standards. If the need for flexibility is strong enough, and the
numbers of transactions not too high, these substantive benefits may
swamp transaction costs. Furthermore, I explained why the current
standards approach is preferable both to tradeable obligations and to
safe harbors that rely on a numerical target or similar rules because
the positive incentives those approaches sought to harness can be cat-
alyzed under CRA's standard without the inefficiencies that inflexible
targets would create.
In addition, I argued that the rules and standards debate is
missing an important point: Employing a standard, coupled with an
iterative process of public engagement on its implementation,
enhances both the accuracy of the evaluation and the legitimacy of the
regulatory response. Regulators, the banks, and the public are
engaged in interpreting the meaning of the CRA standard during
examinations as well as merger reviews. A rule would provide far less
room for meaningful public engagement. The iterative process of
public participation in the shaping of a legal norm, far beyond the
normal process of public input into notice and comment rulemaking,
could be employed in other areas of the law where regulators enjoy
significant discretion and concerns about regulatory accountability are
heightened. This level of ongoing civic engagement furthers regula-
tory accountability and democratic legitimacy, and thus ought to be
counted among CRA's benefits. Moreover, CRA's standard conveys
expressive benefits by articulating a norm of inclusion and setting out
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a structure for an ongoing dialogue among the public, banks, and reg-
ulators about the meaning of that norm. These expressive benefits
ought to be weighed alongside the transaction costs of public
involvement.
Critics have often argued without serious analysis that alterna-
tives to CRA are preferable. In order to place CRA in the context of
other alternative institutional arrangements, the Article considered
the policy tradeoffs implicit in CRA with other approaches to market
failures and discrimination. I compared CRA to four other types of
credit market regulation-fair lending laws, disclosure, product regu-
lation, and subsidy-as well as to the tax and transfer system. Con-
trary to critics' claims, I argued that the presence of these alternatives
is not a sound ground for elimination of CRA. Each of these alterna-
tives involves tradeoffs, as to both theoretical foundations and prac-
tical results, as does CRA, which makes it hard to argue as a matter of
either theory or practice that eliminating CRA would be preferable.
Viewing CRA in the context of these other real-world or plausible
alternatives reinforces the essential argument of the Article that CRA
is a reasonable policy response to market failures and discrimination,
and that abandoning CRA would be imprudent.
More broadly, it is my hope that the Article has contributed, at
least by way of example, to a non-utopian form of legal analysis that
takes seriously the economic, institutional, and political constraints
under which regulatory policy is made. I have shown that CRA is
justified in theory, that the empirical evidence is more consistent with
these theoretical justifications than with the views of CRA's critics,
and that comparative analysis supports my contention that CRA
effectively responds to market failures and discrimination. A number
of different structures could plausibly be employed to overcome
market failures and discrimination in credit markets. I have not
sought to defend the Community Reinvestment Act as the "ideal"
form of policy. I have made what I hope is a persuasive case that it is
a reasonable one. In my experience, an assessment of whether a
policy is reasonable or not is more useful, and more honest, than an
evaluation of whether it is ideal. In that regard, the case for CRA is
strong.
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